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It goes without saying that I do not deny--unless I am a 
fool--that many actions called immoral ought to be avoided 
and resisted, or that many called moral ought to be done and 
encouraged--but I think the one should be encouraged and the 
other avoided for other reasons than hitherto 
Nietzsche, Daybreak 
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CHAPTER ONE 
NIETZSCHE'S HAMMER: REVALUATION, RECURRENCE, AND KANT 
Introduction 
It might at first appear quixotic to attempt to locate 
a positive moral doctrine in Nietzsche's philosophy. No 
philosopher before Nietzsche, and perhaps none since, has 
given his "antimoral propensity" such unbridled expression. 1 
It is specifically in opposition to morality, and the moral 
interpretation of existence, that Nietzsche develops his 
conception of an "artists' metaphysics" in The Birth of 
Tragedy. 2 In this work Nietzsche rejects the idea that 
morality is humanity's "truly metaphysical activity."3 It 
is only as an aesthetic phenomenon, Nietzsche contends, and 
not as a moral phenomenon, that the existence of the world 
is justified. 4 In The Gay Science and Thus Spoke 
1Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, in Basic 
Writings of Nietzsche, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: The 
Modern Library, 1968), "Attempt at a Self-Criticism," no. 5, 
23. 
2Ibid., 24: "It was against morality that my 
instinct turned with this questionable book, long ago; it 
was an instinct that aligned itself with life and that 
discovered for itself a fundamentally opposite doctrine and 
valuation of life--purely artistic and anti-Christian." 
3Ibid., 22. 
4Ibid.: " . the existence of the world is 
justified only as an aesthetic phenomenon." 
Zarathustra, Nietzsche proclaims the death of God, and 
thereby removes the metaphysical foundation upon which 
morality, especially Christian morality, rests. 5 In later 
works, such as On the Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche 
attempts to divest morality of any remaining vestige of 
2 
metaphysical significance by tracing the moral consciousness 
to the internalization of the instinct of cruelty. 6 In 
Beyond Good and Evil Nietzsche makes his hostility toward 
morality absolutely unambiguous: "We sail right over 
morality," he writes, 
we crush, we destroy perhaps the remains of our 
own morality by daring to make our voyage there--
but what matter are we! 7 
Passages such as this give an indication of the difficulties 
faced by anyone who would attempt to locate a positive 
morality in Nietzsche's writings. 
It is undeniable that Nietzsche is opposed to morality, 
as traditionally conceived. But what is implied by the 
phrase "traditionally conceived"? From Nietzsche's 
perspective, traditionally conceived morality refers 
primarily to Plato, whose "invention" of "the pure spirit 
5The Gay Science, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1974), no. 108, 167. See also Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra, in The Portable Nietzsche, trans. Walter 
Kaufmann (New York: Viking Press, 1968), "Zarathustra's 
Prologue," no. 2, 124. 
60n the Genealogy of Morals, in Basic Writings, 
second essay, 493-532. 
7Beyond Good and Evil, in Basic Writings, no. 23, 
221. 
3 
and the good as such" Nietzsche calls "the worst, most 
durable, and most dangerous of all errors so far. 118 
Traditionally conceived morality also includes Christianity, 
i.e., "Platonism for 'the people. 1119 According to 
Nietzsche, the world view of Christian morality offers an 
interpretation of existence that is both antithetical to art 
and hostile to life: 
Christianity was from the beginning, essentially 
and fundamentally, life's nausea and disgust with 
life, merely concealed behind, masked by, dressed 
up as, faith in 'another' or 'better' life. 10 
Nietzsche's opposition to traditionally conceived morality 
is, in other words, a rejection of any type of idealistic 
doctrine that locates the value of the world outside of the 
world itself. It is also a rejection of traditionally 
conceived morality's absolute value standards and universal 
moral norms, which Nietzsche takes to be at odds with the 
finite, limited, and perspectival nature of human existence. 
Nietzsche's opposition to traditionally conceived 
morality cannot, however, be restricted to a rejection of 
Platonism and Christianity. Nietzsche also rejects 
Schopenhauer's morality of pity as a life-denying "new 
Buddhism." 11 Nietzsche maintains that Schopenhauer's 
8Ibid., preface, 193. 
1
°'rhe Birth of Tragedy, "Attempt at a Self-
Criticism," no. 5, 23. 
110n the Genealogy of Morals, preface no. 5, 455. 
glorification of pity, self-abnegation, and self-sacrifice 
is an example of "the will turning against life, the tender 
and sorrowful signs of the ultimate illness ..•. 1112 
4 
Schopenhauer's morality of pity and metaphysical doctrine of 
the will represent a self-devaluation and self-denial of the 
will that is nihilistic and ultimately self-destructive. 13 
The ideas underlying Nietzsche's rejection of the 
absolute metaphysical values of Platonism and Christianity 
and of Schopenhauer's morality of pity combine in his 
rejection of Kant's moral philosophy. On the one hand, 
Nietzsche maintains that Kant's fundamental moral principle, 
the categorical imperative, which holds that a will can only 
be considered good if it acts for the sake of duty is, like 
Schopenhauer's morality of pity, a destructive self-denial 
of the will. 14 on the other hand, by insisting on the moral 
necessity of God, freedom, and the immortality of the soul, 
Kantian morality represents a variation on the metaphysical 
12Ibid. : "What was especially at stake was the value 
of the 'unegoistic,' the instincts of pity, self-abnegation, 
self-sacrifice, which Schopenhauer had gilded, deified, and 
projected into a beyond for so long that at last they became 
for him 'value-in-itself,' on the basis of which he said No 
to life and to himself." 
13Ibid. : "It was precisely here that I saw the great 
danger to mankind, its sublimest enticement and seduction--
but to what? to nothingness?" 
~The Antichrist, in The Portable Nietzsche, no. 11, 
577: "How could one fail to feel how Kant's categorical 
imperative endangered life itself!" 
themes of traditionally conceived morality. 15 
When Nietzsche writes that art and not morality is 
humanity's genuine metaphysical activity he places himself 
in stark opposition to Kant. For Kant, morality is the 
genuine metaphysical activity of human beings. Kant's 
critique of Pure Reason limits pure speculative reason to 
the domain of possible sense experience. Any pretension of 
speculative reason to extend its reach beyond the bounds of 
sense experience is rejected as dogmatic and unjustified. 
The objects of metaphysical reasoning, i.e., God, freedom, 
and the immortality of the soul, are thinkable only through 
5 
the practical application of reason. Morality is the "ratio 
cognoscendi" of freedom. 16 The moral life is completed by 
the concept of the highest good, i.e., happiness in 
proportion to virtue, which, on Kant's view, requires the 
postulation of God and the immortality of the soul. 
Speculative reason is not extended in this postulation of 
God and immortality. That is, we cannot make any knowledge 
claims about them, but their possibility cannot be ruled 
out, and in fact is required by morality, according to Kant. 
Therefore, it is in morality, rather than in theoretical 
speculation, that we find humanity's genuine metaphysical 
uibid., no. 10, 577: "Kant's success is merely a 
theologians' success: like Luther, like Leibniz, Kant was 
one more clog for German honesty, which was none too steady 
in the first place." 
16Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, trans. 
Lewis White Beck (New York: Macmillan, 1989), preface, 4. 
6 
activity, on Kant's view. 
Nietzsche is directly opposed to Kant's view that 
morality is humanity's genuine metaphysical activity. But 
when we look closer at Nietzsche's texts, and the substance 
of his philosophy, it becomes necessary to qualify his 
opposition to Kant. This is important for my purposes 
because I believe that it is in Nietzsche's critical 
relationship to Kant, specifically Kantian morality, that we 
will find the basis of Nietzsche's positive conception of 
morality. 
Like Kant, Nietzsche places special emphasis on the 
role of autonomy, i.e., the will's self-legislation, as the 
criterion of authentic human moral agency. For Kant, only a 
will that is autonomous, i.e., one that freely and 
rationally legislates for itself, without being determined 
by external, material considerations, has genuine moral 
worth. For Nietzsche, similarly, only a will that actively 
creates values for itself expresses the nobility of soul 
characteristic of "master morality. 1117 
On the basis of this mutual emphasis on autonomy some 
argue that Nietzsche's conception of autonomy is a 
radicalization of Kant's conception of autonomy. Ludwig 
Nagl, for example, states that "[one] could pointedly say 
17Beyond Good and Evil, no. 260, 395: "The noble type 
of man experiences itself as determining values; it does not 
need approval; it judges, 'what is harmful to me is harmful 
in itself'; it knows itself to be that which first accords 
honor to things; it is value-creating." 
7 
that the center of Nietzsche's 'immoralism' is an 
(excessively radicalized) version of Kant's 'autonomy,' 
situated in an artistically redesigned Leibnizian world. 
1118 such statements are misleading, however, if no account 
is given of Nietzsche's persistent and systematic opposition 
to Kantian morality. 19 This ambiguity in Nietzsche's 
relationship to Kant generates the following question: Can 
we understand both Nietzsche's general rejection of Kant's 
moral philosophy and the similarities of their conceptions 
of autonomy in terms of something more fundamental than a 
simple "radicalization"? 
statement of Purpose and Thesis 
In this study I will argue that Nietzsche's idea of the 
eternal recurrence, like Kant's categorical imperative, 
serves as a self-given directive principle of autonomous 
human action. In their discussions of Nietzsche's idea of 
the eternal recurrence, many commentators have attempted to 
separate it into theoretical and practical aspects. Some 
treat the eternal recurrence as a cosmological theory that 
holds that all events repeat in identical and unending 
18Ludwig Nagl, "The Enlightenment--A Stranded 
Project? Habermas on Nietzsche as a 'Turning Point' to 
Postmodernity," History of European Ideas 11 (1989): 748. 
190n the Genealogy of Morals, preface no. 3, 453. 
This opposition is clearly expressed in Nietzsche's 
description of his genealogical inquiry into the origin of 
moral values as the command of an "anti-Kantian, enigmatic 
'categorical imperative' .... 11 
8 
cycles. I refer to this interpretation (in all its forms) 
as the "theoretical" interpretation of the eternal 
recurrence because it contends that Nietzsche is attempting 
to demonstrate that the eternal recurrence is a true or 
factual account of reality. 
On the other hand, the eternal recurrence is also often 
treated as an ethical prescription that holds that we ought 
to live our lives as if all events repeated in an unending 
cycle, whether or not this is in fact the case. I refer to 
this as the "practical" interpretation of the eternal 
recurrence because of its emphasis on the role the eternal 
recurrence can play as a self-given directive principle of 
action. The practical interpretation of the eternal 
recurrence gives priority to the prescriptive rather than 
the descriptive value of the eternal recurrence. 
Those who advocate the practical interpretation of the 
eternal recurrence often suggest that there is a parallel 
between it and the categorical imperative. As I briefly 
mentioned briefly, the categorical imperative is Kant's 
supreme moral principle. It tests the moral worth of 
subjective principles of action (maxims) by asking whether 
we can will our maxims to be universal laws: 
So act that the maxim of your will could always hold at 
the same time as a principle establishing universal 
law. 20 
Like the categorical imperative, the eternal recurrence 
20critigue of Practical Reason, 30. 
9 
appears to function as a practical imperative: Whatever you 
do, do it in such a way that you can will its eternal 
recurrence. In this sense, the eternal recurrence can be 
construed as an imperative of authenticity. 21 Just as the 
categorical imperative serves as a test determining moral 
worth, the eternal recurrence tests our ability to 
authentically affirm our actions by asking us to imagine 
their infinite repetition. 
Nietzsche seems to encourage a Kantian interpretation 
of the eternal recurrence by occasionally formulating it in 
the language of Kant's categorical imperative. For example, 
in a note from 1881, Nietzsche writes: 
Meine Lehre sagt: so leben, dass du wtinschen musst, 
wieder zu leben ist die Aufgabe--du wirst es 
jedenfalls ! 22 
But it is important not to read too much into Nietzsche's 
quasi-Kantian formulation of the eternal recurrence. To do 
so would be to overlook a fundamental antithesis in 
Nietzsche's and Kant's general moral frameworks. We can 
begin to understand this antithesis when we recognize 
Nietzsche's opposition to what he refers to as "antinatural" 
ncf. Bernd Magnus, Nietzsche's Existential 
Imperative (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978), 
passim. 
22Nietzsche, Nachqelassene Fragmente 1880-1882, 
Kritische Studienausgabe, ed. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino 
Montinari (Mtinchen: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1988), 
vol. 9, no. 11(163], 505. Subsequent references to this 
edition of Nietzsche's collected works will be abbreviated 
"KSA," and will be followed by volume, aphorism, and page 
numbers. 
10 
morality. Roughly speaking, antinaturalism is comprised of 
three basic features. First, antinaturalism is found in the 
unconditional will to truth as the highest value. Second, 
antinaturalism is found in the faith in opposite values that 
places the source of the highest values outside of the 
empirical world of nature and history in a transcendent 
"true world." Finally, antinaturalism is found in the 
presumption of moral equality which grounds all conceptions 
of universal moral norms. I will argue that the essence of 
an antinatural morality is that it gives priority to acts of 
value judgment over acts of value legislation. In other 
words, following Nietzsche, we could say that antinatural 
morality emphasizes a reactive, rather than an active, mode 
of value positing. 
For Nietzsche, Kant's moral philosophy represents the 
epitome of antinaturalism. The unconditional will to truth 
is reflected in Kant's effort to establish the foundations 
of morality on a priori grounds. The faith in opposite 
values is found in Kant's denial of knowledge "in order to 
make room for faith."n Finally, Kant's conception of 
autonomy, as formulated in the categorical imperative, is 
antinatural, according to Nietzsche, because it identifies 
autonomy of the will with the universalizability of the 
nKant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp 
Smith {New York: St. Martin's, 1965), B xxx: "I have_ 
therefore found it necessary to deny knowledge, in order to 
make room for faith." 
11 
will's subjective principles of action. Universalizability 
of principles presupposes moral equality. On Nietzsche's 
view, however, universalizability is harmful to human beings 
if, as he maintains, they are not in fact morally equal.~ 
Nietzsche contends that the presumption of moral equality, 
and, consequently, the idea of universal moral norms, 
represent a secret will to revenge and judgment on the part 
of those who are incapable of creating values. 25 Thus, 
Nietzsche holds that despite Kant's emphasis on autonomy and 
self-legislation, his emphasis on the universalizability of 
maxims as the content of autonomy places him in a moral 
framework in which judgment is tacitly and inadvertently 
given priority over legislation. In other words, on 
Nietzsche's view, Kant's account of autonomy implicitly 
undermines itself. 
The primary thesis that I argue for in this study is 
that the eternal recurrence represents Nietzsche's attempt 
to ground a conception of autonomy on a naturalistic basis. 
Nietzsche's eternal recurrence offers a reconceptualization 
of human autonomy in light of the experience of modern 
physics. The eternal recurrence represents the lesson of 
~Thus Spoke Zarathustra, "On the Tarantulas," 213: 
"I do not wish to be mixed up and confused with these 
preachers of equality. For, to me justice speaks thus: 'Men 
are not equal.' Nor shall they become equal! What would my 
love of the overman be if I spoke otherwise?" 
25Ibid. , 212: "Out of every one of their compl~ints 
sounds revenge; in their praise is always a sting, and to be 
a judge seems bliss to them." 
12 
modern physics that we can find no independent laws within 
nature and that, consequently, we must give ourselves laws 
in the face of the experience of total, recurring 
meaninglessness, if we want to have coherently organized and 
meaningful existence. 26 With its emphasis on self-
legislation over moral judgment, Nietzsche's conception of 
autonomy remains Kantian, in a broad sense, but Nietzsche 
rejects both the Kantian model of the moral subject and 
Kant's moral metaphysics as antinatural. Nietzsche creates 
a norm of autonomy in which value legislation is given 
priority over value judgment without the need of postulating 
a fixed, Cartesian self or a transcendent metaphysical 
realm. Another way of putting the same point, perhaps more 
sharply, would be to say that, on the issue of autonomy, 
Nietzsche is more consistently Kantian than Kant. 
In support of my main thesis I will argue for the 
secondary thesis that the 'foundation' of Nietzsche's 
naturalism is located in the idea of the will to power. I 
read the will to power not as a metaphysical principle but 
rather as a methodological principle of interpretation. As 
an interpretive principle, the will to power provides the 
means to overcome the three basic antinatural positions that 
Nietzsche associates with traditionally conceived morality. 
It provides a non-dualistic conceptual framework that 
26Hans Seigfried, 11 Autonomy and Quantum Physics, 11 
Philosophy of Science 57 (1990): 623-624. 
13 
opposes the unconditional will to truth and eliminates the 
dualism of the faith in opposite values. At the same time, 
it provides the means to challenge the Kantian conception of 
universal moral norms by undermining the presumption of 
moral equality. 
Some Interpretive Considerations 
In this section I discuss the interpretive strategy 
that will govern my study. I will try to do this briefly, 
but hopefully not so briefly as to appear dogmatic. Two 
pairs of issues must be discussed. First, there is the 
issue of the relative priority I will give to Nietzsche's 
published texts over his posthumous writings, known as the 
Nachgelassene Fragmente. Second, there is the issue of 
whether I will take a thematic or an historical approach to 
Nietzsche's texts. 
Regarding the first issue, I can state my position 
briefly. Generally speaking, I think that an author's 
published texts should be given priority over texts that, 
for whatever reason, the author chose not to publish. 
Published texts represent the author's ideas as he or she 
chose to represent them to the world. Therefore, I give 
precedence to Nietzsche's published works over the writings 
contained in the Nachgelassene Fragmente. In the event of a 
conflict between these two sources, I will give the 
published works priority. The only exception to this. 
general interpretive principle involves the eternal 
14 
recurrence. Because of the relative paucity of material on 
the eternal recurrence in Nietzsche's published texts, I 
have employed both published texts and writings from the 
Nachgelassene Fragmente in my reconstruction of the eternal 
recurrence. 
On the second issue, my position is perhaps more 
controversial. I do not subscribe to the view that 
Nietzsche's philosophy must be understood in terms of 
successive periods of development. I think that such 
periodization is arbitrary and artificial, and that it has 
very little explanatory power. I believe that Nietzsche's 
philosophy is more unified and consistent than many 
interpreters recognize. Therefore, I believe that an 
interpretation that emphasizes particular themes is the 
appropriate manner to approach Nietzsche's texts, rather 
than one that focuses on the chronological development of 
these themes. 
A thematic approach to Nietzsche's texts is not without 
its problems, however. It could be objected that a thematic 
approach is problematic because it tends to artificially 
systematize Nietzsche's thought.n This becomes 
questionable in light of Nietzsche's aphoristic style and 
his opposition to systematic philosophy. Therefore, it 
ncf. Eric Blondel, Nietzsche's Style of Affirmation: 
The Metaphors of Genealogy," in Nietzsche as Affirmative 
Thinker, ed. Yirmiyahu Yovel (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 
1986), 134. 
15 
might appear that my interpretation of Nietzsche is somehow 
"un-Nietzschean." 
The search for a suitable framework in which to pursue 
my project has led me to Nietzsche's hammer metaphor. The 
hammer metaphor unifies many of the diverse threads of 
Nietzsche's philosophy. I believe that this metaphor, 
suitably interpreted, can also provide a unifying strategy 
for my study. In order to make this clear, I will conclude 
this introductory chapter with a brief examination of this 
metaphor. 
Nietzsche's Hammer Metaphor 
There is perhaps no more appropriate symbol of the 
substance and spirit of Nietzsche's philosophy than the 
hammer. During the final years of Nietzsche's philosophical 
activity the image of a hammer is found scattered throughout 
his unpublished notes and it is a ubiquitous presence in 
Twilight of the Idols, where it appears in the notorious 
subtitle, How One Philosophizes With A Hammer. In the 
pref ace of this work Nietzsche downplays the eschatological 
overtones of the title by characterizing the hammer as the 
instrument of the philosophical physician, who diagnoses the 
emptiness of traditional values, ideals, and institutions: 
... regarding the sounding out of idols, this time 
they are not just idols of the age, but eternal idols, 
which are here touched with a hammer as with a tuning 
fork: there are altogether no older, no more convinced, 
16 
no more puffed-up idols--and none more hollow. 28 
In the course of his series of lectures on Nietzsche's 
philosophy, Heidegger has attempted to discourage the 
destructive reading of the hammer metaphor. Heidegger 
maintains that Nietzsche's intent is not "to go in swinging, 
wrecking everything. 1129 Instead, he sees the hammer as 
emblematic of the redemptive character of Nietzsche's 
thought which "wants to give things weight and importance 
again." 30 
Heidegger's claim is supported by texts in which 
Nietzsche discusses purely destructive philosophical 
criticism. Given Nietzsche's predilection for the rhetoric 
of war and images that appear to celebrate destruction, it 
is understandable that his claim to philosophize with a 
hammer most naturally calls to mind destructive 
philosophical criticism. This manner of interpreting the 
hammer metaphor makes it particularly amenable to 
deconstructive strategies of interpretation. 31 But upon 
28Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols or, How One 
Philosophizes With a Hammer, in The Portable Nietzsche, 
preface, 466. Kaufmann's translation deviates from 
Nietzsche's subtitle, which reads "Wie man mit dem Hammer 
philosophirt." 
29Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche, trans. David Farrell 
Krell (San Francisco: Harper, 1991), vol. 1, 66. 
30Ibid. 
31See, for example, Bernd Magnus, "The Deification of 
the Commonplace: Twilight of the Idols," in Reading 
Nietzsche, ed. Robert c. Solomon and Kathleen Higgins 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 156. Magnus 
17 
examination we discover that Nietzsche expresses disdain for 
mere destruction that lacks an overriding creative 
component. The mutual implication of destruction and 
creation in the philosophical sense can be said to be one of 
Nietzsche's most fundamental principles: 
If a temple is to be erected a temple must be 
destroyed: that is the law--let anyone who can show me 
a case in which it is not fulfilled! 32 
The interaction between destruction and creation is 
reflected in the manner in which the genuine philosopher 
integrates the critical task of philosophical labor with 
philosophical creativity. Philosophical labor involves 
gathering and codifying "former positings of values, 
creations of value which have become dominant and are for a 
time called 'truths'."" According to Nietzsche, this is 
the task that Kant performs with distinction. Kant performs 
the "wonderful" preliminary work of consolidating and 
overcoming the past, but, according to Nietzsche, he fails 
to progress adequately beyond critique. Thus, even Kant, 
"the great Chinese of K6nigsberg," is regarded by Nietzsche 
remarks that Nietzsche applies his hammer to idols in a 
manner that "destroys them in the sense of deconstructing 
them .•.. " See also Jacques Derrida, "Tympan," in Margins 
of Philosophy, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1982), xii-xv. 
320n the Genealogy of Morals, second essay, no. 24, 
531. See also The Gay Science, no. 58, 122. "We can 
destroy only as creators." 
33Beyond Good and Evil, no. 211, 326. 
as "merely a great critic.--1134 critique is an instrument 
of genuine philosophers who are also creators and 
legislators of values: "they say, thus it shall be! 1135 
18 
In what manner does philosophical labor complement the 
creative activity of genuine philosophers? We can approach 
this question by returning to Nietzsche's use of the hammer 
metaphor in the preface of Twilight of the Idols. In this 
context, Nietzsche draws an analogy between the 
philosopher's hammer and a tuning fork. Just as a tuning 
fork is used to test the pitch of a note as a means of 
tuning a musical instrument, Nietzsche employs critique to 
sound out idols, i.e., traditional values, norms, and 
institutions, to see if they are hollow. 
For once to pose questions here with a hammer, and, 
perhaps, to hear as a reply that famous hollow sound. . 
36 
Nietzsche does not dogmatically presume the hollowness of 
traditional idols, as is indicated by his use of the word 
"perhaps." Rather, the hammer functions here as a symbol of 
the diagnostic, experimental quality of Nietzsche's 
philosophy, the intent of which is not necessarily to 
destroy values but to assess "the value of these values 
themselves. 1137 It reveals an attitude of reflective, 
~Ibid., no. 210, 325. 
"Ibid., no. 211, 326. 
36Twilight of the Idols, preface, 465. 
370n the Genealogy of Morals, preface no. 6, 456. 
19 
critical detachment regarding traditional values and 
Nietzsche's openness to new and different ways of conceiving 
of values. 
This notion of rigorous testing by comparison describes 
the work of consolidation carried out by the philosophical 
laborer and accords well with the image of the hammer as a 
tuning fork that critically sounds out idols. But the 
experimental testing of values to determine whether or not 
they have retained any value is not an end in itself. 
Extending Nietzsche's musical analogy we could say that just 
as tuning an instrument with a tuning fork is preliminary to 
actually playing the instrument, the sounding out of idols 
points beyond itself to a creative act. 
Nietzsche makes this clear by extending the hammer 
metaphor to incorporate the activities of the genuine 
philosopher. Just as genuine philosophers must employ the 
hammer as a laborer to critically test idols, they must also 
use the hammer as a means to create new idols, or new 
ideals: 
With a creative hand they reach for the future, and all 
that is and has been becomes a means for them, an 
instrument, a hammer. Their 'knowing' is creating, 
their creating is a legislation, their will to truth 
is--will to power. 38 
The hammer is a doubly appropriate symbol for the creative 
task of the genuine philosopher. On the one hand, it 
represents the hardness of those who dare to create a new 
~Beyond Good and Evil, no. 211, 326. 
interpretation of existence. 39 On the other hand, it 
represents the tool of the sculptor, who uses a hammer to 
produce works of art from shapeless stone. In this case, 
the stone represents 'man,' "the as yet undetermined 
animal. 1140 The work of art represents the overman, i.e. , 
Nietzsche's new ideal for humanity: 
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But my fervent will to create impels me ever again 
toward man; thus is the hammer impelled toward the 
stone. o men, in the stone there sleeps an image, the 
image of my images. Alas, that it must sleep in the 
hardest, the ugliest stone! Now my hammer rages 
cruelly against its prison. Pieces of rock rain from 
the stone: what is that to me? I want to perfect it; 
for a shadow came to me--the stillest and lightest of 
all things came to me. The beauty of the overman came 
to me as a shadow. o my brothers, what are the gods to 
me now?41 
The intrinsic relationship between critique and 
creation, a relationship that is mirrored in the 
relationship of philosophical labor and philosophical 
creativity, is expressed by the multiple meanings latent 
within the image of the hammer. On the one hand the hammer 
is thought of as a tuning hammer and symbolizes critique. 
On the other hand the hammer is thought of a sculptor's 
hammer and symbolizes the creative activity of the genuine 
philosopher. 
39Twilight of the Idols, "The Hammer Speaks," 563. 
"And if your hardness does not wish to flash and cut and cut 
through, how can you one day create with me? For all 
creators are hard." 
40Beyond Good and Evil, no. 62, 264. 
41Thus Spoke Zarathustra, "Upon the Blessed Isles," 
199-200. 
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The fact that Nietzsche uses a single image, the 
hammer, to metaphorically express both critique and creation 
does not indicate their diametrical opposition, but rather 
their deep interrelatedness. This deep interrelatedness is 
crucial to the concept of interpretation that is the basis 
of Nietzsche's hypothesis of the will to power. 42 
Interpretation unifies critique and creation in the sense 
that the creation of a new interpretation necessarily 
involves the transformation of an already existing 
interpretation. 
For Nietzsche, it is the possibility of alternative 
interpretations of existence that makes possible a 
revaluation of all values; it is the threat of nihilism that 
makes this revaluation necessary. Nietzsche maintains that 
the greater part of human history has been dominated by a 
single interpretation of existence, i.e, the interpretation 
associated with traditionally conceived morality. The 
distinguishing characteristic of this interpretation is an 
unshakable faith that it alone is the sole and exclusive 
possessor of truth. The spirit of truthfulness cultivated 
by traditionally conceived morality has been fruitful. It 
has civilized humanity and it has instilled within human 
beings a drive for knowledge, a will to truth. The will to 
truth, however, has also led to traditionally conceived 
42The will to power is discussed in the context of 
Nietzsche's naturalism in chapter two. 
morality's undoing, according to Nietzsche, because it has 
ruthlessly exposed the human, all too human basis of the 
supposedly transcendent grounds of existence. This is the 
dialectic of nihilism--that "the highest values devaluate 
themselves. " 43 It is potentially disastrous for humanity 
because the collapse of this interpretation of existence, 
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which was thought to be the only possible one, is mistakenly 
taken to imply the collapse of all interpretations.~ 
The revaluation of values, made necessary by the threat 
of nihilism, calls for the appearance of "spirits strong and 
original enough to provide the stimuli for opposite 
valuations .••. "tj The appearance of such spirits, 
genuine philosophers in the sense discussed above, cannot be 
taken for granted. The possibility of their appearance 
itself necessitates a revaluation of values, 
• • • under whose new pressure and hammer a conscience 
would be steeled, a heart turned to bronze, in order to 
endure the weight of such responsibility. . 46 
Among Nietzsche's innumerable sketches and plans for his 
ultimately abandoned magnum opus, The Will to Power, there 
is one that includes a section entitled "Der Hammer: Lehre 
0 The Will to Power, trans. Walter Kaufmann and R. J. 
Hollingdale (New York: Vintage, 1968), no. 2, 9. 
~Ibid., no. 55, 35. 
tjBeyond Good and Evil, no. 203, 307. 
46Ibid. 
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von der ewigen Wiederkunft. " 47 In The Gay Science, 
Nietzsche makes it clear that he believes that the eternal 
recurrence is the hardest idea to accept; it is the greatest 
weight, the idea that will "change you as you are or perhaps 
crush you. 1148 The eternal recurrence is the idea that 
will crush the pretensions of those who remain committed to 
truth in the received, traditional sense. It symbolizes the 
idea that the "in vain" of their search will be eternally 
repeated. But the eternal recurrence also offers the 
possibility of change. It implicitly contains the idea that 
we are responsible for our interpretations of existence and 
must constantly re-affirm these interpretations if they are 
to retain any value. Thus, within the eternal recurrence we 
find yet another expression of the critical and creative 
aspects of revaluation that are metaphorically expressed in 
the hammer image. 
Nietzsche's Hammer and Kant's Categorical Imperative 
Can the hammer metaphor be used to guide my study of 
Nietzsche's relationship to Kant? I think that it can. We 
have seen that the hammer metaphor functions as a symbol of 
the critical and creative activity that characterizes the 
activities of the genuine philosopher. We have also seen 
that Nietzsche implies that his relationship to Kant can be 
~KSA 13, no. 13[4], 215. 
~The Gay Science, no 341, 274. 
understood in terms of the relationship of a genuine 
philosopher to a philosophical laborer. This may be a 
questionable over-estimation on Nietzsche's part, but it 
does not exhaust the possibilities of the hammer as an 
interpretive guide. 
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In this study I will use the image of the hammer to 
provide the framework for my examination of the relationship 
of Nietzsche's and Kant's conceptions of autonomy and 
morality in general. The next two chapters focus primarily 
on the critical aspects of Nietzsche's relationship to Kant, 
while my last chapter focuses primarily on what I see as the 
creative aspects of this relationship as embodied in the 
eternal recurrence. 
Chapter two initiates my exploration of the critical 
aspect of Nietzsche's philosophy through an examination of 
his naturalistic conception of morality and its opposition 
to "antinatural" morality. I argue that the principle of 
Nietzsche's naturalism is found in the will to power. The 
will to power supplies an immanent principle of 
interpretation that allows Nietzsche to reject metaphysical 
dualism and moral views that rest on dualistic 
presuppositions, such as Kant's. The will to power also 
provides the means for a shift from a teleological 
conceptual framework to a more economical framework based on 
a single explanatory principle. In a practical context, the 
will to power represents an attempt to prioritize the 
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legislative act of interpretation over the act of moral 
judgment, causing a fundamental change in the way moral 
values are understood. The most important aspect of this 
change, I argue, is a rejection of moral equality and a 
corresponding rejection of universal moral norms. I 
maintain that this is the primary source of Nietzsche's 
opposition to Kant's identification of autonomy with the 
universalizability of maxims, as formalized in the 
categorical imperative. Although Kant offers a morality of 
self-legislation, Nietzsche contends that the antinatural 
presuppositions of Kant's position undermine the genuinely 
legislative content of his philosophy. 
Chapter three continues my exploration of the critical 
aspect of Nietzsche's philosophy through an examination of 
his attempt to undermine the foundations of Kant's "majestic 
moral structures." I argue that the basis of Nietzsche's 
critique lies in his opposition to Kant's adoption of the 
consciousness of the moral law as a fact of reason, rather 
than a fact of history. In short, Nietzsche provides a 
critique of Kantian moral rationalism from an empirico-
historical perspective. Nietzsche uses a genealogical 
examination of the moral consciousness to reveal its non-
rational origins. I discuss Nietzsche's assimilation of the 
categorical imperative into the antinatural framework of 
slave morality. I argue that this assimilation is somewhat 
problematic, given Kant's strong emphasis on autonomy, but 
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that Nietzsche's critique remains a justifiable criticism of 
the content of autonomy within the Kantian moral framework. 
Chapter four turns to the creative aspect of 
Nietzsche's relationship to Kant through an examination of 
the relationship of the eternal recurrence to the 
categorical imperative. I reject both the conventional 
theoretical and practical interpretations of the eternal 
recurrence and argue that the eternal recurrence represents 
Nietzsche's attempt to provide a positive response to 
antinaturalism through a reconceptualization of autonomy 
within the bounds of naturalism. My interpretation of the 
eternal recurrence focuses primarily on Nietzsche's 
assertion that the eternal recurrence is "the most 
scientific of all possible hypotheses."® I interpret this 
remark in three complementary senses, each of which 
corresponds to a different facet of antinaturalism. 
I am optimistic that the cumulative result of my 
examination will be a new manner of understanding not only 
the relationship between the eternal recurrence and the 
categorical imperative but, more importantly, a new manner 
of understanding the relationship between Nietzsche and 
Kant. It is this new way of understanding the relationship 
between Nietzsche and Kant that makes this dissertation a 
study in revaluation. 
49The Will to Power, no. 55, 36. 
CHAPTER TWO 
THE NATURALISTIC BASIS OF NIETZSCHE'S CRITIQUE OF KANT 
Introduction 
Throughout Nietzsche's writings there is a consistent 
rejection of all forms of moral norms and values that 
require a metaphysical foundation for their legitimacy. 
Nietzsche characterizes all forms of metaphysically based 
moral norms and values as "antinatural." Corresponding to 
this rejection of antinatural morality is a call for what 
Nietzsche refers to as the "naturalization" of morality. 1 
Naturalistic and antinaturalistic moralities are 
distinguished primarily by their differing estimations of 
the value of "life." A naturalistic morality, Nietzsche 
writes, "is dominated by an instinct of life. II An 
antinatural morality, on the other hand, 
that is, almost every morality which has so far been 
taught, revered, and preached--turns, conversely, 
against the instincts of life: it is condemnation of 
these instincts, now secret, now outspoken and 
impudent. 2 
Since antinaturalism is a feature of "almost every 
1The Will to Power, no. 462, 255: "In place of 
'moral values,' purely naturalistic values. Naturalization 
of morality." 
2Twilight of the Idols, "Morality as Anti-Nature," 
no. 4, 489-490. 
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morality" hitherto, it does not refer exclusively to a 
specific moral practice or moral philosophy. Instead, 
antinaturalism refers to a distinctive and recurring pattern 
of epistemological, metaphysical, and normative 
presuppositions. Antinaturalism is found in epistemology in 
the unconditional will to truth. The unconditional will to 
truth is the belief that truth, in the form of an objective 
and definitive account of reality in-itself, is the supreme 
human value. This will to truth is antinatural because it 
denies the interpretive, perspectival, creative, and 
'artistic' character of human reason. Nietzsche identifies 
the unconditional will to truth very closely with Platonism 
and Christian morality and suggests that it represents "'a 
will to negate life. . 1 n3 
The antinaturalism of metaphysics is a corollary of the 
unconditional will to truth. On the supposition that the 
will to truth could not originate out of the will to 
deception, a fictitious, transcendent realm is invented that 
can serve as the object of the will to truth. 4 The 
empirical worlds of nature and history are seen as mere 
appearances, merely preliminary steps towards the true, 
i.e., metaphysical, world. The creation of a "true world" 
is antinatural, according to Nietzsche, because it 
3The Birth of Tragedy, "Attempt at a Self-
Criticism," no. 5, 23. 
4Beyond Good and Evil, no. 2, 200. 
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implicitly negates or devalues "this world, our world."5 
Finally, antinaturalism includes the presupposition of 
moral equality that has dominated moral discussion and 
debate at least since the time of Hobbes. It is the 
presumption of moral equality that makes possible universal 
moral norms and values. Universal moral norms and values 
represent, on Nietzsche's view, a harmful denial of life if 
human beings are not morally equal. He holds that moral 
inequality is suggested by the fact that some people can 
create values while others cannot. If human beings are not 
morally equal, then universal moral norms and values will 
serve a repressive function, denying the full expression of 
life to those who can create new values. In On the 
Genealogy of Morals Nietzsche traces this repressive 
function to the ressentiment of those who are incapable of 
creating values. 
In this chapter I will argue that Nietzsche's 
naturalism is based upon the hypothesis of the will to 
power. I maintain that the will to power does not function 
as a metaphysical principle about reality per se. Rather, I 
argue that the will to power functions as a methodological 
principle of understanding or interpretation that makes 
possible a transition from a conceptual framework organized 
around superfluous metaphysical and teleological modes of 
explanation toward a more economical conceptual framework 
5The Gay Science, no. 344, 283. 
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organized around value of concepts for life. 6 
Within a moral context, I argue that the most important 
implication of Nietzsche's naturalism is that it shifts the 
emphasis of moral deliberation from value judgment to value 
legislation. A naturalistic moral framework stresses the 
active creation of values in accordance with self-given laws 
rather than the reactive application of laws which we have 
no hand in creating. In other words, a naturalistic 
conception of morality is synonymous with autonomy. On 
Nietzsche's view, a naturalistic moral framework would 
contribute to the development of psychologically healthier 
human beings, greater unity of cultural expression, and 
perhaps, eventually, a universal conception of morality that 
is not based on arbitrary metaphysical presuppositions, but 
rather on actual knowledge of the conditions of life. 7 
An examination of Nietzsche's naturalism is, so to 
speak, the natural place to begin my study of Nietzsche's 
critique and revaluation of Kantian morality because, for 
Nietzsche, Kant represents the epitome of antinaturalism. 8 
Therefore, if we can understand the opposition of 
naturalistic and antinaturalistic moralities, we will be in 
6KSA 12, no. 9(86] (61), 380. 
7Human, All Too Human, trans. R. J. Hollingdale 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), no. 25, 25. 
8The Antichrist, no. 11, 578: "The instinct which 
errs without fail, anti-nature as instinct, German decadence 
as philosophy--that is Kant!" 
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a better position to understand Nietzsche's opposition to 
Kantian morality, which will be treated in the next chapter. 
As will become clear, Nietzsche's naturalistic 
prioritization of value legislation is not only crucial to 
understanding his critique of morality in general, it is 
also crucial to understanding his relationship to Kant. The 
idea of moral legislation, particularly in the sense of 
autonomy or self-legislation of directive principles of 
action, will serve as the common ground that will allow me 
to place Nietzsche and Kant into productive dialogue with 
each other. 
Any discussion of Nietzsche's naturalism is complicated 
by the lack of agreement among contemporary philosophers 
about the meaning of Nietzsche's view. I begin this chapter 
with a brief survey of some prominent interpretations of 
Nietzsche's naturalism that indicates the range of opinions 
on this issue. I then distinguish Nietzsche's naturalism 
from what he takes to be quasi-naturalistic views, i.e., 
stoicism, essentialistic accounts of human nature, and 
Rousseau's doctrine of the state of nature. I proceed to a 
discussion of the antinaturalism of the unconditional will 
to truth, the hypothesis of the "true world," and the 
presupposition of moral equality. After this, I examine the 
hypothesis of the will to power as the basis of Nietzsche's 
naturalism. The implications of naturalism for morality are 
developed through an interpretation of a text from The Gay 
science entitled "Long Live Physics!" where Nietzsche 
attempts to undermine traditional conceptions of moral 
judgment and replace them with a conception of moral 
discourse in which legislative conditions predominate. I 
conclude this chapter by indicating the relevance of "Long 
Live Physics!," and related texts, for Nietzsche's 
conception of autonomy and for understanding the 
relationship of Nietzsche and Kant. 
What Naturalism Might Be: Some Suggestions 
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Nietzsche's naturalism has been interpreted in a wide 
variety of ways. It would be helpful to survey briefly some 
prominent views in order to get a sense of this diversity 
and to determine which aspects of Nietzsche's position 
remain unclear. In this section I will discuss the 
interpretations of Jilrgen Habermas, Hans Seigfried, Richard 
Schacht, Robert c. Solomon, Theodore R. Schatzki, and 
Michael J. Mattis. 
On Habermas' view, Nietzsche fails in his attempt to 
merge the contradictory presuppositions of naturalism and 
positivism. For Habermas, Nietzsche's naturalism involves a 
recognition of the connection of knowledge and interests. 
Nietzsche's positivism is found in his rejection of 
metaphysics and in his restriction of legitimate knowledge 
to the findings of the natural sciences. Nietzsche's 
naturalistic connection of knowledge and interests is 
opposed to positivism's rigid fact-value distinction. 
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Habermas argues that the tension between these two positions 
is problematic. As a positivist, Nietzsche's devaluation of 
metaphysics leads to nihilism, while as a naturalist he is 
unable to exclude any knowledge claims as invalid. 
Consequently, Habermas concludes, Nietzsche's position 
collapses into subjectivistic skepticism. 9 
In opposition to Habermas, Seigfried emphasizes the 
importance of natural science for Nietzsche's naturalism. 
On his view, Nietzsche's attitude towards science cannot be 
dismissed as merely positivistic. Seigfried interprets 
naturalism as a "radically experimental morality" that must 
be sharply distinguished from traditional attempts to 
isolate directives of action in "the tendencies and 
propensities of our natural drives. 1110 On this view, 
Nietzsche uses the experimental paradigm of modern science 
as a model for moral reasoning. As a result, Seigfried 
concludes that, for Nietzsche, "insistence on naturalism in 
moral matters can mean only one thing, namely, that 
successful experimental interaction between us and nature 
alone can tell what good and evil and the conditions of good 
9Jilrgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, 
trans. Jeremy J. Shapiro (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), 297: 
"The basis of knowledge in interest affects the possibility 
of knowledge as such. Since this gratification of all needs 
is congruent with the interest in self-preservation, any 
illusion at random can put forth the same claim to validity, 
as long as some need interprets the world through it." 
1~ans Seigfried, "Nietzsche's Natural Morality," 
Journal of Value Inquiry 26 (1992): 423. 
society are. "11 
Schacht maintains that naturalism is a 
"reinterpretation of nature and humanity" in light of 
Nietzsche's "de-deification of nature. 1112 Schacht links 
this project to an "anthropological shift" in Nietzsche's 
philosophy. The purpose of this shift is "to arrive at an 
understanding and appreciation of the kind of creature we 
fundamentally are" in order to determine "what we may 
become." 13 In other words, for Schacht, Nietzsche's 
naturalism is a theory of human nature that has decisive 
normative implications. 
Solomon locates Nietzsche's naturalism in his shift 
34 
away from traditional rule-governed ethics to a concern with 
personal style. Solomon's interpretation stresses the role 
of nihilism in Nietzsche's thought. He offers a positive 
interpretation of nihilism that emphasizes its "demand for 
freedom from certain values as moral commands, namely, 
'other worldly values'. 1114 Other-worldly values impose 
"false needs and desires," while naturalistic values are 
11 b'd I 1 • , 429. 
12Richard Schacht, "Nietzsche's Gay Science, Or, 
How To Naturalize Cheerfully," in Readina Nietzsche, ed. 
Robert c. Solomon and Kathleen M. Higgins (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1988), 68. 
13Ibid., 75. 
uRobert c. Solomon, "Nietzsche, Nihilism, and 
Morality," in Nietzsche: A Collection of Critical Essays, 
ed. Robert c. Solomon (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University 
Press, 1973), 207. 
life-affirming, personal virtues arising from the 
individual's needs, desires, aspirations, and interests. 15 
According to Solomon, the gratification of needs and, the 
integration of values within a whole personality replaces 
35 
the justification of actions or intentions by means of rules 
and principles that characterizes traditional morality. 
For Schatzki, Nietzsche's naturalism consists in "the 
adoption of a biologically and physiologically informed 
viewpoint on human life and history. 1116 The biological 
dimension of Nietzsche's thought is found in his emphasis on 
the Darwinian notion of the struggle for existence and in 
his emphasis on "life." In accordance with this biological 
emphasis, values are seen as conditions of life that can 
help or hinder the human species in its struggle for 
existence. Schatzki locates the physiological dimension of 
Nietzsche's naturalism in his materialistic emphasis on the 
body. This is reflected in Nietzsche's concern with 
diagnosing various forms of life as either strong or weak, 
healthy or unhealthy . 17 It is also reflected in his concern 
with the material aspects of life such as "heredity, race-
mixing, diet, climate, age, emigration, and disease. 1118 
15 b. d I 1 • I 221. 
MTheodore R. Schatzki, "Ancient and Naturalistic 
Themes in Nietzsche's Ethics," Nietzsche-studien 23 (1994): 
150. 
17Ibid. I 148. 
18Ibid. 
As could be expected, Nietzsche's view is not without 
its critics. Mattis discusses Nietzsche's position within 
the context of ethical naturalism.~ His thesis is that 
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Nietzsche's philosophy is inherently antinaturalistic. The 
primary tenet of ethical naturalism, according to Mattis, is 
that value statements are reducible to factual statements 
about natural qualities such as pleasure or happiness. On 
this view, moral values and actions are evaluated in 
quantitative terms, based on whether or not they add to or 
subtract from the natural quality in question. Some forms 
of ethical naturalism also involve developmental or 
teleological notions of human perfectibility. Although many 
of Nietzsche's statements about ethics appear compatible 
with both of these forms of ethical naturalism, Mattis 
argues that the essence of Nietzsche's philosophy is 
contrary to ethical naturalism because of the priority 
Nietzsche gives to becoming. Mattis concludes that 
"Nietzsche's anti-naturalism (sic], then, consists in the 
priority that he gives to becoming, a priority that 
precludes the measurement of growth, and thus the 
determination of value that naturalism presupposes is 
possible."w 
1~ichael J. Mattis, "Nietzsche as Anti-
Naturalist [sic]," Philosophy Today (Summer, 1993): 170. 
Wlbid., 175. 
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What Naturalism Is Not 
The preceding survey sketched the spectrum of opinion 
concerning Nietzsche's naturalism. While all of the 
philosophers I have discussed agree that naturalism is a 
significant feature of Nietzsche's philosophy, each of them 
characterizes Nietzsche's naturalism in a different way. 
Habermas describes it as an overcoming of the fact-value 
distinction, Seigfried as the moral adoption of the 
experimental spirit of science, Schacht as an inquiry into 
human nature, Solomon as individualistic self-affirmation, 
and Schatzki as materialistic biologism. In opposition to 
these interpretations, Mattis argues that Nietzsche's 
emphasis on becoming is inherently antinaturalistic. 
Given the lack of agreement about Nietzsche's 
naturalism it appears necessary to continue the 
investigation into its meaning. An appropriate way to 
continue this investigation is to look at texts where 
Nietzsche discusses philosophical views in which the concept 
of nature plays a significant role. This will show how 
Nietzsche's naturalism differs from some philosophical 
positions that have been considered naturalistic. In this 
section I discuss Nietzsche's critique of stoicism, 
essentialistic accounts of human nature, and Rousseau's 
concept of the state of nature. This will allow me to 
establish what Nietzsche's naturalism is not before I go on 
to discuss what I think is a plausible and comprehensive 
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account of Nietzsche's positive view of naturalism that 
builds upon the work of the commentators in the preceding 
section. 
Before discussing Nietzsche's critique of stoicism I 
must consider the theory of truth that is presupposed by his 
critique. Nietzsche's early writings contain a metaphorical 
conception of truth that is opposed to the view that truth 
is the correspondence of words with reality. On Nietzsche's 
view, words relate us to the world through a two-step 
process in which perceptions are transformed into nerve 
stimuli and these stimuli are transformed into sound. 
Because sense data must pass through these disparate 
mediums, words bear only a metaphorical relationship to 
things as they are in-themselves. 21 Therefore, truth should 
not be understood as the correspondence of words and objects 
but as an agreement within a linguistic community to use 
language in accordance with communally agreed upon 
conventions. 22 
Nietzsche's critique of the correspondence theory of 
21Nietzsche, "On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral 
Sense," in Philosophy and Truth: Selections from Nietzsche's 
Notebooks of the Early 1870's, ed. and trans. Daniel · 
Breazeale (New Jersey: Humanities Paperback Library, 1979), 
82-83: "It is this way with all of us concerning language: 
we believe that we know something about the things 
themselves when we speak of trees, colors, snow, and 
flowers; and yet we possess nothing but metaphors for 
things--metaphors which correspond in no way to the original 
entities." 
22Ibid. , 84. 
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truth extends to the realistic view that scientific laws are 
descriptive of nature in-itself. In Beyond Good and Evil he 
challenges the view that physics reads-off laws that are 
inscribed in nature. Nietzsche cannot assert that the 
realist's conception of nature's conformity to law is false 
without tacitly presupposing some sort of privileged access 
to nature, which is precisely what he wants to deny. 
Therefore, he challenges the realist indirectly. He argues 
that physics is not an explanation of natural occurrences, 
but rather a pragmatically justified interpretation of these 
occurrences. 23 He defends this claim by proposing an 
alternative interpretation of scientific laws which can 
achieve the same results as the realist's view without the 
realist's dogmatic assumptions. 
Nietzsche contends that the realist's notion of 
"nature's conformity to law" is the product of an 
anthropomorphic interpretation of nature under the influence 
of the "democratic instincts of the modern sou1. 11 M He does 
not object to this interpretation, per se, but rather to the 
claim that this interpretation is the only possible 
naeyond Good and Evil, no. 14, 211: "It is perhaps 
just dawning on five or six minds that physics, too, is only 
an interpretation and exegesis of the world (to suit us, if 
I may say so!) and not a world explanation .... " 
24Ibid., no. 22, 220: '"Everywhere equality before 
the law; nature is no different in that respect, no better 
off than we are'--a fine instance of ulterior motivation, in 
which the plebeian antagonism to everything privileged and 
autocratic as well as a second and more refined atheism are 
disguised once more." 
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interpretation. He points out that one could conceivably 
interpret nature in terms of "the tyrannically inconsiderate 
and relentless enforcement of claims of power" and yet reach 
the same conclusion as the realist: 
. an interpreter . . . might, nevertheless, end by 
asserting the same about this world as you do, namely, 
that it has a 'necessary' and 'calculable' course, not 
because laws obtain in it, but because they are 
absolutely lacking, and every power draws its ultimate 
consequences at every moment. 25 
On Nietzsche's view, the laws of nature cannot simply 
be read-off from nature. Laws of nature are not simply 
generalizations based on the passive observation of 
regularities in nature. What we learn from nature, 
according to Nietzsche, is a function of a transaction with 
nature in which we approach nature through active 
experimentation based on research programs that we have 
designed. What is crucial to recognize is that on this view 
it is human beings and not nature that poses the 
questions. 26 This does not result in mere constructivism 
because the laws that are established in this way are 
functions of interactions between intelligent beings and 
nature. Laws are not "imposed," i.e., they are not merely 
25Ibid. 
~Cf. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Bxiii: "· .. 
a light broke upon all students of nature. They learned 
that reason has insight only into that which it produces 
after a plan of its own, and that it must not allow itself 
to be kept, as it were, in nature's leading-strings, but 
must itself show the way with principles of judgment based 
upon fixed laws, constraining nature to give answers to 
questions of reason's own determining." 
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free-floating constructions, but neither are they "found," 
i.e., they are not conceiver-independent natural realities. 
This brief discussion of Nietzsche's views on truth is 
sufficient to provide the background needed to understand 
his critique of the stoic conception of nature. It is 
important to keep in mind that Nietzsche is not attacking 
any specific formulation of stoicism, but rather a kind of 
generalized stoic position. Roughly speaking, the view that 
Nietzsche has in mind is that there is a rational principle 
operative within nature that can be known and that can be 
used to guide human action. If we accept this 
characterization of stoicism, then Nietzsche's critique can 
be anticipated based on the conception of truth sketched 
above. 
If the rational principle operative in nature, i.e., 
nature's apparently law-like behavior, is the product of 
human interpretation, then attempting to conform to nature, 
or attempting to locate objective norms of action within the 
workings of nature, must be understood as fundamentally 
mistaken. This explains Nietzsche's hostility to stoicism, 
which he views as an elaborate form of self-deception: 
. while you pretend rapturously to read the canon 
of your law in nature, you want something opposite, you 
strange actors and self-deceivers! Your pride wants to 
impose your morality, your ideal, on nature--even on 
nature--and incorporate them in her; you demand that 
she should be nature 'according to the Stoa,' and you 
would like all existence to exist only after your own 
image--as an immense eternal glorification and 
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generalization of Stoicism.n 
Analogously, if our conception of nature is the result 
of a transaction between nature and our experiments, then 
the same must be true for human nature as well. Nietzsche 
discusses the concept of human nature in Human. All Too 
Human within the context of a critique of philosophical 
method. He refers to the lack of a sense of history, the 
belief in absolute facts and eternal truths, as the "family 
failing of philosophers."u One of the consequences of this 
lack of historical sense is that philosophers assume that 
human nature is fixed and unchanging. Rejecting this view, 
Nietzsche maintains that a fully developed sense of history 
would show that philosophical analyses of human nature have 
been restricted to human nature as it appears within 
narrowly circumscribed historical contexts. 29 Nietzsche 
concedes that the basic features of humanity probably have 
not altered much during the course of recorded history. 
Nevertheless, he also maintains that this does not justify 
the conclusions of the historically unconscious 
metaphysician who finds 
... 'instincts' in man as he now is and assumes that 
these belong to the unalterable facts of mankind and to 
that extent could provide a key to the understanding of 
the world in general: the whole of teleology is 
constructed by speaking of the man of the last four 
27Beyond Good and Evil, no. 9, 205-206. 
28Human. All Too Human, no. 2, 12. 
29Ibid. I 12-13. 
millennia as of an eternal man towards (sic) whom all 
things in the world have had a natural relationship 
from the time he began. 30 
Nietzsche's critique of Rousseau's doctrine of the 
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state of nature builds on his criticisms of stoicism and the 
idea of human nature. The idea of a state of nature 
originally served as a means employed by social contract 
theorists to explain the origin of civil society and the 
state. Thomas Hobbes argues in Leviathan that human 
equality in the state of nature leads to competition for 
scarce goods, resulting in a continual state of war "of 
every man, against every man. " 31 In the Discourse on the 
Origin and Foundations of Inequality and The Social Contract 
Rousseau argues, in contrast to Hobbes' position in 
Leviathan, that the natural state of humanity is one of 
equality, peace, and goodness. In contrast to Hobbes, 
Rousseau maintains that it is civilization, not natural 
competition, that is morally corrupting. 32 
One of the implications of Nietzsche's position is that 
a state of natural humanity such as that referred to by both 
Hobbes and Rousseau does not exist. On his view, Rousseau's 
30Ibid. I 13. 
31Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (London: Penguin, 1987), 
185. 
32Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Discourse on the Origin 
and Foundation of Inequality, in The First and Second 
Discourses, trans. Roger D. and Judith R. Masters (New York: 
st. Martin's Press, 1964), 193: "Men are wicked; sad and 
continual experience spares the need for proof. However, 
man is naturally good; I believe I have demonstrated it." 
doctrine of the state of nature is "a kind of attempt to 
read moral Christian 'humanity' into nature--. 1133 
Elsewhere,~ Nietzsche argues that Rousseau's thesis 
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regarding the harmful effects of civilization upon morality 
in the Discourse on the Arts and Sciences constitutes a 
revealing reversal of cause and effect. In Daybreak he 
notes that it is equally likely that morality is responsible 
for the present state of social decline and the only way to 
settle the matter is by experiment. 35 While Rousseau uses 
the notion of a state of nature as a hypothetical standpoint 
from which to criticize society, Nietzsche takes it as a 
symptom of the desire "to have a corner of the world into 
which man and his torments could not enter. . 1136 
For Nietzsche, each of these purportedly naturalistic 
positions, i.e., stoicism, essentialistic account of human 
nature, and the idea of a state of nature, manifests a 
pattern of presuppositions that undermines their 
naturalistic pretensions. Appeals to the moral order of 
nature, the timeless essence of human nature, or to an 
33The Will to Power, no. 340, 186. 
~Daybreak, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1982), no. 17, 16. 
"Ibid., no. 163, 100: "The truth cannot possibly 
be on both sides: and is it on either of them? Test them 
and see." 
36In the next chapter I discuss Nietzsche's effort 
to avoid the charge that he is arguing ad hominem in this 
and similar cases. 
idyllic state of nature tacitly express the desire to flee 
from the empirical world of nature and history, thereby 
absolving humanity of any ultimate responsibility for its 
actions. In other words, a "true world" is constructed in 
relation to which the only accepted attitude is one of 
passive conformity. Nietzsche refers to this as the 
mentality of an antinatural morality. 
Antinatural morality is the expression of an 
interrelated set of epistemological, metaphysical, and 
normative presuppositions. These antinatural components 
feed back into and reinforce each other, thus creating a 
kind of closed system. Antinatural presuppositions become 
reified in cultural and social institutions (especially 
religion and morality) which then work to support and 
protect them. This circularity is an important reason why 
Nietzsche criticizes traditional philosophical attempts to 
ground morality on an a priori foundation. If philosophy 
and reason are based on antinatural assumptions, then 
grounding morality upon a foundation of a priori reason 
reduces to an exercise in question-begging. 37 As a result, 
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37Beyond Good and Evil, no. 186, 288: "What 
philosophers called 'a rational foundation for morality' and 
tried to supply was, seen in the right light, merely a 
scholarly variation on the common faith in the prevalent 
morality; a new means of expression for this faith; and thus 
just another fact within a particular morality; indeed, in 
the last analysis a kind of denial that this morality might 
ever be considered problematic--certainly the very opposite 
of an examination, analysis, questioning, and vivisection of 
this very faith." 
the real problem of morality is left unresolved. This 
problem reveals itself only when many different moralities 
are compared on the basis of their value for life. 38 
But why does Nietzsche place so much emphasis on the 
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need for a critique of moral values from a perspective that 
is not implicated in antinaturalism? Nietzsche maintains 
that an escape from the perspective of antinaturalism might 
create the conditions for moral values that affirm and 
foster life in a psychologically cleaner and healthier sense 
than has been the case up until now. Nietzsche repeatedly 
asserts that the human beings cultivated within antinatural 
morality are of a degenerate, unhealthy type. Moreover, he 
maintains that the logic of antinaturalism is now drawing 
its ultimate conclusions and that the lack of any 
alternative value system threatens a decline into nihilism. 
As Nietzsche puts it in his notes, "[one] interpretation has 
collapsed; but because it was considered the interpretation 
it now seems as if there were no meaning at all in 
existence, as if everything were in vain."D 
What is Antinatural? 
~Ibid. See also On the Genealogy of Morals, 
preface no. 3, 453. 
39The Will to Power, no. 55, p. 35. These basic 
factors also amplify each other. For example, Nietzsche 
argues that the degenerate form of humanity cultivated 
within herd morality is unlikely to even recognize the onset 
of nihilism, let alone offer a positive response to it. 
See, e.g., Thus Spoke Zarathustra, "Zarathustra's Prologue," 
no. 5, 130. 
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The most fundamental reason for Nietzsche's opposition 
to traditionally conceived morality is that it is in some 
sense antinatural. But what does Nietzsche mean when he 
says that morality is antinatural? In this section I will 
formulate an answer to the question 'What is Antinatural?' 
through an examination of its epistemological, metaphysical, 
and normative features. 
The Antinaturalism of Epistemology 
The antinaturalness of epistemology is found in the 
unconditional will to truth. According to Nietzsche, the 
basis of knowledge consists in the interaction of logical 
fictions, "the purely invented world of the unconditional 
and self-identical," with the absolute randomness of the 
universe, which organizes it into coherent experience. 40 
Thinking about the world in terms of these logical fictions, 
e.g., "thing," "substance," "body," is indispensable for 
human survival, but the truth value of these logical 
fictions cannot be measured against an ultimately correct 
perception of reality because we lack access to any such 
reality. 41 In other words, we must come to acknowledge 
"untruth as a condition of life. 110 If, as Nietzsche 
maintains, untruth is a condition of life, then it follows 
40Beyond Good and Evil, no. 4, 202. 
41The Gay Science, no. 110, 169. 
42Beyond Good and Evil, no. 4, 202. 
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that the insistence on the unconditional value of truth must 
be seen as contrary to the basic interests of life. 
Given the necessity of conceptual simplification and 
falsification, Nietzsche infers that "[the] falseness of a 
judgment is for us not necessarily an objection to a 
judgment. 1143 He proceeds to speculate that the 
"falsest" judgments, among which he includes Kant's 
synthetic a priori judgments, might be the most necessary 
for human survival.« What matters in a judgment is not its 
truth, but "to what extent it is life-promoting, life-
preserving, species-preserving, perhaps even species-
cul ti vating. 1145 
The pragmatic value of conceptual falsification 
underlies one of the central antitheses in Nietzsche's 
philosophy--the antithesis of art and morality. Morality, 
especially Christian morality, insists on absolute truth: 
"it says stubbornly and inexorably, 'I am morality itself, 
and nothing besides is morality.'"% Consequently, 
traditionally conceived morality, is inherently critical of 
~Ibid., no. 4, 201. 
«Ibid., 202: "And we are fundamentally inclined to 
claim that the falsest judgments (which include the 
synthetic judgments a priori) are the most indispensable for 
US• • • •II 
45Ibid. I 201. 
%Ibid., no. 202, 306. 
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everything artistic, relegating art to the realm of lies.~ 
In morality's hostility to art Nietzsche locates a hostility 
to life, 
. a furious, vengeful antipathy to life itself: for 
all life is based on semblance, art, deception, points 
of view, and the necessity of perspectives and error. 48 
Life, which requires perspective and error, in the form of 
conceptual falsification, must be in error when viewed from 
the absolute standards of morality. Thus, for Nietzsche, 
morality represents a "will to negate life," and, possibly, 
"the danger of dangers. 1149 
In contrast, art, viewed from the perspective of the 
artist, recognizes the importance of falsification for life. 
Art represents the "good will to appearance" which removes 
morality from the realm of being and relegates it to the 
realm of deception "as semblance, delusion, error, 
interpretation, contrivance, art."~ In other words, 
morality is viewed as a fiction used for the management of 
human affairs. 
The relegation of morality to the realm of 
interpretation is also a consequence of the progress of 
science. Without the cultivation of art, and the artistic 
47The Birth of Tragedy, "Attempt at a Self-
Criticism," no. 5, 23. 
48Ibid. 
49Ibid. 
50Ibid. 
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recognition of the interpretive, perspectival character of 
human mental life, the results of science, i.e., "the 
realization that delusion and error are conditions of human 
knowledge and sensation," would, Nietzsche maintains, "lead 
us to nausea and suicide. 1151 Since art and not morality 
provides the means to counteract the nihilistic threat of 
science, it is art that deserves our ultimate gratitude. 52 
The Antinaturalism of Metaphysics 
The antinatural will to negate life is also present in 
metaphysics. Metaphysics places the source of the highest 
values in a fictitious realm of being, a "true world," which 
lowers the value of this world and human life to a 
corresponding degree. The most directly perceivable reason 
for the creation of a true world is found in two erroneous 
assumptions which, Nietzsche maintains, underlie all 
metaphysical reasoning. The first is the assumption of the 
validity of logic that leads us to assume the existence of 
value oppositions such as good and evil, true and false. 
This is the faith that Nietzsche refers to as "the faith in 
51The Gay Science, no. 107, 163. 
llrbid.: "If we had not welcomed the arts and 
invented this kind of cult of the untrue, then the 
realization of general untruth and mendaciousness that now 
comes to us through science--the realization that delusion 
and error are conditions of human knowledge and sensation--
would be utterly unbearable. Honesty would lead us to 
nausea and suicide. But now there is a counterforce against 
our honesty that helps us to avoid such consequences: art as 
the good will to appearance." 
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opposite values. 1153 The second assumption is that something 
cannot originate from its opposite, e.g., good out of evil. 
If the positive pole of these value oppositions cannot have 
originated out of the negative, then a fortiori the highest 
values cannot have an earthly origin, but must instead have 
a "peculiar" source in "the lap of Being, the intransitory, 
the hidden god, the 'thing-in-itself'--there must be their 
basis, and nowhere else."54 This, in turn, necessitates the 
postulation of a transcendent, "true world" which can serve 
as the locus of the highest values. On Nietzsche's view, 
Plato's realm of the forms, the Christian after-life, and 
Kant's thing-in-itself serve as the prime examples of true 
worlds. 
In Twilight of the Idols Nietzsche sums up his 
objections to the hypothesis of the true world in four 
elementary propositions. These four propositions illustrate 
how Nietzsche vacillates between criticism of the conceptual 
difficulties associated with the true world and criticism of 
the hidden motives latent in this doctrine. Nietzsche's 
first proposition states that the reasons cited for 
distinguishing the world of appearance from reality are the 
same reasons that demonstrate the reality of appearance. 55 
~Beyond Good and Evil, no. 2, 200. 
55Twilight of the Idols, "'Reason' in Philosophy," 
no. 6, 484. 
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The hypothesis of the true world begins with the premise 
that there is a different type of reality than that of 
appearance. But Nietzsche asserts that the existence of any 
type of reality other than that of appearance is "absolutely 
indemonstrable. " 56 Therefore, the distinction between a 
true and an apparent world collapses. 
The reasoning behind Nietzsche's first proposition is 
expanded in a second proposition that states that the 
criteria which have been used to determine the "true being" 
of a thing, e.g., substance and permanence, are actually the 
criteria of non-being in the realm of appearance. As 
Nietzsche puts it, "the 'true world' has been constructed 
out of contradiction to the actual world. . 1157 This 
reduces the true world to the status of the apparent world 
"insofar as it is merely a moral-optical illusion."~ 
The transition from the second to the third of 
Nietzsche's propositions marks the transition from his 
conceptual critique of the true world to a critique of its 
underlying assumptions. Nietzsche's third proposition 
states that "fables" about the inaccessible realm of true 
being are meaningless, "unless an instinct of slander, 
detraction, and suspicion against life has gained an upper 
56Ibid. 
57Ibid. 
58Ibid. 
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hand in us. • . . 1159 Nietzsche's fourth proposition sums-up 
this line of criticism by stating that any distinction 
between a "true" and an "apparent" world is a sign of 
decadence and "a symptom of the decline of life." 60 
The Antinaturalism of Universal Moral Norms 
The final aspect of antinaturalism that I will discuss 
concerns Nietzsche's opposition to universal moral norms. 
Nietzsche's association of universal moral norms with 
antinaturalism is clear from remarks such as one, found in 
The Antichrist, where he writes that the conception of the 
good as "impersonal and universally valid" is both a chimera 
and the expression of the "final exhaustion of life. 
1161 In order to see why Nietzsche associates universal 
moral norms with antinaturalism it is important to recognize 
that any conception of universal moral norms must presuppose 
moral equality among agents. That is, despite obvious 
physical and mental differences, some morally relevant 
characteristic common to all agents must be assumed if moral 
demands are to be universalizable. In Kantian morality, for 
example, agents are morally equal due to their rational 
nature, while in John Stuart Mill's writings it is the 
common human desire to attain pleasure and avoid pain that 
59Ibid. 
60Ibid. 
~The Antichrist, no. 11, 577. 
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makes it possible for Mill to formulate a universal standard 
of right and wrong action. 62 
Nietzsche maintains that if people were, in fact, 
morally equal, i.e., "similar in strength and value 
standards," then the idea of "placing one's will on a par 
with that of someone else" would be a reasonable demand upon 
individuals. 63 If people are not morally equal, however, 
then the desire to impose universal moral norms takes on an 
arbitrary quality that Nietzsche interprets as symptomatic 
of a more basic, but disguised, sentiment. 
One of the distinguishing features of Nietzsche's 
conception of morality is his outright rejection of moral 
equality. In Thus Spoke Zarathustra, for example, he makes 
the following declaration: 
••. to me justice speaks thus: 'Men are not equal.' 
Nor shall they become equal! What would my love of the 
overman be if I spoke otherwise?M 
Elsewhere, Nietzsche remarks that the acceptance of equality 
as a fundamental principle of society represents "a will to 
the denial of life, a principle of disintegration and 
decay. 1165 The desire for equality is taken as symptomatic 
of a will to revenge on the part of those who are morally 
62John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, {Indianapolis: 
Hackett, 1979), 7. 
63Beyond Good and Evil, no. 259, 393. 
MThus Spoke Zarathustra, "On the Tarantulas,-" 213. 
~Beyond Good and Evil, no. 259, 393. 
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inferior. Nietzsche refers to those who preach equality as 
"tarantulas," i.e., creatures who kill slowly by injecting 
their victims with poison.M The tarantulas are morally 
inferior, not in the sense of being bad, but in the sense of 
being incapable of legislating their own values. Thus their 
will to revenge expresses itself as the desire to pass 
judgment and condemn those who are capable of legislating 
their own values: 
Out of every one of their complaints sounds revenge; in 
their praise there is always a sting, and to be a judge 
seems bliss to them. 67 
This secret will to revenge on the part of those who 
defend moral equality is not sufficient to explain why 
Nietzsche associates moral equality and universal moral 
norms with the antinatural denial of life. To understand 
this association it must be recognized that, for Nietzsche, 
life is the highest "value." All other values are to be 
determined only in reference to their value for life. The 
value of life itself, however, cannot be estimated. 
Consequently, "judgments of value, concerning life, for it 
or against it, can, in the end, never be true: they have 
Mrn passing I note that in the pref ace to 
Daybreak, no. 3, 3, Nietzsche remarks that Kant had been 
bitten by the "moral tarantula" Rousseau, who, as the 
spiritual father of the French Revolution, represents to 
Nietzsche the preacher of equality par excellance. 
~Thus Spoke Zarathustra, "On the Tarantulas," 212. 
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value only as symptoms. 1168 Because life is the 
highest value, anything that elevates, enhances, or affirms 
it becomes valuable as a means. Conversely, "(w)hatever is 
not a condition of life harms it. . " 69 Within 
antinaturalism, Nietzsche maintains that this evaluation of 
life is not recognized because there it is truth and not 
life that holds the highest value. Within antinaturalism, 
whatever is most harmful to life is thought to have the 
highest value and is called "true," while "whatever elevates 
it, enhances, affirms, justifies it, and makes it 
triumphant, is called 'false. 11170 
Antinaturalism assumes moral equality as a pre-
condition of universal moral norms. To Nietzsche this 
represents a radical and life-denying reversal of values 
because life requires inequality, conflict, and obstacles to 
overcome. 71 Why does Nietzsche think that life requires 
inequality? Because, as he puts it in Beyond Good and Evil: 
..• life is essentially appropriation, injury, 
overpowering of what is alien and weaker; suppression, 
hardness, imposition of one's own forms, incorporation 
and at least, at its mildest exploitation. . . . 72 
Focusing for the moment on the idea that life essentially 
68Twiliqht of the Idols, "The Problem of Socrates," 
no. 2, 4 74. 
~Ibid., no. 11, 577. 
wrbid., no. 9, 576. 
nThus Spoke Zarathustra, "On the Tarantulas," 213. 
72Beyond Good and Evil, no. 259, 393. 
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involves the "imposition of one's own forms," it immediately 
becomes clear why Nietzsche would be fundamentally opposed 
to any conception of universal moral norms. If life is 
understood as value-positing activity, then accepting values 
that are imposed from an external source must be viewed as 
antithetical to the essence of life. And Nietzsche equates 
any conception of universal moral norms as an imposition of 
external values. 
In opposition to universal moral norms, Nietzsche 
maintains that virtues must be personal creations or they 
are harmful to life. As he says in The Antichrist, "[a] 
virtue must be our own invention, our most necessary self-
expression and self-defense, any other kind of virtue is 
merely a danger."n This conclusion helps us get a sense of 
why Nietzsche places himself in opposition to Kantian 
morality. On Nietzsche's view, Kant's conception of virtue 
is impersonal, "prompted solely by a feeling of respect for 
the concept of 'virtue,'" and a "sacrifice to the Moloch of 
abstraction.nu Thus, for Nietzsche, Kantian morality is 
not merely antinatural, it is the epitome of antinaturalism: 
"How could one fail to feel how Kant's categorical 
imperative endangered life itself! 1175 
Thus far I have given a negative characterization of 
nThe Antichrist, no. 11, 577. 
74Ibid. 
75Ibid. 
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Nietzsche's naturalism as it arises out of his opposition to 
antinaturalism. The opposition of naturalism and 
antinaturalism is the opposition of two alternative 
conceptions of life. The naturalist interprets life as 
essentially value-positing activity: 
When we speak of values, we speak with the inspiration, 
with the way of looking at things, which is part of 
life: life itself forces us to posit values; life 
itself values through us when we posit values. 76 
If we are to gain a positive understanding of naturalism, 
and what Nietzsche means by a naturalistic morality, we must 
reach a better understanding of this value-positing activity 
that he identifies with life. Fortunately, this task is not 
as difficult as it may at first appear because Nietzsche 
provides us with an important clue to understanding what he 
means by life. "Life," he writes in Beyond Good and Evil, 
"simply is will to power. 1177 Therefore, a positive 
characterization of Nietzsche's conception of naturalism 
cannot be separated from an account of Nietzsche's idea of 
the will to power. 
What is Naturalism? The Will to Power as Basic Principle 
The purpose of Nietzsche's naturalism is to provide the 
means to create an alternative conceptual framework within 
which to reconstruct "the laws of life and action" that is 
76Twilight of the Idols, "Morality as Anti-Nature," 
no. 5, 490. 
77Beyond Good and Evil, no. 259, 393. 
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not implicated in antinaturalism. As we have already seen, 
the critique of antinaturalism is an important aspect of 
Nietzsche's position. But Nietzsche's naturalism also has a 
positive aspect that involves a determination of the 
conditions of life which can serve as the standard for the 
creation of new values, laws, and ideals. 
Positively speaking, Nietzsche's naturalism is an 
attempt to integrate the techniques of critical analysis 
used in the historical disciplines with the interpretive and 
experimental strategies of the natural sciences into a 
unified philosophical method. In Human. All Too Human 
Nietzsche refers to his naturalistic method as "historical 
philosophy. 1178 This name is somewhat misleading, however. 
Nietzsche's notion of historical philosophy should not be 
confused with historicism, like that which forms the basis 
of Dilthey's attempt to provide a conceptual foundation for 
the human sciences. Dilthey attempts to develop a rigorous 
method for the human sciences distinct from the mechanistic 
mode of understanding that he associates with the natural 
sciences. 79 In contrast to Dilthey's radical separation of 
the historical and natural sciences, Nietzsche maintains 
that historical philosophy "· .. can no longer be separated 
78Human, All Too Human, vol. 1, no. 1, 12. 
~Richard E. Palmer, Hermeneutics (Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press, 1969), 98ff. 
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from natural science. . 1180 What must be clarified is 
precisely how Nietzsche merges the conceptual strategies of 
historical inquiry and natural science into a coherent 
philosophical method. Nietzsche does this by providing a 
principle which creates the basis for a unified explanatory 
framework. The will to power serves as this unifying 
principle. 81 
The will to power is intended as a means of tempering 
the mechanistic mode of explanation Nietzsche associates 
with positivistic science and the teleological mode of 
explanation he associates with the historical sciences. The 
hypothesis of the will to power is inspired by 
methodological considerations that bear a strong resemblance 
to William of Ockham's strictures against the needless 
multiplication of entities. Nietzsche's methodological 
assumption is contained in the following statement from 
Beyond Good and Evil: 
Not to assume several kinds of causality until the 
experiment of making do with a single one has been 
pushed to its utmost limit . . . that is a moral of 
method which one may not shirk today--it follows 'from 
8
°Human, All Too Human, vol. 1, no. 1, 12. 
81The following operational and interpretational 
account of the will to power is inspired by Hans Seigfried, 
"Law, Regularity, and Sameness: A Nietzschean Account," Man 
and World 6 {1973): 372-389. My discussion of the will to 
power will be guided by the account found in Nietzsche's 
published works and focuses primarily on the formulations 
found in Beyond Good and Evil and On the Genealogy of 
Morals. 
its definition,' as a mathematician would say.~ 
The hypothesis of the will to power begins with the 
premise that the only "reality" that we have access to is 
the world of our desires and passions and their 
interaction. 83 If this is the case, then Nietzsche's 
methodological principle dictates that the experiment be 
undertaken to determine whether the model of efficient 
interaction of forces provided by the interplay of our 
drives and passions is sufficient to interpret the 
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mechanistic world of causal relations. Nietzsche maintains 
that if all aspects of conscious life and organic functions, 
such as nourishment and procreation, could be interpreted as 
manifestations of one fundamental form of the will, namely 
the will to power, then 
• . . one would have gained the right to determine all 
efficient force univocally as--will to power. The 
world viewed from inside, the world defined and 
determined according to its 'intelligible character'--
it would be 'will to power' and nothing else.--M 
The point of Nietzsche's argument seems to be that the 
ideal of inquiry should be a single explanatory principle 
and that this principle would do nothing more (but nothing 
less) than make appearance intelligible. This principle is 
limited to making appearance intelligible, it has no 
pretensions of transcendent validity. In other words, the 
82Beyond Good and Evil, no. 36, 238. 
83Ibid. 
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will to power acts as a methodological principle of 
interpretation and not as a metaphysical principle. It does 
not describe the essence or nature of reality, but rather 
provides a principle by means of which we can understand 
appearance. 
In On the Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche refers to the 
will to power as a "major point of historical method" which 
can be used to reject the teleological mode of 
explanation. 85 He illustrates this through an examination 
of the origin and purpose of punishment. Typically, 
Nietzsche argues, moral historians seek a purpose in 
punishment, e.g., revenge or deterrence, which is then re-
interpreted as the cause of punishment's origin. 86 
Nietzsche contends, however, that this manner of 
investigation is based on a faulty methodological 
assumption. The origins of a concept or a practice are 
different from its actual employment, purpose, or utility at 
any given moment: 
... whatever exists, having somehow come into being, 
is again and again reinterpreted to new ends, taken 
over, transformed, and redirected by some power 
. t 't ~ superior o 1 • • • • 
The same is true, Nietzsche argues, within the organic world 
as well. All events reflect a subduing and "becoming 
850n the Genealogy of Morals, second essay, no. 12, 
514. 
86Ibid., 513. 
87Ibid. 
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master," i.e., a new interpretation or adaptation overcomes 
a previously dominant meaning. Thus the purpose or utility 
presently possessed by something cannot be taken as the 
expression of a telos inherent in the thing, but only as a 
sign that "a will to power has become master of something 
less powerful and imposed upon it the character of a 
function. . • . " 88 The history of the thing or concept can 
be understood as a "continuous sign-chain" of mutually 
independent interpretations which, taken as a whole, does 
not develop in any necessary, law-like, or logical manner. 89 
As Nietzsche sums up this point, "[the] form is fluid, but 
the 'meaning' is even more so." 90 
Within this framework, progress is not the result of an 
increase in utility, but "in the shape of the will and a way 
to greater power and is always carried through at the 
expense of numerous smaller powers. "91 It is this sense of 
the will to power that also opposes the mechanistic mode of 
scientific explanation that prioritizes the reactive concept 
88Ibid. 
~Ibid., 513-514: "The 'evolution' of a thing, a 
custom, an organ is thus by no means its progressus toward a 
goal, even less a logical progressus by the shortest route 
and with the smallest expenditure of force--but a succession 
of more or less profound, more or less mutually independent 
processes of subduing, plus the resistances they encounter, 
the attempts at transformation for the purposes of defense 
and reaction, and the results of successful counteractions." 
90Ibid. I 514. 
91 Ibid. 
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of adaptation and, as a result, loses the essential concept 
of activity. Adaptation, i.e., activity of the second rank, 
is placed in the foreground, rather than the form-giving 
interpretive activity of the will to power. 92 
The will to power as an explanatory principle comes to 
fruition in the form of genealogy. Once again this can be 
illustrated by reference to the concept of punishment. The 
present meaning of the concept of punishment is a synthesis 
of numerous successive interpretations that have crystalized 
into a unity that resists analysis. Such concepts elude 
univocal definition because they compress an entire range of 
historically variable and mutually independent meanings. As 
a result, it is impossible to justify punishment because the 
concept itself is indefinable: "· only that which has no 
history is definable."" In order to resolve this problem, 
Nietzsche introduces the idea of genealogy as an inquiry 
into the history of origins. 
Genealogy frees a conceptual horizon for normative 
reconstruction by penetrating beneath the accrued 
sedimentation of meanings contained in moral concepts and 
92Ibid., 515: "Thus the essence of life, its will 
to power, is ignored; one overlooks the essential priority 
of the spontaneous, aggressive, expansive, form-giving 
forces that give new interpretations and directions, 
although 'adaptation' follows only after this; the dominant 
role of the highest functionaries within the organism itself 
in which the will to life appears active and form-giving is 
denied." 
93 b'd I i • , no. 13 , 516 . 
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calling into question their necessary validity. As we have 
seen, the present meaning of a concept, such as punishment, 
is the result of a tangled history of successive meanings: 
At an earlier stage, on the contrary, this synthesis of 
'meanings' can still be disentangled, as well as 
changed; one can still perceive how in each individual 
case the elements of the synthesis undergo a shift in 
value and rearrange themselves accordingly, so that now 
this, now that element comes to the fore and dominates 
at the expense of others; and under certain 
circumstances one element (the purpose of deterrence 
perhaps) appears to overcome all the remaining 
elements. 94 
This passage neatly sums up the reasoning behind Nietzsche's 
genealogical investigation into the origin of slave morality 
in On the Genealogy of Morals. 95 Nietzsche's intent is not 
to show that slave morality is false or incorrect by tracing 
its origins to the ressentiment of the weak against the 
strong. Rather, Nietzsche's intent is two-fold. On the one 
hand, he wants to undermine slave morality's claim to 
absolute validity and necessity by tracing its origin to 
contingent historical events. On the other hand, Nietzsche 
is trying to show that more than one type of morality is 
possible. 
The genealogical study of moral concepts introduces the 
enormous task of tracing the origins of individual moral 
concepts and writing the history of their development. 
"Where," Nietzsche asks, "could you find a history of love, 
94Ibid. 
"Nietzsche's characterization of master and slave 
moralities is discussed extensively in chapter three, below. 
of avarice, of envy, of conscience, of pious respect for 
tradition, or of cruelty?"% Nietzsche proposes research 
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programs to study the moral effects of the regular division 
of the day, of different foods, human co-habitation, and the 
manners of scholars, artists, and businessmen.~ He 
contends that if these and many other investigations were 
carried out, then "the most insidious question of all" would 
arise: 
• • . whether science can furnish goals of action after 
it has proved that it can take such goals away and 
annihilate them; and then experimentation would be in 
order that would allow every kind of heroism to find 
satisfaction--centuries of experimentation that might 
eclipse all the great projects and sacrifices of 
history to date. So far, science has not yet built its 
cyclopic buildings; but the time for that, too, will 
come. §s 
According to Nietzsche, we have entered a period of 
moral interregnum, between an era dominated by moral 
feelings and judgments and a new era whose ideals will be 
based on knowledge of human life and the conditions of 
culture as determined by "the sciences of physiology, 
medicine, sociology, and solitude .... " 99 During this 
period of moral interregnum, Nietzsche contends that "the 
best we can do . . . is to be as far as possible our own 
reges and found little experimental states. We are 
%The Gay Science, no. 7, 81. 
~Ibid., 81-82. 
98Ibid. I 82. 
99Daybreak, no. 453, 190. 
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experiments: let us also want to be them! 11100 
Nietzsche's rejection of traditional forms of morality 
has, of course, been the subject of much controversy. It 
has been argued that the loss of absolute moral standards 
has led to the rise of subjectivistic immoralism and that 
Nietzsche is, in some sense, responsible for this situation. 
Variations of this claim are found in the writings of 
Alasdair Macintyre and Kurt Rudolf Fischer. 
Macintyre's interpretation of Nietzsche's philosophy in 
After Virtue is found within an extensive analysis and 
critique of contemporary ethical discourse. According to 
Macintyre, modern ethical discourse has become detached from 
its meaning-giving ground in a society organized around the 
shared presuppositions of an Aristotelian conception of 
ethical virtue. Without this foundation in a shared 
community of virtues, ethical discourse loses its objective 
source of legitimacy and authority. The result is an 
emotivistic moral environment in which the rational 
resolution of moral problems becomes impossible. This 
conclusion motivates Macintyre's effort to reconstruct the 
basis of moral discourse by integrating a notion of the 
virtues into the structure of modern society. 
Nietzsche's role in Macintyre's discussion is pivotal, 
'
00Ibid., 191. See also The Gay Science, no. 319, 
253: "But we, we others who thirst after reason, are 
determined to scrutinize our experiences as severely as a 
scientific experiment--hour after hour, day after day. We 
ourselves wish to be our experiments and guinea pigs." 
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but ambiguous. On Macintyre's view, Nietzsche's primary 
philosophical distinction is 
• • . to understand . . • not only that what purported 
to be appeals to objectivity were in fact expressions 
of subjective will, but also the nature of the problems 
that this poses for moral philosophy . 101 
But Nietzsche's prescient diagnosis of the problems within 
contemporary moral discourse leads to a worsening of the 
disease rather than a cure. Although Macintyre believes 
that Nietzsche recognizes the subjectivistic/emotivistic 
bases of modern morality, his attempt to address this 
situation only exacerbates it: 
The underlying structure of (Nietzsche's) argument is 
as follows: if there is nothing to morality but 
expressions of will, my morality can only be what my 
will creates • • . I myself must now bring into 
existence 'new tables of what is good. ' 102 
In short, Macin~yre concludes that Nietzsche supplants moral 
reason with a form of "prophetic irrationalism" that finds 
its most extreme expression in "that at once absurd and 
dangerous fantasy, the Ubermensch. " 103 
Fischer argues that Nietzsche's experimental 
perspective is responsible for the rise of modern moral 
irrationalism. Fischer claims that Nietzsche's philosophy 
is not only inflammatory, but that it is also indirectly 
responsible for the rise of National Socialism in Germany. 
~Alasdair Macintyre, After Virtue, second edition 
(Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984), 106. 
102Ibid. I 107. 
103Ibid. I 113. 
Fischer maintains that Nazism is "a phenomenon of post-
Nietzschean culture." 104 He argues that the existential 
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element of Nietzsche's notion of experimentalism, especially 
when taken in conjunction with his antidemocratic 
sentiments, paves the way for Nazism and, ultimately, for 
Auschwitz, by making possible a consciousness "that excluded 
nothing anyone might think, feel, or do, including 
unimaginable atrocities carried out on a gigantic order." 1~ 
I believe that Kathryn Pyne Parsons provides an 
effective means to address Fischer's and Macintyre's 
criticisms. Parsons sees a connection between Nietzsche's 
views and the Aristotelian notion of the "great souled man." 
Within the Nietzschean framework, genuine values are not the 
product of a pre-existing moral code. They must instead be 
created by the individual who overcomes the model of the 
self that holds sway within the dominant moral paradigm. As 
Parsons puts it, "In this self-overcoming, one creates 
himself (sic] anew, and creates values." 106 On Parsons' 
view, traditional forms of moral justification by means of 
moral principles act as "a sort of post hoc rationalization, 
taking this rationalization as essential to morality." 107 
104Kurt Rudolf Fischer, "Nazism as a Nietzschean 
'Experiment,'" Nietzsche-Studien 6 (1977): 116. 
105Ibid. 1 116. 
106Kathryn Pyne Parsons, "Nietzsche and Moral 
Change," in Nietzsche: A Collection of Critical Essays, 189. 
107Ib' d 186 1 • , • 
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Nietzsche urges a paradigm shift away from traditional 
morality's concern with questions of obligation, rules, and 
principles, and toward the character of the individual moral 
agent. 1~ Within the dominant moral paradigm, however, 
Nietzsche's moral revolution cannot be recognized as moral 
because within this paradigm morality is synonymous with 
universal moral norms. This explains why Nietzsche's moral 
philosophy cannot be recognized as such from the perspective 
of Macintyre and Fischer. 
Parsons has provided an important clue to understanding 
Nietzsche's position by characterizing it as a shift away 
from the traditional moral paradigm and the historically 
dominant form of moral judgment. But I believe that she has 
mistakenly characterized this paradigm shift as a move away 
from moral laws and principles per se and towards a concern 
with character and style on the model of Aristotelian 
virtue. The virtue-based conception that Parsons attempts 
to impose on Nietzsche appears to be at odds with 
Nietzsche's characterization of the change in moral 
reasoning he is attempting to carry out. Nietzsche does not 
advocate the elimination of principles, rules, and laws, but 
rather a radical reconceptualization of our relationship to 
the principles, rules, and laws with which we govern our 
lives. 
As an indication of this reconceptualization consider 
·~ b'd I 1 • , 188. 
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Nietzsche's remarks toward the end of "Long Live Physics!" 
from The Gay Science. 1w Nietzsche urges the elimination of 
traditional forms of moral judgment: 
Sitting in moral judgment should offend our taste. Let 
us leave such chatter and such bad taste to those who 
have nothing else to do but drag the past a few steps 
further through time and who never live in the rresent-
-which is to say the many, the great majority. 11 
Moral judgment appears to have a peculiarly reactive quality 
because we can only pass judgments on actions that have 
already occurred. In contrast to the reactivity of moral 
judgment Nietzsche proposes a more active alternative: 
We • . . want to become those we are--human beings who 
are new, unique, incomparable, who give themselves 
laws, who create themselves. 111 
In the next and concluding section of this chapter I will 
discuss what I take to be the meaning of Nietzsche's move 
away from moral value judgment and toward value legislation 
and indicate the relevance of this move for understanding 
Nietzsche's critique of Kant. 
The Consequences of Naturalism: "Lonq Live Phvsics!" 
and the Prioritization of Legislative Discourse 
In the context of the regulation of human conduct and 
action we can understand a law in the most general sense as 
an exceptionless rule or directive principle. A moral law 
is expressed in the form of a command or imperative that 
iwThe Gay Science, no. 335, 266. 
llOibid. 
111Ibid. 
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places whoever is subject to it under a binding obligation. 
Thus, the idea of a law implicitly contains elements of both 
commanding and obeying. An autonomous will is one that 
unites the activities of commanding and obeying by being 
both the source of the command and that which obeys. In 
other words, an autonomous will is self-legislative: it is 
both the author and the subject of the law. 
Commanding and obeying are the psychological 
counterparts of the juridical functions of legislation and 
judgment. Commanding and obeying can be called the 
subjective forms of legislation and judgment. Legislation 
is the act of issuing commands that will serve as rules or 
directives and judgment is the act of subsuming an action or 
intention under pre-existing rules or directive principles. 
Legislation and judgment are both necessary features of laws 
of conduct. Any complete conception of autonomy as self-
legislation must, therefore, contain both the creative 
element of legislation and the administrative aspect of 
judgment. 
Although legislation and judgment are both necessary 
features of laws of conduct, it is not necessary that both 
elements be present to the same degree in every moral 
system. From a logical point of view, moral judgment 
presupposes some form of prior value legislation. We cannot 
make a moral judgment without at least some pre-existing 
standards or principles to direct our judgment. From a 
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historical point of view, however, the role of legislation 
in morality has been relatively minor. On Nietzsche's view, 
the moral tradition founded by Plato and disseminated by the 
spread of Christianity has prioritized judgment over 
legislation in characterizing the deliberation of moral 
agents. Legislative activity is curtailed by the presumably 
transcendent origin of the moral law. Within this moral 
tradition, the legislative power of the moral law derives 
from its non-natural status and purity. Nietzsche sums up 
his position regarding this conception of the moral law in a 
passage from Daybreak: 
[Up to now] the moral law has been supposed to stand 
above our own likes and dislikes: one did not want 
actually to impose this law upon oneself, one wanted to 
take it from somewhere or discover it somewhere or have 
Iteommanded to one from somewhere. 112 --
In other words, within this moral tradition, Nietzsche 
maintains that the dominant relationship to the moral law is 
one of reactive passivity that reflects a slavish attitude. 
We should not conclude from the preceding discussion 
that Nietzsche depreciates the value of a moral framework in 
which judgment predominates. In Beyond Good and Evil, for 
example, he criticizes the anarchist who complains about 
being subject to "capricious" laws: 
But the curious fact is that all there is or has been 
on earth of freedom, subtlety, boldness, dance, and 
masterly sureness, whether in thought itself or in 
government, or in rhetoric and persuasion, in the arts 
just as in ethics, has developed only owing to the 
112Daybreak, no. 108, 63-64. 
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'tyranny of such capricious laws'; and in all 
seriousness, the probability is by no means small that 
precisely this is "nature" and "natural"--and not that 
laisser-aller . 113 
It is not the fact of law that Nietzsche rejects. Nietzsche 
sees the "tyranny" of law as indispensable to the education 
of the human spirit. 114 As the passage quoted above 
suggests, human nature is not a concept that is antithetical 
to law. Rather, human nature is the product of the laws 
that human beings give themselves. Nietzsche's model is 
that of the artist, who is most natural and inspired 
precisely when obeying thousandfold laws, 
• . . laws that precisely on account of their hardness 
and determination defy all formulations through 
concepts (even the firmest concept is, compared with 
them, not free of fluctuation, multiplicity, and 
ambiguity) . 115 
The model of the artist is also true of morality as well, 
according to Nietzsche. The "moral imperative of nature" 
requires long obedience to laws as a means of spiritual 
discipline . 116 This moral imperative of nature, however, is 
sharply distinguished from Kant's categorical imperative in 
that it is neither categorical nor directed to the 
113Beyond Good and Evil, no. 188, 290. 
iuibid., 291: "Slavery is, as it seems, both in 
the cruder and in the more subtle sense, the indispensable 
means of spiritual discipline and cultivation, too." 
115Ibid., no. 188, 291. 
116Ibid. , 2 9 2 . 
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individual. 117 
From this we can conclude that Nietzsche does not 
necessarily reject moral frameworks in which judgment and 
obedience are present. Rather, what he objects to are moral 
frameworks in which considerations of judgment are given 
precedence over legislative considerations. On Nietzsche's 
view there are deep philosophical difficulties bound up with 
a conception of morality in which judgment is given 
priority. In order to see this it is necessary to consider 
Nietzsche's critique of moral judgment contained in "Long 
Live Physics!" 
In "Long Live Physics!" Nietzsche attempts a reductio 
ad absurdum of traditional conceptions of moral judgment. 118 
The model of moral reasoning that Nietzsche discusses is 
contained in the following passage: 
To come to the point: when a human being judges 'this 
is right' and then infers 'therefore it must be done,' 
and then proceeds to do what he has thus recognized as 
right and designated as necessary--then the essence of 
his action is moral (263). 
Nietzsche's characterization of this form of moral 
reasoning is missing several key premises. These premisses 
can be supplied and the position that Nietzsche is 
criticizing can be reconstructed in the following manner 
(Nietzsche's version appears as steps four through nine of 
118References to this text will be given 
parenthetically and refer to The Gay Science, no. 335, 263-
266. 
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this reconstruction): 
{l) If person P judges actions of a certain type to be 
morally right, and if P desires to act morally, then P 
must perform actions of that type. 
{2) P judges actions of type X to be morally right. 
{3) Therefore, P ·must perform actions of type X, if P 
desires to act morally. 
{4) Action A is judged by P to be of type X. 
{5) Therefore, A is morally right. 
{6) Therefore, P must perform A, if P desires to act 
morally. 
{7) P desires to act morally. 
{8) P must do A. 
{9) P does A. 
On this model, actions are morally justified by being 
subsumed under a category of action type that is deemed 
morally correct. The proposed action then becomes the 
subject of a series of inferences that culminate in an 
action-guiding judgment. On Nietzsche's view, however, this 
model of moral reasoning is seriously flawed because its 
conception of action is unnecessarily restricted: 
But my friend, you are speaking of three actions 
instead of one. When you judge 'this is right,' that 
is an action, too. Might it not be possible that one 
could judge in a moral and in an immoral manner? (263) 
As actions, acts of judgment and inference can also be moral 
or immoral, according to Nietzsche. Thus, acts of judgment 
and inference cannot serve to justify our actions without 
77 
being justified themselves. Therefore, on Nietzsche's view, 
if we remain at the level of judgment and inference, then 
this model of moral reasoning is threatened with an infinite 
regress. The attempt to morally justify an action in turn 
necessitates actions (judgments and inferences) which 
themselves must be justified, and so on, ad infinitum. The 
question then becomes, can we bring this regress to a halt? 
How can we justify our acts of moral judgment and inference 
and thereby justify our actions? 
Nietzsche turns to the claim that we can stop the 
regress of justification by appealing to non-cognitive 
grounds that are immediate and hence do not require acts of 
judgment. In particular, he discusses the appeal to moral 
conscience to justify our moral principles: 
Why do you consider this, precisely this, right? 
'Because this is what my conscience tells me; and the 
voice of conscience is never immoral, for it alone 
determines what is to be moral' (263). 
Nietzsche objects that such intuitionistic appeals do not 
halt the regress of justification, but merely push it back a 
step. This is the case because the intuitionist's appeal to 
the voice of conscience to justify moral principles must 
itself be justified: 
But why do you listen to the voice of your conscience? 
And what gives you the right to consider such a 
judgment true and infallible? (263) 
On Nietzsche's view, the moral conscience is not a pure 
source of moral rightness; it has a "pre-history in your 
instincts, likes, dislikes, experiences, and lack of 
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experiences" (263-264). If this origin were fully 
understood, however, it would not provide an answer to the 
more fundamental question--why listen to the voice of 
conscience? Even if the voice of conscience exists, it must 
be interpreted before it can be applied in specific moral 
judgments. Conscience can be listened to in a variety of 
ways, e.g., blindly, lovingly, stupidly, and badly {264). 
The voice of conscience may simply be the outward form of a 
secret prejudice or self-interest. Thus, the firmness or 
decisiveness of the moral conscience may, in fact, be a sign 
of its immorality: 
And, briefly, if you had thought more subtly, observed 
better, and learned more, you certainly would not go on 
calling this 'duty' of yours and this 'conscience' of 
yours duty and conscience. Your understanding of the 
manner in which moral judgments have originated would 
spoil these grand words for you ... {264). 
To sum up: Nietzsche's criticisms pose a dilemma for 
the moral justification of action. On the one hand, if we 
attempt to justify the appeal to the voice of conscience or 
moral intuition by means of judgment or inference we are 
threatened with circularity: our appeal to conscience was 
designed to halt the regress of justification of action in 
terms of judgment or inference. On the other hand, if we 
justify our appeal to conscience with yet another appeal to 
conscience, we find ourselves in yet another regress. 
The difficulties raised by his critique of moral 
judgment prompt Nietzsche to propose an alternative mode of 
moral discourse in which legislative considerations 
predominate. We have already seen that Nietzsche proposes 
that we strive to become self-legislative, self-creative 
beings. Nietzsche's intent is not to eliminate moral 
judgment, but to reverse the priority of judgment over 
legislation. We must come to recognize the importance of 
legislative considerations and take an active part in 
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legislation by giving ourselves goals of action. Only after 
this is done, Nietzsche argues, would it be possible for 
there to be universal moral laws: 
Only if mankind possessed a universally recognized goal 
would it be possible to propose 'thus and thus is the 
right course of action': for the present there exists 
no such goal. It is thus irrational and trivial to 
impose the demands of morality upon mankind. --To 
recommend a goal to mankind is something quite 
different: the goal is then thought of as something 
which lies in our own discretion; supposing the 
recommendation appealed to mankind, it could in pursuit 
of it also impose urion itself a moral law, likewise at 
its own discretion. 19 
As this passage makes clear, however, Nietzsche's goal is 
not merely a reversal of the priority of judgment over 
legislation. If it were, then Nietzsche's view would reduce 
to a constructivistic morality that would not be an advance 
over the metaphysically based view that he is trying to 
supplant. Nietzsche's point is not that legislation implies 
the imposition of goals of action upon human beings, but 
rather that legislation recommends goals of action, the 
adoption of which is left up to our discretion, and is 
subject to future revision. Unlike a mere imposition, a 
119Daybreak, no. 108, 63. 
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recommendation is contextual; it cannot be determined in 
abstraction from the concrete circumstances of life. It can 
only be adopted in an experimental fashion. If it turns out 
that a particular goal is detrimental to life, then it 
should either be modified or abandoned in favor of another 
goal that furthers the interest of life. 120 
The passage quoted above is also significant because it 
helps to clarify both the similarities and differences 
between Nietzsche's idea of self-legislation and Kant's 
conception of autonomy. In the Groundwork of the Metaphysic 
of Morals Kant defines autonomy of the will as "the property 
the will has of being a law to itself. 11121 Many of 
Nietzsche's formulations of his conception of self-
legislation are reminiscent of Kant's. For example, in 
Daybreak Nietzsche asks us to consider the possibility of a 
future treatment of criminal behavior in which a wrongdoer 
. . • calls himself to account and publicly dictates 
his own punishment, in the proud feeling that he is 
thus honoring the law which he himself has made, that 
by punishing himself he is exercising his power, the 
power of the lawgiver. . 122 
Nietzsche maintains that this state of affairs presupposes a 
conception of lawgiving based on the idea that "'I submit 
only to the law which I myself have given, in great things 
12
°Human Al 1 Too Human, no. 2 5 , 2 5 . 
121Kant, Groundwork of the Metaohvsic of Morals, 
trans. H.J. Paton (New York: Harper, 1964), 108. 
1noaybreak, no. 187, 109. 
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and in small. '" 123 
Kant's moral philosophy represents to Nietzsche a 
failed attempt to prioritize the self-legislative power of 
the will over considerations of moral judgment. In Kant's 
writings this prioritization has its roots in his 
realization that "reason has insight only into that which it 
produces after a plan of its own .... 11124 In the context 
of Kant's theory of practical reason, the shift from 
judgment to legislation is clear. Things in nature act in 
accordance with laws, argues Kant, but only a rational being 
"has the power to act in accordance with his idea of laws--
that is, in accordance with principles--and only so has he a 
will. 11125 An autonomous will is one that has the power "of 
being a law to itself." 1M Self-legislation takes on a 
special form in the human will because we are not completely 
rational beings. The human will is divided between its 
rational and its material sources of motivation. Such a 
will cannot be genuinely self-legislative, according to 
Kant, unless it is able to free itself from all sensuous 
determinations and material motivations and direct itself by 
a rational, a priori principle. Thus, on Kant's view, a 
human will is autonomous only when the faculty of choice is 
123Ibid., 110. 
lMcritigue of Pure Reason, Bxiii. 
125Groundwork, 8 O. 
126Ibid. I 108. 
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directed by pure practical reason. The moral law derived 
from pure practical reason is experienced by the ordinary 
moral consciousness as duty and is formalized in Kant's 
supreme moral principle, the categorical imperative: 
So act that the maxim of your will could always hold at 
the same time as a principle establishing universal 
law. u121 
What makes Kant's effort so ironical to Nietzsche is 
that it is carried out completely a priori, in total 
isolation from all empirical considerations. In Human, All 
Too Human Nietzsche remarks that Kant constructs his moral 
theory "as if everyone knew without further ado what mode of 
action would benefit the whole of mankind .... 11128 In 
fact, on Kant's view, separating the metaphysics of morals 
from empirical considerations derived from anthropology and 
physics is indispensable to both moral theorizing and 
action.u9 For Nietzsche, in contrast, it is precisely to 
these sciences that we must turn in order to gather 
knowledge about human life and culture that can serve as a 
"scientific standard" for setting for ourselves ecumenical 
127Critigue of Practical Reason, 30. 
128Human, All Too Human, no. 25, 25. 
129Groundwork, 78: "Nevertheless such a completely 
isolated metaphysics of morals, mixed with no anthropology, 
no theology, no physics or hyperphysics, still less with 
occult questions (which might be called hypophysical) is not 
only an indispensable substratum of all theoretical and 
precisely defined knowledge of duties, but is at the same 
time a desideratum of the utmost importance for the actual 
execution of moral precepts." 
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goals. 130 As he remarks at the end of "Long Live Physics! ", 
all previous values and ideals "have been based on ignorance 
of physics or were constructed so as to contradict it. 11131 
But in order to become legislators in Nietzsche's sense, 
i.e., those who create values, "we must become the best 
learners and discoverers of everything that is lawful and 
necessary in the world. . "132 Therefore, Nietzsche 
concludes, we must become physicists . 133 
I don't think that Nietzsche's call to us to become 
physicists should be taken literally. This would be plainly 
absurd. I think that when Nietzsche says that in order to 
become autonomous we must become physicists he is implying 
that the laws of morality need not be understood as being 
essentially different in kind from the laws of physics. The 
laws of nature determined by physics are not simply the 
result of an imposition of an interpretation by the 
physicist, but rather the product of a transaction between 
an experimental set-up on the one hand and nature on the 
other. While the laws of nature cannot be understood in 
isolation from the creative activity of the physicist, they 
cannot simply be reduced to this creativity either, without 
13
°Human, Al 1 Too Human, no. 2 5 , 2 5 . 
131The Gay Science, no. 335, 266. 
132Ibid. 
133Ibid.: "· .. we must become physicists in order 
to be able to be creators in this sense .... " 
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falling into constructivism. Nietzsche contends that the 
same is true of moral laws as well. They cannot simply be 
read-off of nature (or human nature), but neither can they 
simply be imposed upon human beings without running the risk 
of disaster. Rather, moral laws must be understood as self-
imposed, and therefore as autonomous, but they must also be 
understood from within the context of the empirical 
circumstances in which they are adopted as ecumenical goals, 
and therefore not simply as constructivistic. 
From a metaphysical point of view, Nietzsche's position 
entails the compatibility of freedom and causality. In 
other words, for Nietzsche, autonomy and the laws of physics 
do not exclude each other. This view is diametrically 
opposed to Kant's position. According to Kant, the world of 
appearance is strictly determined by the laws of causality. 
The type of freedom required by morality is thinkable only 
as existing in the intelligible realm of the thing-in-
itself. Thus, for Kant, the realm of physics and the realm 
of morality are absolutely separate. 1M 
This explains why Nietzsche believes that Kant remains 
within an antinatural moral framework despite the fact that 
Kant introduces legislative considerations into morality. 
Because Kant views freedom and causality as separate, he is 
required to postulate a "true world" in which freedom can be 
located. On Nietzsche's view, however, Kant has exploited 
IMKant, Groundwork, 78. 
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his incompatibilism as a means to regain the metaphysical 
realm excluded by the limitations placed on reason by the 
first Critique. Nietzsche's opposition to Kant is best 
expressed in "Long Live Physics!": 
--And now don't cite the categorical imperative, my 
friend! This term tickles my ear and makes me laugh 
despite your serious presence. It makes me think of 
the old Kant who had obtained the "thing in itself" by 
stealth--another very ridiculous thing!--and was 
punished for this when the "categorical imperative" 
crept stealthily into his heart and led him astray--
back to "God," "soul," "freedom," and "immortality," 
like a fox who loses his way and goes astray back into 
his cage. Yet it had been his strength and cleverness 
that had broken open the cage! 135 
Nietzsche's naturalism culminates with a radical 
rejection of a separation of autonomy and causality, as well 
as an insistence that empirical considerations cannot be 
eliminated from morality. This implies a fundamental 
opposition to Kant's grounding of morality on a metaphysical 
foundation and calls for a radical reconceptualization of 
the Kantian conception of the autonomous moral self . 136 In 
the next chapter I will explore the implications of 
Nietzsche's naturalization of morality for Kant's moral 
theory. I will examine Nietzsche's attempt to undermine 
Kant's "majestic moral structures" by his attack on what he 
sees as the antinaturalism of Kantian morality. Various 
aspects of Nietzsche's critique will be discussed, but I 
1
"The Gay Science, no. 335, 264. 
136victoria Wike, "Metaphysical Foundations of 
Morality in Kant," Journal of Value Inquiry 17 (1983): 225-
234. 
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will give particular attention to Nietzsche's interpretation 
of Kant's categorical imperative. As we will see, 
Nietzsche's critique of the categorical imperative centers 
on Kant's identification of autonomy of the will with duty, 
i.e., the will's ability to universalize its subjective 
principles of action. 
CHAPTER THREE 
NIETZSCHE'S CRITIQUE OF KANTIAN MORALITY 
Introduction 
In the transcendental dialectic of the Critique of Pure 
Reason Kant states that his task is, 
• . • to level the ground, and to render it 
sufficiently secure for moral edifices of . 
majestic dimensions. For this ground has been 
honeycombed by subterranean workings [Maulwurfsgange) 
which reason, in its confident but fruitless search for 
hidden treasures, has carried out in all directions, 
and which threaten the security of the 
superstructures. 1 
The metaphor of levelling the ground describes the dual 
intent of Kant's critical project--to secure the foundations 
of synthetic a priori knowledge within the bounds of 
experience and, thereby, to make room for morality and 
religious faith. 2 In the preface to Daybreak, Nietzsche 
defines his philosophical objectives in opposition to Kant. 
Nietzsche refers to himself as an underground man, a 
subterranean creature, and a mole (Maulwurf), i.e., "one who 
tunnels and mines and undermines. 113 This image captures 
Nietzsche's intention to burrow into the foundations of 
1Critigue of Pure Reason, A 318-319/B 376-377. 
2Ibid., B xxx. 
3Daybreak, preface no. 1, 1. 
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philosophical systems and expose the prejudices that they 
rest upon. It also captures the spirit of Nietzsche's aim 
of toppling Kant's moral edifice by undermining the 
foundation upon which it rests. 
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Nietzsche's critique of Kant's moral philosophy 
proceeds indirectly. Nietzsche rarely attacks Kant's 
arguments on the grounds of their internal or logical 
consistency. This is not to say that Nietzsche completely 
ignores this manner of criticism, but that the main focus of 
his critique lies elsewhere. He does not dispute Kant's 
account of the consciousness of duty and categorical 
imperative if this account is taken merely as a descriptive 
analysis of how the prevailing form of morality actually 
operates. What Nietzsche objects to is Kant's view that his 
account of morality reveals the a priori foundation of 
morality. In other words, Nietzsche wants to challenge the 
view that morality must operate this way. Nietzsche is 
interested in determining how the form of morality given 
philosophical expression by Kant came to be dominant, and in 
determining whether or not a different form of morality, 
conceived along naturalistic lines, might be possible. 
Nietzsche's critique of Kant's moral philosophy takes 
place within the framework created by his naturalistic 
opposition to antinatural moralities. On Nietzsche's view, 
Kant's moral philosophy epitomizes the three aspects of 
antinaturalism discussed in the previous chapter. The 
unconditional will to truth is found in Kant's effort to 
establish the a priori foundations of morality. The true 
world is represented by Kant's limitation of the scope of 
pure reason, which allows for the postulation of the 
necessary ideas of practical reason--God, freedom, and the 
immortality of the soul. The normative aspects of 
antinaturalism are found in Kant's identification of an 
autonomous will with one whose subjective principles are 
determined by pure reason and are therefore suitable to 
serve as universal laws of nature. 
I will argue that Nietzsche's opposition to the 
categorical imperative does not ultimately rest on an 
incompatibility of his conception of autonomy and Kant's. 
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As I indicated in the previous chapter, Nietzsche follows 
Kant in attempting to create a framework for human moral 
agency in which the self-legislative activity of the will is 
given priority over moral judgment. Nietzsche's opposition 
to Kant's conception of morality lies in the content of 
Kant's theory of autonomy. Kant links autonomy to the 
universalizability of an individual's subjective principles 
of action. Universalizability in turn presupposes the moral 
equality of agents. As I suggested in the previous chapter, 
however, Nietzsche rejects the presupposition of moral 
equality because he believes that it inherently gives 
greater emphasis to moral judgment over moral legislation. 
On Nietzsche's view, therefore, universalizability and moral 
equality are incompatible with autonomy. In other words, 
from Nietzsche's naturalistic perspective, there is a deep 
contradiction in Kantian morality between the will's 
autonomy and the content of the will's autonomy, namely 
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universalizability, that serves to undermine Kant's account 
of autonomy. 
I begin this chapter with an examination of Nietzsche's 
early rejection of Kant's denial of knowledge to make room 
for faith. This lays the foundation for an examination of 
Nietzsche's attack on Kant's "moral fanaticism" and on the 
uncritical moral prejudices he believes are reif ied in 
Kant's conception of the moral consciousness. In the 
following section I contrast Kant's and Nietzsche's 
positions regarding the a priori foundations of ordinary 
moral knowledge. I then turn to an examination of 
Nietzsche's master-slave dialectic in On the Genealogy of 
Morals and apply the results of my analysis to Kant's 
conception of autonomy as formalized in the categorical 
imperative. I conclude this chapter with a brief critical 
discussion of Nietzsche's critique of Kantian morality. 
Making Room for Art: Nietzsche's Early 
Opposition to Kant 
In this section I examine Nietzsche's opposition to 
Kant's transcendental idealism. To understand Nietzsche's 
relationship to Kant it is crucial to recall Kant's remark 
in the preface to the second edition of the Critique of Pure 
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Reason that he has found it necessary "to deny knowledge in 
order to make room for faith. "4 This can be taken as the 
motto of Kant's attempt to revolutionize metaphysics and 
transform it into a scientific discipline while at the same 
time making possible a metaphysical basis for morality. He 
does this by limiting the legitimate claims of synthetic g 
priori reason to objects of possible sense experience. 
Kant's limitation of reason has direct practical 
implications. The effort of traditional metaphysics to 
extend the speculative principles of reason beyond the 
bounds of sensibility threatens to make reality identical 
with the sensible. 5 But the practical employment of pure 
reason inevitably goes beyond the limits of sensibility, 
according to Kant. Therefore, if left unlimited, 
speculative reason actually reduces the scope of reason as a 
whole by eliminating the possibility of pure practical 
reason. In short, limiting speculative reason has a 
positive effect in that it finds room within reality in 
which to postulate the necessary objects of practical 
reason, i.e., God, freedom, and the immortality of the soul, 
without in any way extending knowledge beyond the limits of 
sensibility. 6 In Kant's words, knowledge is denied to make 
room for faith. 
4Critigue of Pure Reason, B xxx. 
5Ibid., B xxiv-xxv. 
6Ibid., B xxv. 
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Nietzsche's early reception of Kant's critical 
philosophy is inseparable from his effort to address what he 
interprets as the widespread cultural fragmentation 
resulting from the rise of a positivistic conception of 
knowledge. Nietzsche's understanding of the wider 
implications of positivism can be summarized as follows. 
Positivism maintains that natural science is the only source 
of universally true statements (natural laws) about reality. 
It therefore invades the hitherto privileged domain of 
metaphysics and harbors pretentions to absolute knowledge. 
As a result of positivism's absolutism, metaphysical 
knowledge is left without rational support and cannot 
therefore serve as a ground for norms, values, and ideals. 
Moreover, these norms, values, and ideals themselves lose 
their rational support. 
Science is a potential source of cultural degeneration, 
according to Nietzsche, because it can undermine traditional 
religious, moral, and aesthetic values while putting nothing 
in their place. 7 Moreover, by assuming reality is co-
extensive with the sensible world of appearance, 
positivistically conceived science undermines the 
possibility of providing its own search for knowledge with a 
7See, e.g., Schopenhauer as Educator, in Untimely 
Meditations, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1983), no. 4, 148: "The sciences, pursued 
without any restraint and in a spirit of the blindest . 
laissez-faire are shattering and dissolving all firmly held 
belief .... " 
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normative ideal or purpose. In other words, positivism 
implicitly contradicts its claims of pr1ority for its form 
of rationality by becoming a fragmented and desperate search 
for knowledge without any unifying purpose or human 
relevance. Within this environment the critical task for 
philosophy, as Nietzsche conceives it, is to restore the 
unity of knowledge and life, to establish a unifying goal of 
existence in the face of the positivistic devaluation of the 
highest values, and, thereby, to re-establish the basis for 
a genuine culture. To achieve this end, Nietzsche turns in 
The Birth of Tragedy to the culture of ancient Greece in his 
search for an historical precedent that can, perhaps, point 
the way out of the crisis. 
In The Birth of Tragedy Nietzsche locates the origin of 
Attic tragedy in the satyr chorus and follows its 
development through the golden age of Greek philosophy. 
Attic tragedy is the product of a peace treaty between the 
opposing art deities Apollo and Dionysus. Representational 
arts, i.e., sculpture and epic poetry, as well as the realm 
of dreams, belong to Apollo. Music, lyric poetry, and 
intoxication belong to Dionysus. Apollo is also described 
as the principle of individuation. The peace treaty that 
unites Apollo and Dionysus is disrupted by the introduction 
of dialectic into the tragic drama by Euripedes, and by 
Socrates. Socrates disrupts the balance that makes the 
tragic experience possible--the ability of the dramatic 
chorus to allow the spectator to behold in Apollinian 
rapture the presence of Dionysus--and thereby causes the 
death of tragedy. 
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Socrates' role in The Birth of Tragedy is analogous to 
the destructive potential of positivism in modern society. 
Socrates is the "prototype of the theoretical optimist" who 
believes that reality in-itself can be known via science. 8 
Socrates' optimism parallels the belief that Nietzsche 
associates with positivistic science, i.e., that reality in-
itself can be completely captured in the net of logic and 
science. The optimistic belief in science is destructive 
because it rules out the possibility of other realms of 
experience where the values that we create could apply and 
make sense. But it is precisely within the optimism of 
positivistic science that Nietzsche locates the possibility 
of the re-birth of tragic culture. The scope of knowledge 
is constantly expanding and with every increase in knowledge 
the perimeter shared by the known and the unknown increases. 
Therefore, Nietzsche contends, the positivistic dream of 
absolute knowledge must continuously be frustrated. 
Nietzsche believes that this unending, and increasingly more 
desperate, search for knowledge can eventually lead to 
skeptical despair among the practitioners of science who 
8The Birth of Tragedy, no. 15, 97. 
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might then turn to art "as a protection and remedy. 119 Thus 
at the heart of scientific optimism lies the potential for 
tragic insight. 
On Nietzsche's view, the critical philosophies of Kant 
and Schopenhauer provide the basis for a critique of 
posi ti vistic science. 10 As I mentioned above, Kant rejects 
the identification of the real with the sensible, and limits 
the claims of pure, a priori reason to the realm of 
appearance. For Kant, this limitation of theoretical 
knowledge has the positive effect of allowing for a realm of 
reality distinct from appearance in which the necessary 
ideas of morality and faith can be postulated, without in 
any way extending our knowledge to the suprasensible. In 
The Birth of Tragedy, the issue is not a priori reason, but 
rather the destruction of tragedy at the hands of scientific 
Socratism. Nevertheless, in the following passage Nietzsche 
adopts a quasi-Kantian formulation of the problem while 
translating it into his own idiom: 
Anyone who has ever experienced the pleasure of 
9Ibid., 98: "· .. when they see to their horror 
how logic coils up at these boundaries and finally bites its 
own tale--suddenly the new form of insight breaks through, 
tragic insight which, merely to be endured, needs art as 
protection and remedy." 
'°Ibid., no. 19, 120-121: "Let us recollect ... 
that Kant and Schopenhauer made it possible for the spirit 
of German philosophy ... to destroy scientific Socratism's 
complacent delight in existence by establishing its 
[Socratism's] boundaries; how through this delimitation was 
introduced an infinitely profounder and more serious view of 
ethical problems and of art .... " 
Socratic insight and felt how, spreading in ever-
widening circles, it seeks to embrace the whole world 
of appearances, will never again find any stimulus 
towards existence more violent than the craving to 
complete this conquest and weave the net impenetrably 
tight. 11 
Just as for Kant the dogmatic identification of the 
real and the sensible leaves no room for faith, positivism 
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weaves the net of knowledge too tightly, leaving no room for 
art to flourish and reveal the tragic ground of existence. 
Kant circumvents his version of the problem by limiting the 
scope of reason, thus allowing the postulation of a 
metaphysical world beyond the world of appearance. 
Despite the fact that Nietzsche incorporates Kant's 
language into his analysis of the problems of 
positivistically conceived science, he does not accept 
Kant's solution to the problem. Rather than simply denying 
knowledge in order to make room for art, thus implicitly 
assuming a distinction between knowledge and art, Nietzsche 
suggests that we look at knowledge, particularly scientific 
knowledge in a new way. He suggests that we "look at 
science in the perspective of the artist. 1112 In other 
words, on Nietzsche's view, it might be possible to view 
knowledge, not from the passive perspective of a neutral 
observing spectator, but from a more active, i.e., artistic 
point of view. Knowledge must be transformed from the 
11Ibid., no. 15, 97. 
12Ibid., "Attempt at a Self-Criticism," no. 2, 19. 
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neutral, value-free collection of facts to an active, 
experimental, transactional relationship with our subject 
matter. This view of knowledge is more active and artistic 
because it recognizes that our experiments are the product 
of research programs that we have designed. In other words, 
science, like religion and myth, becomes simply one of the 
numerous ways in which appearance can be interpreted in 
order to give meaning to existence. Viewed in this way it 
becomes possible to weave the net of knowledge "more tightly 
and delicately," increasing, rather than limiting its scope, 
without falling into the trap of traditional metaphysics. 13 
Looking back on this period in his "Attempt at a Self-
criticism," added to the 1886 edition of The Birth of 
Tragedy, Nietzsche expresses regret at trying to incorporate 
his artists' metaphysics into the framework of Kantian and 
Schopenhauerian philosophy: 
How I regret now that in those days I still lacked the 
courage (or immodesty?) to permit myself in every way 
an individual language of my own for such individual 
views and hazards--and that instead I tried laboriously 
to express by means of Schopenhauerian and Kantian 
formulas strange new valuations which were basically at 
odds with Kant's and Schopenhauer's spirit and 
taste! 1114 
As early as Schopenhauer as Educator Nietzsche's enthusiasm 
for Kant begins to wane. Here Nietzsche characterizes 
Kant's denial of knowledge as a means of "fashioning an idle 
13Ibi'd., o 15 98 n • , . 
uibid., "Attempt at a Self-Criticism," no. 6, 24. 
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skepticism that will soon be of no interest to anybody. 1115 
By the time of Beyond Good and Evil Nietzsche's opposition 
to Kant is already well-established. In the introduction to 
the first Critique Kant frames his inquiry as a means to 
answer the question "How are a priori synthetic judgments 
possible? 1116 Nietzsche objects to the "Tartuffery" implicit 
in Kant's answer to this question: 
'How are synthetic judgments a priori possible?' Kant 
asked himself--and what really is his answer? '~ 
virtue of a faculty'--but unfortunately not in five 
words, but so circumstantially, venerably, and with 
such a display of German profundity and curlicues that 
people simply failed to note the comical niaiserie 
allemande involved in such an answer. 17 
In order to highlight the "German foolishness" of Kant's 
answer, Nietzsche compares it to the answer of the doctor in 
Moliere's Tartuffe. Nietzsche recounts how in response to 
the question "'How does opium induce sleep?'" the doctor 
replies that it possesses a sleepy faculty "'whose nature it 
is to put the senses to sleep. ' 1118 In other words, 
Moliere's doctor begs the question by merely reformulating 
the question in his answer. 
Nietzsche maintains that a similar kind of question-
begging is apparent in Kant's denial of knowledge in order 
to make room for faith. According to Nietzsche, Kant's 
15Schopenhauer as Educator, no. 8, 188. 
16Cr i tigue of Pure Reason, B 19 . 
17Beyond Good and Evil, no. 11, 208. 
18Ibid. 
effort to establish the metaphysical bases of morality is 
problematic for a number of reasons. On Nietzsche's view, 
Kant's moral philosophy undermines the critical philosophy 
as a whole by implicitly returning it to the horizon of 
traditional metaphysics. Kant's distinction between 
appearances and things-in-themselves limits speculative 
reason to the domain of possible experience, while at the 
same time making it possible for reason, in its practical 
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application, to postulate God, freedom, and immortality. By 
allowing practical reason to have suprasensible application, 
however limited, Nietzsche believes that Kant simply gives 
back with one hand what he had taken away with the other: 
A path had been found on which one could sneak back to 
the old ideal. The conception of a "true world," the 
conception of morality as the essence of the world 
(those two most malignant errors of all time!), were 
once again, thanks to a wily and shrewd skepticism, if 
not provable, at least no longer refutable. Reason, 
the right of reason, does not extend that far. Reality 
had been reduced to mere "appearance," and a 
mendaciously fabricated world, the world of being, was 
honored as reality. Kant's success is merely a 
theologians' success. . 19 
According to Nietzsche, this helps to explain why Kant's 
"discovery" of a faculty of synthetic a priori judgment was 
greeted with jubilation by the ensuing generation of 
Tilbingen seminarians--who soon began to beat the bushes "all 
looking for 'faculties'."w 
19The Antichrist no. 10, 577. See also The Gay 
Science, no. 335, 264. 
20Beyond Good and Evil, no. 11, 208. See also The 
Antichrist, no. 10, 576. 
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Kant's attempt to establish the metaphysical bases of 
morality is also problematic on Nietzsche's view because it 
takes morality for granted. Kant denies knowledge to make 
room for faith and morality, but morality is uncritically 
accepted as a "fact of reason. " 21 In other words, Kant 
accepts morality as a fact and apparently never questions 
its basic soundness. Thus, in Nietzsche's eyes, Kant's 
critical philosophy reduces to an elaborate instrument the 
purpose of which is to provide a post hoc justification for 
the ordinary moral consciousness: 
. • . to create room for his 'moral realm' [Kant] saw 
himself obliged to posit an undemonstrable world, a 
logical 'Beyond'--it was for precisely that that he had 
need of his critique of pure reason! In other words: 
he would not have had need of it if one thing had not 
been more vital to him than anything else: to render 
the 'moral realm' unassailable, even better 
incomprehensible to reason--for he felt that a moral 
order of things was only too assailable by reason! 22 
In the next section I discuss Nietzsche's view that Kant's 
faith in morality, his "moral fanaticism," is, in part, the 
expression of an element of irrationalism and unrecognized 
moral prejudice at the heart of his moral rationalism. 
Nietzsche on Kant's "Moral Fanaticism" 
Kant's moral philosophy is rationalistic. Kant argues 
that if the moral law is to be a source of obligation, then 
it must be absolutely necessary, i.e., valid for the will of 
21Cri tigue of Practical Reason, 31. 
22Daybreak, pref ace no. 3, 3 . 
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all rational beings. Therefore, the moral law cannot be 
based on any specific features of human nature or history, 
nor on the merely contingent consequences of human actions, 
but must instead be sought a priori in the concept of 
rational being as such and in the idea of rational 
willing. 23 
As Lewis White Beck has noted, "[the] 'moral judgment 
of every man' is the true starting point of the Kantian 
moral philosophy. 1124 This should not be surprising 
given the general strategy of Kant's critical philosophy, 
which begins with the fact of coherent experience and works 
back to the a priori conditions that make experience 
possible. The same is true within a moral context as well. 
Kant takes the experience of obligation, consciousness of 
the moral law, as a fact of reason and proceeds analytically 
to its a priori basis in the concept of a rational being 
with a will of its own. 25 
23Groundwork, 74-76. See also 79: "Since moral 
laws have to hold for every rational being as such, we ought 
. • . to derive our principles from the general concept of a 
rational being as such .... " 
24Lewis White Beck, A Commentary on Kant's 
"Critique of Practical Reason" (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1960), 164. 
25critique of Practical Reason, 31. My account of 
Kant's method relies on the analytic of ordinary moral 
knowledge in the first chapter of the Groundwork. Although 
incomplete from the standpoint of Kant interpretation, this 
approach allows me to highlight Kant's position on the 
essential soundness of ordinary practical reason that is the 
focus of many of Nietzsche's criticisms. 
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Kant argues that mere objects act in conformity to 
objective laws of nature. A rational being, however, "has 
the power to act in accordance with his idea of laws--that 
is, in accordance with principles--and so has he a will."~ 
A will is absolutely good if it is impossible for it to be 
evil, that is, if its subjective principle ("maxim") when 
raised to the level of a universal law of nature "can never 
be in conflict with itself."v If reason infallibly 
determines the will (as is the case with God's "holy will"), 
then objectively necessary actions are also subjectively 
necessary. In other words, for a holy will there are no 
imperatives--no "I ought," but only "I will. "28 If reason 
does not infallibly determine the will (as is the case with 
the human will), then objectively necessary actions are 
subjectively contingent, "and the determining of such a will 
in accordance with objective laws is necessitation."~ This 
necessitation is experienced by the ordinary moral 
consciousness as duty, and it forms the basis of Kant's 
supreme moral principle, the categorical imperative: 
So act that the maxim of your will could always hold at 
the same time as a principle establishing universal 
law. 30 
26Groundwork, 80. 
27Ibid., 104. 
28Ibid., 81. 
29Ibid., 80. 
30critj,gue of P;racticS!l Reason, 30. 
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One of the interesting features of Nietzsche's critique 
of the categorical imperative, and of Kantian morality as a 
whole, is that Nietzsche does not focus his critique on the 
formalistic and rationalistic elements of Kant's account of 
morality, as is frequently the case. Instead, Nietzsche 
emphasizes what he interprets as the uncritical aspects of 
Kant's moral philosophy. on Nietzsche's view, Kant's moral 
philosophy simultaneously expresses the moral enthusiasm of 
the eighteenth century, a peculiarly German tendency to 
idealize the inclination to obedience, and "a subterranean 
Christianity. 1131 
Nietzsche's critique is guided by the principle that 
"moralities a~e . . . merely a sign language of the 
affects. 1132 When one penetrates beneath the external 
logical form of a moral system one discovers that it 
implicitly expresses the emotive qualities of its creator. 
A moral system may be seen as an indication that its creator 
desires self-justification, self-satisfaction, humiliation, 
revenge, self-concealment, forgetfulness, or simply to be 
31The Will to Power, no. 101, 64. "Kant: inferior 
in his psychology and knowledge of human nature; way off 
when it comes to great historical values (French 
Revolution); a moral fanatic a la Rousseau; a subterranean 
Christianity in his values; a dogmatist through and through, 
but ponderously sick of this inclination, to such an extent 
that he wished to tyrannize it, but also weary right away of 
skepticism; not yet touched by the slightest breath of 
cosmopolitan taste and the beauty of antiquity--a delayer 
and mediator, nothing original .... 11 
32Beyond Good and Evil, no. 187, 290. 
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forgotten. Kant is no exception. "Even apart from the 
value of such claims as 'there is a categorical imperative 
in us,'" Nietzsche remarks, "one can still always ask: what 
does such a claim tell us about the man who makes it? 1133 
What does Nietzsche think the categorical imperative tells 
us about Kant? Nietzsche believes that the categorical 
imperative is the expression of an implicit tendency to 
idealize obedience and conformity: "· .. some others, 
perhaps including Kant, suggest with their morality: 'what 
deserves respect in me is that I can obey--and you ought not 
to be different from me. 11134 
Before proceeding it is important to anticipate a 
possible objection to this aspect of Nietzsche's critique of 
Kant. Is Nietzsche simply conducting an ad hominem attack 
on Kant's personality rather than critically addressing the 
substance of Kant's moral philosophy? Nietzsche often 
refers to Kant as a "moral fanatic" and reproaches his 
"innocent moral enthusiasm." If such remarks are not ad 
hominem, what is their philosophical justification? 
Nietzsche's principle that moralities are a sign 
language of the affects is a corollary of a more general 
hermeneutic principle that takes philosophical concepts and 
33 b'd I 1 ., no. 187, 289. 
34 b'd I 1 ., 289-290. 
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systems as the involuntary autobiography of their 
creators. 35 On Nietzsche's view, every philosophical system 
expresses the mood and personality of its creator. Working 
backwards from the clue of personality one can theoretically 
reconstruct the spirit of an age and the possibilities for 
human development that existed at that time. 36 The 
philosophical personality acts as a clue to its overall 
conceptual environment, and thus serves as a critical or 
diagnostic tool for the philosophical physician. Therefore, 
against the charge that he is arguing ad hominem Nietzsche 
responds: 
... I never attack persons; I merely avail myself of 
the person as of a strong magnifying glass that allows 
one to make visible a general but creeping and elusive 
calamity. 37 
In what sense is Kant's moral philosophy a magnifying 
35Ibid., no. 6, 203: "Gradually it has become clear 
to me what every great philosophy so far has been: namely, 
the personal confession of its author and a kind of 
involuntary and unconscious memoir .... " 
36Philosophy in the Tragic Aae of the Greeks, 
trans. Marianne Cowan (Washington, D.C.: Regnery Gateway, 
1962), preface, 23-24: "Now philosophical systems are wholly 
true for their founders only. For all subsequent 
philosophers they usually represent one great mistake, for 
lesser minds a sum of errors and truths. . . . They always 
have one wholly incontrovertible point: personal mood, 
color. They may be used to reconstruct the philosophic 
image, just as one may guess at the nature of the soil in a 
given place by studying a plant that grows there. 'So this 
has existed--once at least--and is therefore a possibility, 
this way of life, this way of looking at the human scene.' 
The 'system' is a growth of this soil, or at least a part of 
this system ••.. " 
37Ecce Homo, in Basic Writings, "Why I am so Wise," 
no. 7, 688. 
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image of his age? According to Nietzsche, Kantian morality 
is representative of the moral enthusiasm of eighteenth 
century European culture and philosophy. 38 Nietzsche 
interprets the eighteenth century largely in terms of a 
struggle between two opposing points of view. On one side 
are the rationalists, epitomized by Voltaire, who view the 
hand of Providence with a pessimistic eye and dedicate 
themselves to the improvement of social conditions. On the 
other side are the sensualists, epitomized by Rousseau--
optimistic, solitary spirits who believe that "man perfects 
himself to the extent to which he approaches nature ... 
1139 
For Nietzsche, Kant's denial of knowledge in order to 
make room for faith testifies to Rousseau's victory in this 
struggle. Rousseau exercised a profound influence upon 
Kant's attitude towards ordinary moral reason and human 
38The Will to Power, no. 95, 59: "The eighteenth 
century is dominated by woman, given to enthusiasm, full of 
espirit, shallow, but with a spirit in the service of what 
is desirable, of the heart, libertine in the enjoyment of 
what is most spiritual, and undermines all authorities; 
intoxicated, cheerful, clear, humane, false before itself, 
much cana.ille au fond, sociable.--" 
Brbid., no. 100, 62. For Nietzsche's opposition 
of Voltaire and Rousseau see Ibid., nos. 98-100, 61-64. 
Nietzsche dedicated the first edition of Human, All Too 
Human to Voltaire. For this dedication see KSA 2, 
Menschliches, Allzumenschliches, I, 10. Hollingdale omits 
this dedication in his English translation. 
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moral equality.~ Nietzsche maintains that Kant's 
acceptance of the essential soundness of moral consciousness 
shows that Kant has been bitten by the "moral tarantula" 
Rousseau. 41 
Despite the influence of "French fanaticism" on Kant's 
moral philosophy, Nietzsche also holds that as a philosopher 
"one could not have gone to work in a less French fashion, 
more thoroughly, more in a German fashion . than Kant 
did."~ This is true of the first Critique, but it is also 
true of Kant's moral philosophy as well. Kant insists that 
it is not enough to simply accept the fact of moral 
obligation. He proceeds to demonstrate the rational basis 
of this sense of obligation. Nevertheless, Nietzsche 
maintains that Kant's demonstration, particularly his 
emphasis on the centrality of duty in the moral 
consciousness, is strongly influenced by cultural and 
historical factors. 
4
°Kant, Handschriftlicher Nachlass, vol. 7, Kants 
Schriften, vol. 20 , ed. Preussische Akademie der 
Wissenschaften (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1942) 44. This 
passage is quoted in Beck, Commentary on Kant's "Critique of 
Practical Reason", 165: "By inclination I am an inquirer. I 
feel a consuming thirst for knowledge, the unrest which goes 
with desire to progress in it, and satisfaction in every 
advance in it. There was a time when I believed this 
constituted the honor of humanity, and I despised the 
people, who know nothing. Rousseau corrected me in this. 
This blinding prejudice disappeared and I learned to honor 
man." 
~Daybreak, preface no. 3, 3. See also Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra, "On the Tarantulas," 211-214. 
42Ibid. 
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Nietzsche holds that Kant's emphasis on duty reflects a 
characteristically German tendency to idealize unconditional 
obedience. The German attitude towards morality is, in 
part, the expression of the sluggishness of the German 
spirit, which seeks to obey whenever possible. 43 According 
to Nietzsche, a German is capable of overcoming this 
sluggishness and acting in a manner that is "dangerous, 
evil, profound," but in most cases, "he is afraid of 
depending on himself alone, of improvising: that is why 
Germany uses up so many officials and so much ink."44 The 
German spirit also tends towards self-destructive 
superstition, faith, and emotion. Given these 
characteristics, asks Nietzsche, what type of morality can 
we expect? 
The first thing it will certainly require is that in 
this morality its heartfelt inclination to obedience 
shall appear idealized. 'Man has to have something 
which he can obey unconditionally'--that is a German 
sensation, a German piece of consistency: it is to be 
encountered at the basis of all German moral 
teaching. 45 
In contrast to the morality of antiquity, ~hat stresses the 
virtue of personal distinction, German morality stresses the 
virtues of submission and obedience. This tendency is first 
expressed by Luther, whose proof of the existence of God, 
Nietzsche contends, rests on his belief "that there must 
~Ibid., no. 207, 127. 
44Ibid., 128. 
45Ibid. I 129. 
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exist a being in which man could have unconditional 
trust."46 
This tendency to idealize unconditional obedience is 
inherently at odds with the spirit of moral enlightenment.~ 
Morality's unconditional status effectively removes it from 
genuine critical scrutiny. 48 The security of morality from 
criticism lies in its "art of enchantment," which it uses to 
paralyze the critical will. As Nietzsche puts it, morality 
is the "Circe of philosophers" which lures them to shipwreck 
on the rocks.G Thus, in response to the question, "Why is 
it that from Plato onwards every philosophical architect in 
Europe has built in vain?", Nietzsche rejects Kant's answer 
that philosophy's lack of progress is the result of a 
failure to undertake a critique of reason. The correct 
answer, according to Nietzsche, is that all philosophical 
architects, including Kant, were building under the 
"seduction of morality." While they appear to be concerned 
with the foundations of reason, they are actually concerned 
46Ibid. 
47The Gay Science, no. 5, 8 o. 
~Daybreak, preface no. 3, 2: "Conscience, 
reputation, Hell, sometimes even the police have permitted 
and continue to permit no impartiality; in the presence of 
morality, as in the face of any authority, one is not 
allowed to think, far less to express an opinion: here one 
has to obey!" This passage appears to contain a veiled 
reference to Kant's "An Answer to the Question: 'What is 
Enlightenment?'" 
49Ibid. 
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with the construction of "majestic moral structures. 1150 
In the next section I compare and contrast Nietzsche's 
position with Kant's on the rational foundations of 
morality. Nietzsche will employ a genealogical method to 
challenge Kant's claims that the consciousness of the moral 
law is a fact of reason. On Nietzsche's view, the origin of 
duty and the moral law can be traced to specific 
developments in the history of human consciousness that do 
not rest on a priori grounds. 
Kant and Nietzsche on the Rational Foundations of 
The Moral Consciousness 
In the first chapter of the Groundwork, Kant employs 
the method he mentions briefly in the conclusion of the 
preface, i.e., "· .. we proceed analytically from common 
knowledge [of morality] to its supreme principle ... . 51 
Kant's analytic of ordinary moral knowledge has three main 
purposes. First, it is intended to demonstrate the 
essential soundness of ordinary moral knowledge. 52 Second, 
it is intended to point out the limitations of ordinary 
moral knowledge and thereby also demonstrate the need to 
critically establish its rational foundations. Finally, it 
is intended to establish that ordinary moral knowledge, the 
50Ibid., 3. 
51Groundwork, 60. 
52! use the phrase "ordinary moral knowledge" to 
translate Kant's "Gemeine sittlichen Vernunfterkenntnis." 
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consciousness of duty, presupposes the existence of an g 
priori moral law, the categorical imperative, if it is not 
to be merely an illusion. 
Kant's statement regarding his analytical approach is 
somewhat misleading. The term "analysis" might lead us to 
anticipate a survey of diverse moral practices that reduces 
their apparent differences to a common principle or 
foundation. This is not what we find in the early sections 
of the Groundwork. Kant does not derive his supreme moral 
principle from empirical considerations regarding moral 
experience, or from the observation of moral practices, but 
rather by means of conceptual analysis. He begins with 
ordinary moral experience, the consciousness of the moral 
law, and attempts to determine the a priori conditions that 
must be operative to make such a law possible. 
Kant's method of beginning with ordinary moral 
knowledge can be illustrated by the discussion of the good 
will that opens the Groundwork. Kant begins with the 
following declaration: 
It is impossible to conceive anything at all in the 
world, or even out of it, which can be taken as good 
without qualification except a good will." 
Kant is making three distinct claims about the good will. 
If we stress the clause in which the good will is ref erred 
to as "good without qualification," then the good will is 
being characterized as good in itself, i.e., intrinsically 
53Groundwork, 61. 
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good. If we stress the preceding clause where Kant says 
that "it is impossible to conceive" anything besides a good 
will that is good without qualification, then the good will 
must be interpreted as necessarily good. The necessary 
goodness of the good will qualifies its intrinsic goodness, 
distinguishing it from other intrinsically good things, such 
as talents or qualities of temperament, which are only 
contingently good. Finally, Kant is claiming that only a 
good will is both necessarily and intrinsically good. 
It is only after Kant determines the absolute goodness 
of the good will that he turns to experience to confirm the 
validity of his analysis. To confirm the special status of 
a good will among other intrinsic goods, Kant appeals to a 
hypothetical rational spectator who "can never feel approval 
in contemplating the uninterrupted prosperity of being 
graced by no touch of a pure and good will. • 1154 Kant 
acknowledges that the idea that only a good will has moral 
worth may seem strange, "in spite of all the agreement it 
receives even from ordinary reason ...• "" Once again, it 
is consistency with ordinary moral knowledge that is cited 
as confirming a conceptual inquiry. 
In The Gay Science we find Nietzsche's retort to Kant 
in an aphorism entitled "Kant's Joke": 
Kant wanted to prove, in a way that would dumbfound the 
54Ibid., 61. 
55Ib'd 62 1 • , . 
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common man, that the common man was right: that was the 
secret joke of his soul. He wrote against the scholars 
in support of popular prejudice, but for scholars and 
not for the people. 56 
Kant might object to the polemical tone of this aphorism, 
but he would probably agree that his moral philosophy is not 
intended to reform or revolutionize morality, but simply to 
confirm it and render it more secure by revealing its ground 
in pure reason. 
It is this aspect of Kant's philosophy that prevents 
Nietzsche from bestowing upon "the great Chinese of 
K6nigsberg" the designation of genuine philosopher.~ 
Instead, Kant is referred to as "merely a great critic," who 
performs with distinction the "wonderful task" of the 
philosophical laborer.g As a philosophical laborer, Kant, 
in this respect like Hegel, brings order and systematic 
unity to the vast realm of inherited values: 
56The Gay Science, no. 193, 205-206. In a footnote 
to his English translation Kaufmann remarks that in this 
aphorism Nietzsche is referring to Kant's practical 
postulates and to the noumena/phenomena distinction that 
makes room for faith. Cf. David E. Cartwright, "Kant, 
Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche on the Morality of Pity," 
Journal of the History of Ideas (Jan. 1984): 83. Cartwright 
points out that Nietzsche "may also have had in mind Kant's 
claim in the first chapter of the Grundlegung .... " I 
agree with Cartwright's general assessment that "Nietzsche's 
point is . . . that what Kant saw as the source of the 
practical principles a priori present in reason is nothing 
but the product of the moral prejudices of our Judeo-
Christian culture: there is nothing, he argues, either g 
priori or reasonable about these things." 
57Beyond Good and Evil, no. 210, 325. 
gibid., no. 211, 326. 
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Those philosophical laborers after the noble model of 
Kant and Hegel determine and press into formulas, 
whether in the realm of logic or political {moral) 
thought or art, some great data of valuations--that is, 
former positings of values, creations of value which 
have become dominant and are for a time called 
'truths. ' 59 
Although Kant formalizes previous positings of moral 
value, he does not interpret these values as positings, 
i.e., as the product of contingent human decisions and 
choices made in particular historical contexts, but rather 
takes them as indications of the rational foundation of 
morality. In other words, Kant assumes that the 
consciousness of the moral law is a fact of reason rather 
than a fact of history. According to Nietzsche, this lack 
of historical consciousness is one of the crucial flaws in 
Kant's moral methodology. 60 
In contrast to Kant, Nietzsche holds that "there are 
altogether no moral facts. " 61 What Kant has accepted 
without question as a fact of reason is "merely an 
interpretation of certain phenomena--more precisely a 
misinterpretation."62 On Nietzsche's view, one of the jobs 
of the genuine philosopher--in contrast to laborers such as 
Kant and Hegel--is to bring these purported facts and 
59Ibid. 
60.rhe Will to Power, no. 101, 64. 
61Twilight of the Idols, "The 'Improvers' of 
Mankind," no. 1, 501. 
62Ibid. 
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misinterpretations to light. In Nietzsche's words, genuine 
philosophers are "the bad conscience of their time": 
By applying the knife vivisectionally to the chest of 
the very virtues of their time, they . . . exposed how 
much hypocrisy, comfortableness, letting oneself go and 
letting oneself drop, how many lies lay hidden under 
the best honored type of their contemporary morality, 
how much virtue was outlived. 63 
Thus Nietzsche and Kant have diametrically opposed 
views concerning ordinary moral knowledge. Kant accepts 
ordinary moral knowledge as a basic datum that must be 
accounted for and ultimately confirmed. Nietzsche, 
conversely, views the virtues of his time as somehow 
anachronistic, i.e., "outlived," and in need of a more 
radical form of critique than that employed by Kant. One of 
Nietzsche's primary aims in vivisecting the virtues of his 
time is to undermine the belief that traditionally conceived 
morality rests on pure reason. Whereas Kant seeks the 
rational foundation of morality, Nietzsche tries to expose 
traditionally conceived morality's non-rational roots in 
custom, inherited tradition, and the internalization of 
cruelty. 
Nietzsche's discussion of the non-rational origins of 
moral phenomena is not intended as a dogmatic refutation of 
traditional morality, as represented by Kant. Rather, 
Nietzsche's refutation is more in a skeptical mode. He 
attempts to cast doubt on Kant's position by explaining the 
63Beyond Good and Evil, no. 212, 327. 
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same set of phenomena from a diametrically opposed set of 
assumptions. A good statement of Nietzsche's strategy can 
be found in Daybreak. "In former times," Nietzsche writes, 
one sought to prove that there is no God--today one 
indicates how the belief that there is a God could 
arise and how this belief acquired its weight and 
importance: a counter-proof that there is no God 
thereby becomes superfluous."M 
This mode of argumentation does not commit the genetic 
fallacy of arguing that something is false based merely on 
its origins. Instead, it offers an alternative explanation 
of moral phenomena that renders claims of a priori validity 
superfluous. In effect, this transforms morality from a 
necessary to a contingent feature of human existence. This 
is important because once morality is viewed as something 
contingent, then it becomes possible to consider alternative 
moralities that do not conform to traditionally conceived 
models. 
Nietzsche maintains that moral phenomena, such as the 
consciousness of duty and the moral law, rest on custom and 
its social enforcement. With the passage of time, custom 
becomes so deeply integrated into the collective 
consciousness of a culture that it becomes reified into its 
form of practical reason per se. This implies that Kant's 
search for the rational foundation of morality involves an 
inversion of cause and effect. The consciousness of duty, 
Nietzsche maintains, is not "caused" by morality's a priori 
Mpaybreak, no. 95, 54. 
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foundation. Rather, the duration of the enforcement of 
customs has caused morality to appear as an a priori truth. 
Nietzsche's chief proposition concerning the origin of 
morality is as follows: 
•.• morality is nothing other (therefore no more!) 
than obedience to customs, of whatever kind they may 
be; customs, however are the traditional way of 
behaving and evaluating. 65 
Within the morality of custom, a person is called "good" who 
performs customary actions without resistance, "as a result 
of a long inheritance, that is to say easily and gladly. 
1166 A person is called "evil" who resists acting in 
conformity with custom. Thus, within the framework of the 
morality of custom, the autonomous individual is considered 
the most evil. As Nietzsche puts this point in Daybreak, 
"[the) free human being is immoral because in all things he 
is determined to depend upon himself and not upon a 
tradition .... 1167 What is a tradition? on Nietzsche's 
view, a tradition is simply any higher authority that 
imposes commands. 68 The orig in of tradition is not to be 
sought in reason, but in the customs that contribute to the 
65Ibid.,, no. 9, 10. See also Human, All Too 
Human, no. 96, 51: "To be moral, to act in accordance with 
custom, to be ethical means to practice obedience towards a 
law or tradition established from of old." 
66Human, All Too Human, no. 96, 51. 
67Daybreak, no. 9 , 1 o . 
~Ibid., 11: "What is tradition? A higher 
authority which one obeys, not because it commands what is 
useful to us, but because it commands." 
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preservation of the community. 69 
Nietzsche appeals to tradition to explain the origin of 
the consciousness of the moral law. His basic premise is 
that a class distinction has existed throughout the history 
of human social life between the small number who command 
and the large number who obey. Because obedience has been 
exercised by such a large number of people for such a long 
period of time, 
• • . it may fairly be assumed that the need for it is 
now innate in the average man, as a kind of formal 
conscience that commands: 'thou shalt unconditionally 
do something, unconditionally not do something else,' 
in short, 'thou shalt.'m 
In On the Genealogy of Morals Nietzsche offers an 
account of the origin of the moral consciousness that 
develops some of the themes found in this analysis of the 
morality of custom. Like Kant, Nietzsche begins his 
analysis with a common feature of moral life, i.e., the act 
of promising. 71 He does not, however, attempt to deduce its 
a priori foundations. Rather, as a genealogist of morals, 
Nietzsche inquires into the historical circumstances that 
made possible the existence of a creature "with the right to 
69Human. All Too Human, no. 96, 51: "How the 
tradition has arisen is here a matter of indifference, and 
has in any event nothing to do with good and evil or with 
any kind of immanent categorical imperative; it is above all 
directed at the preservation of a community, a people. . . 
" 
70Beyond Good and Ev i 1 , no . 19 9 , 3 o o • 
71Cf. Groundwork, 89-90. 
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make promises."72 
The right to make promises, i.e., the development of 
the sense of moral obligation, presupposes the development 
of memory. The manner in which memory was created is, 
therefore, a key element in the history of the development 
of the moral consciousness. The existence of memory 
requires an explanation because human beings are a 
necessarily forgetful species. Nietzsche maintains that the 
repressive function of active forgetfulness is necessary for 
the development of higher mental operations. Active 
forgetfulness makes us unconscious of our bodily processes 
and makes room for anticipatory functions such as foresight 
and premeditation. 73 
Memory acts as a counter-faculty to active 
forgetfulness and is operative when promises are made. 
Memory is not merely a passive faculty, "but an active 
desire not to rid oneself, a desire for the continuance of 
something desired once, a real memory of the will. . . . 1174 
The memory of the will must be strong enough to function 
even if many obstacles are interposed between the original 
'I will' and the actual carrying-out of the action. This 
720n the Genealogy of Morals, second essay, no. 1, 
493: "To breed an animal with the right to make promises--is 
not this the paradoxical task that nature has set itself in 
the case of man? is it not the real problem regarding man?" 
nibid., no. 1, 494. 
74Ibid. 
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presupposes knowledge, i.e., the ability to separate 
necessary from accidental events, as well as the development 
of instrumental reason. 75 Such knowledge in turn 
presupposes that human beings have become uniform and 
predictable: 
Man himself must first of all have become calculable, 
regular, necessary, even in his own image of himself, 
if he is to be able to stand security for his own 
future, which is what one who promises does! 76 
Uniformity and predictability are the product of the 
forces of socialization associated with the morality of 
custom.n The end result of this process of socialization 
is the autonomous, sovereign individual who possesses the 
right to make promises. 78 The ability to make promises 
serves as the measure of value for the sovereign individual, 
who honors those who are also able to promise while holding 
75Ibid. 
76Ibid. 
nibid., no. 2, 495: "· .. with the aid of the 
morality of mores and the social straightjacket, man was 
actually made calculable." 
78Within the morality of custom, autonomy and 
morality are mutually exclusive. At this stage all morality 
is heteronomous and based upon tradition. This helps to 
explain Nietzsche's claim that a moral system in which the 
autonomous individual is central, such as Kant's, 
presupposes the morality of custom in order to make human 
beings more or less uniform and equal from a moral 
standpoint. See KSA 11, no. 25(437], 128: "Die Moralen 
Kants, Schopenhauers gehen, ohne es zu merken, schon von 
einem moralrischen] Kanon aus: der Gleichheit der Menschen, 
und dass was fur den Einen Moral ist, es auch fur den 
Anderen sein musse. Das ist aber schon die Conseguenz einer 
Moral, vielleicht einer sehr fragwurdigen." 
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in contempt those who promise without being permitted. 79 
Nietzsche maintains that it is this feeling of power over 
oneself and the sense of responsibility that accompanies the 
right to make promises that is called the "conscience. 1180 
The main element in the creation of memory is pain: 
"'If something is to stay in the memory it must be burned 
in: only that which never ceases to hurt stays in the 
memory. • • . ' 1181 The prominence of pain as a tool of 
"mnemotechnics" is seen in the prevalence of sacrifice, 
mutilation, and cruel religious rituals. 82 Asceticism also 
plays an important role here; certain ideas become fixed in 
order to hypnotise the nervous system, 
• and ascetic procedures and modes of life are 
means of freeing these ideas from the competition of 
all other ideas, so as to make them 'unforgettable.'"~ 
Having traced the prerequisite of the right to make 
promises to the creation of memory, Nietzsche now traces the 
development of the moral consciousness. On Nietzsche's 
790n the Genealogy of Morals, second essay, no. 2, 
496. 
wibid., no. 2, 496: "The proud awareness of the 
extraordinary privilege of responsibility, the consciousness 
of this rare freedom, this power over oneself and over fate, 
has in his case penetrated to the profoundest depths and 
become instinct, the dominating instinct. What will he call 
this dominating instinct, supposing he feels the need to 
give it a name? The answer is beyond doubt: this sovereign 
man calls it his conscience." 
81 Ib1'd., o 3 497 n • I • 
82Ibid. 
83Ibid. 
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view, the origins of the moral conceptions of guilt, bad 
conscience, and duty are traceable to the sphere of legal 
obligation. Nietzsche discounts the views of former 
genealogists on this issue. They have not suspected that 
"the major moral concept Schuld (guilt] has its origins in 
the very material concept Schulden [debts]." 84 The debtor, 
in order to inspire trust in the promise to repay the debt, 
pledges something that he possesses, e.g., his body or soul, 
to the creditor in case of failure to repay. The creditor 
accepts as recompense for the injury suffered by the 
uncollected debt the pleasure of exercising cruelty 
proportionate to the debt upon the debtor. 85 
It is Nietzsche's hypothesis that the spiritualization 
and deification of cruelty, as illustrated in the creditor-
debtor relationship, "permeates the entire history of higher 
culture {and in a significant sense actually constitutes 
it). " 86 This is particularly true in the sphere of culture 
in which morality is found. The sublimated cruelty latent 
within culture reveals itself in morality in the inseparable 
link between guilt and suffering. This is a link that is 
still visible in the dominant moralities of Nietzsche's 
time, especially Kant's: 
And might one not add that, fundamentally, this world 
84Ibid., no. 4, 498-499. 
~Ibid., no. 5, 500-501. 
~Ibid., no. 6, 502. 
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has never since lost a certain odor of blood and 
torture? (Not even in good old Kant: the categorical 
imperative smells of cruelty). 87 
What does Nietzsche mean when he says that the 
categorical imperative smells of cruelty? This remark can 
be interpreted in a number of different ways. In terms of 
Nietzsche's analysis of the morality of custom it could be 
taken to mean that the relentless claim of duty within 
Kantian morality prevents it from becoming customary, 
habitual, or unconscious. 88 This distinguishes Kantian 
morality from the morality of custom in which the "good" 
person performs customary actions naturally, without 
internal resistance. It also distinguishes Kant's view of 
morality from that of critics such as, e.g., Friedrich 
Schiller, who see the lack of internal resistance in moral 
action as the mark of a "schone Seele. 1189 
Nietzsche's remark that the categorical imperative 
smells of cruelty can also be taken to imply that Kant's 
conception of duty still retains an element of cruelty that 
Nietzsche argues plays an essential role in the formation of 
the moral consciousness. This interpretation would reflect 
Nietzsche's tendency to interpret the categorical imperative 
nibid., no. 6, 501. 
88Daybreak, no. 339, 163: "To demand that duty must 
always be something of a burden--as Kant does--means to 
demand that it should never become habit and custom: in this 
demand there is concealed a remnant of ascetic cruelty." 
89Henry E. Allison, Kant's Theory of Freedom 
{Cambridge:'Cambridge University Press, 1990), 180-184. 
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in rigoristic terms. The rigoristic interpretation of the 
categorical imperative imputes to Kant the view that duty 
excludes all considerations of pleasure and happiness. A 
rigoristic reading. of Kant is implied in the following 
passage from The Antichrist: 
An action demanded by the instinct of life is proved to 
be right by the pleasure that accompanies it; yet this 
nihilist [i.e., Kant] with his Christian dogmatic 
entrails considered pleasure an objection. What could 
destroy us more quickly than working, thinking, and 
feeling without any inner necessity, without any deeply 
personal choice, without pleasure--as an automaton of 
'duty'?90 
Of course, a more careful reading of Kant's texts might 
perhaps have indicated to Nietzsche that Kant does not 
necessarily consider pleasure or happiness an objection to 
moral action. As Victoria S. Wike has shown, Kant's ethics 
does not require that the moral law be the sole determining 
ground of the will.~ Although Kant is occasionally 
inconsistent in stating his position, it seems that his view 
is that the moral law is the exclusive direct determining 
ground of a good will, but it is not necessarily the sole 
determining ground. As Wike puts it, "[the moral law) is 
not the only determining ground of the will in any absolute 
sense since other determining grounds may operate 
Wrrhe Antichrist, no. 11, 577-578. 
91Victoria s. Wike, "Does Kant's Ethics Require 
That the Moral Law be the Sole Determining Ground of the 
Will?," Journal of Value Inquiry 27 (1993): 85-92. 
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indirectly."92 Therefore, other factors, such as, e.g., 
happiness, can be a determining ground of a good will. This 
does not mean that happiness can be the direct end of a 
categorical imperative. If happiness could be the end of a 
categorical imperative, then the distinction between 
categorical and hypothetical imperatives would collapse. 
But, as Wike shows, happiness still plays a large role in 
Kant's categorical ethics. on the one hand, she argues, 
"happiness may be pursued out of duty in order to facilitate 
the attainment of a direct end of a categorical 
imperative. " 93 On the other hand, practical reason, which 
for Kant is the source of categorical imperatives, "has 
happiness as one of its purposes and one of its ends."~ 
This small point of criticism should not distract us 
from the main point of Nietzsche's genealogical 
investigation into the origin of the moral consciousness. 
As we have seen, Nietzsche traces the formulation of the 
moral consciousness to the internalization or 
spiritualization of the legal conventions of the creditor-
debtor relationship. This conclusion has particular 
significance as a critique of Kant's moral methodology 
because it implies that we need not look to a priori grounds 
92Ibid. , 88. 
93victoria s. Wike, "The Role of Happiness in 
Kant's Groundwork," Journal of Value Inquiry 21 {1987): 78. 
~Ibid. 
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for explaining the possibility of the sense of duty and the 
moral law. The sense of duty may indeed accurately 
characterize the ordinary moral consciousness, but both can 
be accounted for, Nietzsche argues, purely in 
conventionalistic terms. In short, by providing an 
alternative account of the origin of the sense of duty in 
the relationship of creditor and debtor and in the 
internalization of cruelty Nietzsche renders moot Kant's 
attempt to establish the a priori foundations of morality. 
Nietzsche's discussion of the legal relationship 
underlying the genesis of the moral consciousness returns us 
to the juridical considerations I introduced in the previous 
chapter. In the previous chapter I argued that one aspect 
of Nietzsche's naturalistic opposition to antinatural 
moralities could be understood in terms of a distinction 
between two moral frameworks, i.e., one in which legislative 
considerations predominate and one in which judgmental 
considerations predominate. I discussed how the relative 
importance of judgment and legislation is not fixed, but 
rather changes within different moral contexts. 
On Nietzsche's view, most moral frameworks have 
prioritized judgment over legislation. This is clearly seen 
in the morality of custom, in which the legislation of 
values is almost completely subsumed under the authority of 
custom and tradition. Legislation remains possible in the 
morality of customs, but, as Nietzsche notes in Daybreak, it 
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remains "a dreadful, mortally dangerous thing. " 95 By 
reflecting on the history of the moral consciousness 
Nietzsche is trying to make this prioritization of judgment 
evident and to reveal its sordid origins: 
And, briefly, if you had thought more subtly, observed 
better, and learned more, you certainly would not go on 
calling this 'duty' of yours and this 'conscience' of 
yours duty and conscience. Your understanding of the 
manner in which moral judgments have originated would 
spoil these grand words for you, just as other grand 
words, like 'sin' and 'salvation of the soul' and 
'redemption' have been spoiled for you.% 
on the Genealogy of Morals is the locus classicus of 
Nietzsche's attempt to get to the root of moral judgment. 
In the next section I will offer an analysis of Nietzsche's 
master-slave dialectic in terms of the distinction between 
legislation and judgment. This in turn will allow me to 
explore the relevance of Nietzsche's analysis of the origin 
of the moral consciousness to Kant's conception of autonomy. 
Legislation Versus Judgment: 
Nietzsche's Master-Slave Dialectic 
On the Genealogy of Morals is, ostensibly, a polemic 
against the empiricist methodology and conclusions of 
~Daybreak, no. 9, 11: "Originally, therefore, 
everything was custom, and whoever wanted to elevate himself 
above it had to become lawgiver and medicine man and a kind 
of demi-god: that is to say, he had to make customs--a 
dreadful, mortally dangerous thing!" 
%The Gay Science, no. 335, 264. 
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English moral psycho-historians.~ Its deeper purpose, 
however, is to undertake a radical critique of moral values. 
As Nietzsche remarks in the preface, 
• . . the value of these values themselves must first 
be called into guestion--and for that there is needed a 
knowledge of the conditions and circumstances in which 
they grew, under which they evolved and changed. 98 
In this task, Nietzsche places himself in direct opposition 
to Kant, characterizing his genealogical inquiry into moral 
origins as the pursuit of an "anti-Kantian, enigmatic 
'categorical imperative.' 1199 
Nietzsche's first task in On the Genealogy of Morals is 
to overturn the empiricist hypothesis concerning the origin 
of the moral judgment contained in the concept "good." The 
empiricist thesis, as Nietzsche recounts it, holds that the 
judgment "good" is originally associated with unegoistic or 
altruistic actions. Unegoistic actions, it is argued, were 
called "good" from the standpoint of the recipient who 
experienced the benefits of the action. In other words, 
goodness reduced to utility for the recipient. Such actions 
~Although Nietzsche singles out "English 
psychologists" for special criticism, he also remarks in the 
preface to On the Genealogy of Morals, no. 4, 453-454, that 
his first impulse to publish his hypotheses about the 
origins of morality derive from his opposition to Paul Ree's 
Der Ursprung der moralischen Empfindungen, (1877). 
Nietzsche's remarks about Ree in on the Genealogy of Morals 
should be compared with his earlier, more favorable, 
assessment in Human, All Too Human, vol. 1, nos. 36-37, 31-
33. 
~Ibid., preface no. 6, 456. 
99Ibid., 453. 
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were always praised, but the ground of the praise, namely 
utility, was slowly forgotten. Because they were habitually 
praised and felt to be good, unegoistic actions came to be 
perceived as good in-themselves.too 
Nietzsche contends that the empiricist hypothesis 
concerning the origin of the judgment "good" is both 
psychologically untenable and historically inaccurate. It 
is psychologically untenable because it asks us to accept 
that the most obvious feature of an action, namely its 
utility, is something that could plausibly be forgotten. 10t 
It is historically inaccurate as well. Originally, 
Nietzsche maintains, the meaning of the term "good" was not 
determined by the recipient of the benefits of an altruistic 
action. Rather, the judgment "good" reflects the "pathos of 
distance" that divides the ruling class from the ruled, 
nobles from slaves: 
• • • the judgment 'good' did not originate with those 
to whom 'goodness' was shown! Rather it was 'the good' 
themselves, that is to say, the noble, powerful, high-
stationed and high-minded, who felt and established 
themselves and their actions as good, that is, of the 
first rank, in contradistinction to all the low, low-
minded, common and plebeian. t02 
In other words, the origin of the value judgments "good" and 
"bad" does not rest upon a distinction between unegoistic 
and egoistic actions. Rather, the value distinction between 
t00Ibid., first essay, no. 2, 461-462. 
totibid., no. 3, 463. 
t02Ibid., no. 2, 461-462. 
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"good" and "bad" rests ultimately on the relationship of a 
politically superior caste to an inferior one. This 
political relationship in turn reflects the relationship of 
a superior soul to an inferior one . 103 
Nietzsche justifies his claim by appealing to the 
etymological roots of the designations "good" and "bad" in a 
variety of different languages. In every case, Nietzsche 
argues, "good" designates qualities associated with the 
aristocratic class, i.e., "'with an aristocratic soul,' 
'noble,' 'with a soul of a high order,' 'with a privileged 
soul'. • 111°" In contrast to this, "bad" is universally 
associated with the low, common, and plebeian. 105 
Nietzsche refers to this conclusion as a "fundamental 
insight. 11106 What is the meaning of this insight? I take 
it that Nietzsche is offering two related theses. First, 
the value judgment "good" is neither purely normative nor 
purely descriptive, but rather mixed. Whether the 
descriptive or the normative element is emphasized is a 
function of the general moral framework in which the value 
judgment "good" is made. Second, within the framework of 
100Ibid, no. 6, 467. Nietzsche expresses this 
relationship as the general rule that "a concept denoting 
political superiority always resolves itself into a concept 
denoting superiority of soul ..•. " 
1
°"Ibid. , no. 4, 4 64. 
105Ibid. 
106Ibid. 
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master morality, the normative content of the judgment 
"good" is subordinated to its descriptive content. Thus, 
when a noble refers to a slave as "bad" and holds the slave 
in contempt, a value judgment with normative content is 
made. But the noble does not use the judgment "bad" to 
morally judge or condemn, but primarily to refer to the 
slave. Similarly, "good" within master morality is 
primarily a descriptive term that refers to the qualities 
possessed by members of the aristocratic class. As 
Nietzsche puts it, originally the term "good" referred to a 
"typical character trait. 11107 
Once we understand that within master morality the 
normative content of the value judgment "good" is 
subordinated to its descriptive content, the transition from 
master morality to slave morality becomes much clearer. 
Within slave morality the normative content of the value 
judgment "good" begins to dominate its descriptive content. 
"Good" takes on a distinctively moral sense and, as a 
result, value judgment takes on an increasingly moral tone. 
This shift in the relative priority of the descriptive 
and normative components of the judgment "good" is the 
result of a shift in the mode of value positing. Slave 
morality begins when the ressentiment of those ruled by the 
nobles "becomes creative and gives birth to values. 11108 
107rbid., no. 5, 465. 
108 b. d I 1 ., no. 10, 472. 
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Nietzsche characterizes this as a kind of compensatory 
valuation that takes the form of disguised revenge against 
the noble ruling class. The noble posits values in an 
active way, as "a triumphant affirmation of itself. 
11109 The slave, in contrast, posits values defensively, in 
reaction to the noble: 
. slave morality from the outset says No to what is 
'outside,' what is 'different,' what is 'not itself'; 
and this No is its creative deed. This inversion of 
the value-positing eye--this need to direct one's view 
outward instead of back to oneself--is of the essence 
of ressentiment. . 110 
The shift from an active to a reactive mode of value 
positing that marks the transition from a master to a slave 
morality generates a two-fold shift in the meaning of the 
value judgment "good." The positive judgment "good" loses 
its priority over the opposing negative value judgment. 
Within the framework of master morality, "good" is the 
primary or fundamental value, while its negative counterpart 
"bad" is merely an afterthought. The noble "conceives the 
basic concept 'good' in advance and spontaneously out of 
himself and only then creates for himself an idea of 
'bad'! 11111 Within the framework of slave morality, however, 
the negative value judgment "evil" becomes primary, while 
"good" is relegated to secondary status: 
109Ibid. 
llO!bid. 1 472-473. 
111 Ibid., no. 11, 475-476. 
133 
. • • picture 'the enemy' as the man of ressentiment 
conceives him--and here precisely is his deed, his 
creation: he has conceived 'the evil enemy,' 'the Evil 
One,' and this in fact is his basic concept, from which 
he then evolves, as an afterthought and pendant, a 
'good one' --himself! 112 
Accompanying this shift in the relative priority of 
positive and negative values is a shift within the elements 
internal to these value judgments. Within the framework of 
slave morality the normati~e component implicit in the value 
judgment "good" comes to dominate the descriptive component. 
The same is true of the judgment "evil," which has almost an 
exclusively normative content. Within slave morality, the 
judgment "evil" is not used merely descriptively to refer to 
the noble, but to morally condemn the noble. In other 
words, within the framework of slave morality we discover 
the origin of moral value judgments. 
So far I have characterized the shift from noble to 
slave morality in terms of three related conceptual shifts. 
The first is a shift from an active to a reactive mode of 
value positing. The second is a shift in the relative 
priority of positive and negative value judgments. The 
third is a shift in the relative balance of normative to 
descriptive content within value judgments. 
All three transformations that mark the shift from 
master to slave morality can be understood in terms of a 
more fundamental shift from a moral framework in which 
112Ib' d 1 • , no. 10, 475. 
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legislation is the dominant mode of valuation to one in 
which moral judgment is dominant. The shift from master to 
slave morality is not a shift from a moral framework 
composed exclusively of legislative considerations to one 
composed exclusively of judgmental considerations, but 
rather a shift to a moral framework in which legislation is 
subsumed under judgment. 
The shift from the primarily legislative framework of 
the master to the primarily judgmental framework of the 
slave involves a change in the degree to which legislative 
considerations are allowed to enter into moral deliberation. 
The primary activity of the noble is legislation: 
The noble type of man experiences itself as determining 
values; it does not need approval; it judges, 'what is 
harmful to me is harmful in itself'; it knows itself to 
be that which first accords honor to things; it is 
value-creating. 113 
Conversely, the primary activity of the slave is judgment. 
The slave creates values, but in a deficient manner. The 
slave's value creation is merely an inversion and 
condemnation of the existing value structure. The slave's 
value creation is not an original deed, but rather merely a 
means of self-defense against noble values, which are 
condemned. It does not express autonomous self-creation but 
rather a creation via negation. 
In the judgmental framework of the slave, the normative 
content latent in the noble's conception of value comes to 
113Beyond Good and Evil, no. 260, 395. 
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dominate and a value judgment becomes primarily a moral 
value judgment. With the emphasis on normative 
considerations comes a concern for the universal validity of 
values. Genuine values are now thought of as those that can 
be universally affirmed. This is directly opposed to the 
noble mode of valuation in which values were thought of as 
unique creations valid only for their creator. Only within 
the framework of slave morality is goodness identified with 
universality. 
This conclusion returns us to the issue of Nietzsche's 
relationship to Kantian morality. Given Nietzsche's 
emphasis on the noble's self-legislative activity in 
opposition to the slave's reactive value judgments, it might 
be argued that Nietzsche's master-slave distinction 
replicates Kant's autonomy-heteronomy distinction. There 
are more than merely superficial similarities between their 
views. In the Groundwork, Kant defines autonomy as "the 
property the will has of being a law to itself. 11114 In 
contrast, he defines heteronomy as the will's seeking its 
law from some object outside of itself . 115 There is at 
first glance a close parallel between Nietzsche's conception 
of the slave type and Kant's conception of a heteronomous 
will. As we have seen, Nietzsche's slave creates its 
conception of the good heteronomously, via negation of noble 
114Groundwork, 108. 
115Ibid. 
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values. There is also an apparent parallel between 
Nietzsche's portrayal of the noble type and Kant's 
conception of an autonomous will. Both Nietzsche and Kant 
associate the highest value with a will that is self-
legislating. For Kant, only such a will can possess genuine 
moral worth, while for Nietzsche only such a will possesses 
the noble qualities of character. 
The parallel between Nietzsche's master-slave 
distinction and Kant's autonomy-heteronomy distinction 
begins to break down, however, as we look closer at the 
content of their respective positions. For Nietzsche, 
master morality and slave morality represent two distinctive 
and contrasting moral frameworks that are distinguished by 
the relative priority given to value legislation. They are 
also distinguished by the fact that the former attributes 
the highest value to "the well-being of the few" while the 
latter attributes the highest value to "the well-being of 
the many." 116 There is ample evidence that Nietzsche views 
the moral systems of his time as forms of slave morality and 
that he wants to return to the framework of master 
morality. 1n This is consistent with Nietzsche's 
1160n the Genealogy of Morals, first essay, 
concluding note, 492. 
117Ibid., no. 17, 490-491: "Whoever begins at this 
point, like my readers, to reflect and pursue his train of 
thought will not soon come to the end of it--reason enough 
for me to come to the end, assuming it has long since·been 
abundantly clear what my aim is, what the aim of that 
dangerous slogan is that is inscribed at the head of my last 
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naturalistic reaction against antinaturalism. In particular 
it is consistent with Nietzsche's rejection of universal 
moral norms and their presupposition of moral equality. 
Within the framework of the master-slave dialectic it is the 
slaves who, out of ressentiment against the noble, are the 
preachers of equality par excellence. 
In contrast, Kant's distinction between autonomy and 
heteronomy does not represent two distinctive, independent 
moral frameworks. According to Kant, "autonomy of the will 
is the sole principle of all moral laws. 11118 Heteronomy, 
conversely, "is opposed to the principle of duty and to the 
morality of the will. " 119 In terms of content, autonomy is 
characterized negatively as independence from all material 
determinations of the will and positively by "the 
accompanying determination of choice by the mere form of 
giving universal law which a maxim must be capable of 
having. 11120 In other words, for Kant, an autonomous will is 
the same as a will directed by pure, practical reason. 121 
Therefore, from a Kantian perspective, Nietzsche's 
conception of slave morality would be a contradiction in 
book Beyond Good and Evil.--At least this does not mean 
'Beyond Good and Bad'--." 
118Critigue of Practical Reason, 31. 
119Ibid. 
120Ibid. 
121Ibid. 
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terms, i.e., it would represent an attempt to merge 
heteronomy and autonomy. Within the Kantian framework, 
autonomy and heteronomy are strictly separated. Thus, for 
Kant, Nietzsche's distinction of master and slave moralities 
would represent a complete misunderstanding of moral 
reasoning. 
There is a definite affinity between Nietzsche and Kant 
because both prioritize self-legislation. But there is also 
a conflict in the content of their respective criterion for 
self-legislation. To appreciate this conflict it is crucial 
to recognize that Nietzsche interprets Kant's views on the 
will's enactment of law in terms of both universalizability 
and generalizability.in Thus, as Nietzsche interprets it, 
a maxim that passes the test of Kant's categorical 
imperative, i.e., a maxim that can consistently be conceived 
to be a universal law, becomes from that moment on a 
possible general law governing the actions of every human 
being. It is precisely in these terms that Nietzsche reads 
Kant when he reduces Kant's norm of universalizability to 
the formula, "here everyone must judge as I do. 11123 If we 
provisionally accept Nietzsche's interpretation of 
universalizability it becomes easy to see why he would be 
inclined to view Kant's conception of the moral law 
inThe Will to Power, no. 283, 161: "· .. the 
'categorical imperative,' the essence of morality 'universal 
and general.'" 
inThe Gay Science, no. 335, 265. 
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contained in the categorical imperative as an expression of 
slave morality, because it is only with the transition from 
master to slave morality that making universal moral 
judgments becomes the dominant form of moral discourse. In 
other words, from Nietzsche's perspective, Kant's account of 
universalizability of maxims inadvertently undermines 
autonomy and, therefore, genuine human moral agency as both 
Kant and Nietzsche conceive of it. 
One of the main drawbacks of Kant's conception of 
universalizability, according to Nietzsche, is that it 
overlooks the difficulty of analyzing action. On 
Nietzsche's view, universalizability cannot be achieved, 
even in principle, because every action is unique. 
Nietzsche holds that every action past, present, and future 
has been or will be performed in "an altogether unique and 
irretrievable way." 1M We can call this Nietzsche's 
uniqueness principle of action. Because no two actions are 
the same, the categorical demand that "in this case 
everybody would have to act like this" can never be met. 
Regulation and rules may provide a semblance of identity 
between actions, but not actual identity. All regulations 
and rules of action "relate only to their coarse 
exterior. " 125 This implies that the true motives of action 
IM!bid. 
125Ibid. 
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resist all attempts at analysis . 126 Our opinions, 
valuations, and tables of values play a role in action in a 
general sense, but in any specific instance "the law of 
their mechanism is indemonstrable. 111n Considerations such 
as these would justify Nietzsche's rejection of Kant's 
criterion of universalizability as both inapplicable in 
practice and a product of slave morality. 
From a strictly Kantian perspective, it might be 
possible to challenge some of the fine points of Nietzsche's 
reading of Kant. It might be pointed out that it is one of 
the ironies of Nietzsche's critique is that the principle of 
opacity that he employs against Kant is one of the main 
principles underlying Kant's rejection of the attempt to 
ground morality on experience. Experience cannot provide a 
single unquestionable example of an action performed for the 
sake of duty. It is impossible to determine with any degree 
of certainty whether an action was performed for the sake of 
duty or from self-love because, 
•.. we can never, even by the most strenuous self-
examination, get to the bottom of our secret 
impulsions; for when moral value is in question, we are 
concerned, not with the actions which we see, but with 
their inner principles, which we cannot see. 128 
Like Nietzsche, therefore, Kant believes that the true 
1~Ibid.: "· .. as one contemplates or looks back 
upon any action at all, it is and remains impenetrable." 
127Ibid. 
128Groundwork, 7 5 . 
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intentions of an action remain opaque to analysis. This is 
one important reason why Kant avoids making either actions 
or intentions the object of moral evaluation. 129 As the 
above quoted passage clearly shows, for Kant, the issue of 
moral value is not a matter of action but of the principles 
of action. By making subjective principles, i.e., maxims, 
not actions, the object of moral evaluation, Kant could 
effectively challenge this aspect of Nietzsche's critique. 
Nietzsche's critical interpretation of the categorical 
imperative also loses some of its impact because it insists 
on reading Kant in heteronomous terms. This is seen in 
Nietzsche's potentially misleading reading of the test 
imposed by the categorical imperative in terms of the 
generalizability of actions rather than in terms of the 
universalizability of maxims. The former asks whether it is 
in fact possible for everyone to act in a certain way, the 
latter asks whether or not it is conceivable that a 
principle could be followed without exception without 
resulting in a self-contradiction. on Nietzsche's reading, 
Kant maintains that an action passes the test of the 
categorical imperative when an agent can judge that "in this 
case everybody would have to act like this. 11130 This is a 
common interpretation of Kant's categorical imperative, but 
it is not Kant's position. on Kant's view, duty is 
129Ibid., 67-8. 
1J0.rhe Gay Science, no. 335, 265. 
incompatible with the notion of generalizability that 
Nietzsche attributes to it because duty is purely self-
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referential. An autonomous will gives itself the law, but 
does not impose commands upon others. Since Kant identifies 
duty with autonomy, he associates any acceptance of the law 
from an alien source with heteronomy. 131 Moreover, the 
categorical imperative cannot be read as saying that 
"everybody would have to act like this" because it does not 
impose any positive commands. It merely provides a test to 
determine which maxims are permitted or forbidden if a will 
is to be considered as having genuine moral worth. 132 
Such misunderstandings implicit in Nietzsche's attack 
on the categorical imperative cause Nietzsche to exaggerate 
his differences with Kant and overlook their commonalities. 
I began this chapter with a quote from the transcendental 
dialectic of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason in which Kant 
remarks that the purpose of the dialectic is to lay the 
foundations for "moral edifices of . . . majestic 
dimensions." It is this passage that Nietzsche seizes on in 
order to demonstrate that Kant, like all philosophical 
architects since Plato, is laboring under the seductions of 
morality. The apparent intention of these philosophical 
system builders is the pursuit of truth. In fact, however, 
131Groundwork, 108. 
132Ibid., 107: "An action which is compatible. with 
the autonomy of the will is permitted; one which does not 
harmonize with it is forbidden." 
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Nietzsche maintains their intentions have always involved 
the construction of "'majestic moral structures': to employ 
once again the innocent language of Kant .. "133 
What Nietzsche does not remark upon is that the entire 
purpose of Kant's transcendental dialectic is to show that 
the kind of metaphysical knowledge required to construct the 
"majestic moral structures" dreamt of by the metaphysical 
tradition is beyond our reach. Kant's argument in the 
transcendental analytic of the Critique of Pure Reason is 
meant to show that a priori knowledge is possible only of 
objects of possible experience. Therefore, transcendent 
knowledge of God, freedom, and the immortality of the soul 
is not possible for human beings, given the nature of our 
manner of knowing. Thus, we lack the material with which to 
construct any majestic moral structures and must settle for 
something more modest: 
We have found, indeed, that although we had 
contemplated building a tower which should reach to the 
heavens, the supply of materials suffices only for a 
dwelling-house, just sufficiently commodious for our 
business on the level of experience, and just 
sufficiently high to allow of our overlooking it. 134 
In other words, according to Kant, we should design our 
moral "dwelling houses" to suit the needs appropriate to the 
kind of being that we are. This is the task that Kant 
alludes to in the introduction to the transcendental 
'"Daybreak, preface no. 3, 3. 
'~critique of Pure Reason, A 707/ B 735. 
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doctrine of method: 
• we must plan our building in conformity with the 
material which is given to us, and which is also at the 
same time appropriate to our needs.rn 
As I noted at the conclusion of the previous chapter, 
there is a close affinity between the spirit of Kantian 
autonomy and Nietzsche's call to become those we are, "human 
beings who are new, unique, incomparable, who give 
themselves laws, who create themselves. 11136 Both Kant and 
Nietzsche argue that autonomy is the defining feature of 
human moral agency. Despite this similarity, however, 
Nietzsche and Kant are divided over the issue of 
universalizability as a criterion of autonomy. As we have 
seen, Kant links autonomy to the universalizability of the 
will's maxims. Conversely, Nietzsche identifies 
universalizability with slave morality and antinaturalism. 
The antinaturalism of Kantian morality is one of the primary 
motivations behind Nietzsche's attempt to eliminate 
universality from the content of autonomy. In the next 
chapter I will argue that the final result of this effort 
can be found in the idea of the eternal recurrence. I will 
argue that the eternal recurrence can be read as an attempt 
to reconceptualize autonomy without the problematic aspects 
of universalizability that Nietzsche associates with Kant. 
136The Gay Science, no. 335, 266. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
THE ETERNAL RECURRENCE 
AND NIETZSCHE'S NATURALIZATION OF AUTONOMY 
Introduction 
The eternal recurrence is perhaps the most enigmatic of 
all of Nietzsche's ideas. One reason for the mysteriousness 
of the eternal recurrence is its ambiguity. Beginning in 
the early 1880's the eternal recurrence appears in 
Nietzsche's published and unpublished writings and manifests 
itself in a number of different guises. The eternal 
recurrence is cast as a scientifically provable cosmological 
hypothesis; as a metaphysical truth; as a quasi-religious 
prophecy; as a means of cultural enhancement; as a personal 
mystical experience; as a rejection of teleological 
conceptions of history; and as an existential principle of 
the affirmation of life. 
As I noted in my introductory chapter, one way that 
interpreters have tried to reduce this diversity of meanings 
is to interpret the eternal recurrence in either of two 
distinctive ways. For convenience, I refer to these two 
interpretations of the eternal recurrence as the 
"theoretical" and the "practical" interpretations, 
respectively. 
145 
146 
The theoretical interpretation of the eternal 
recurrence emphasizes texts in which Nietzsche appears to 
treat the eternal recurrence as a metaphysical or 
cosmological thesis. This version of the eternal recurrence 
holds that all events within the physical world repeat 
themselves in unending and invariable cycles. The practical 
interpretation of the eternal recurrence, conversely, 
emphasizes texts in which Nietzsche treats it as a practical 
prescription or imperative. On this interpretation, the 
eternal recurrence is thought to assert that we ought to 
live our lives as if all events repeated themselves in an 
unending cycle. Our ability to affirm the eternal 
recurrence of an action is taken as a test of the action's 
value. 1 
It has frequently been noted that some of Nietzsche's 
formulations of the eternal recurrence are very similar to 
at least some of the formulations of Kant's categorical 
imperative. 2 For example, in a note from 1881, Nietzsche 
10ne important distinction between the theoretical 
and the practical interpretations of the eternal recurrence 
is that the latter, unlike the former, is not dependent upon 
the factual truth of recurrence. At least on some prominent 
practical interpretations of the eternal recurrence, as we 
will see in the course of this chapter, it is not necessary 
for the eternal recurrence to be true. It must simply be 
taken to be true. That is, we are urged to act as if the 
eternal recurrence were true. 
2See, e.g., Bernd Magnus, Nietzsche's Existential 
Imperative (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978). 
Georg Simmel, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, trans. Helmut 
Loiskandl, Deena Weinstein, and Michael Weinstein (Amherst: 
University of Massachusetts Press, 1986), 171-172; Henry 
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writes: 
Meine Lehre sagt: so leben, dass du wtinschen musst, 
wieder zu leben ist die Auf gabe--du wirst es 
jedenfalls! 3 
In purely formal or syntactic terms this formulation of the 
eternal recurrence appears to be a hybrid of two versions of 
the categorical imperative, i.e., 
And, 
• • • handle nur nach derjeniqen Maxime, durch die du 
zuqleich wollen kannst, dass sie ein allqemeines Gesetz 
werde. 
.•. handle so, als ob die Maxime deiner Handlung 
durch deinen Willen zum allgemeinen Naturgesetze werden 
David Aiken, "An Introduction to Zarathustra," in Nietzsche: 
A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. Robert C. Solomon 
(Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1973), 129-130; 
J. M. Bernstein, "Autonomy and Solitude," in Nietzsche and 
Modern German Thought, ed. Keith Ansell-Pearson (New York: 
Routledge, 1991), 221; Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche & 
Philosophy, trans. Hugh Tomlinson (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1983), 68: "The eternal recurrence gives 
the will a rule as rigorous as the Kantian one." See also 
Karl Jaspers, Nietzsche: Einfilhrunq in das Verstandnis 
seines Philosophierens, third edition (Berlin: Walter de 
Gruyter, 1950), 356. Jaspers implies that there is a 
parallel between the eternal recurrence and the categorical 
imperative when he writes that the eternal recurrence is "· 
.. wie ein neuer ethischer Imperativ, der fordert, alles, 
was ich filhle, will, tue, bin, unter den Massstab zu 
stellen, ob ich es so vollziehe, dass ich es unendliche Male 
immer wieder so vollziehen mochte; anders ausgedrilckt, ob 
ich wollen kann, dass dies Dasein immer wieder so sei. Es 
ist eine blosse Form, deren Erfilllungsmoglichkeiten 
inhaltlich grenzenlos sind." See also Oscar Ewald, 
Nietzsches Lehre in ihren Grundbegriffen. Die ewige 
Wiederkunft des Gleichen und der Sinn des tibermenschen. 
Eine kritische Untersuchung (Berlin: Ernst Hofmann & Co., 
1903), 62: "Jede unserer Handlungen und Regungen soll den 
Anspruch auf Ewigkeit erheben dilrfen, soll der Ewigkeit wert 
sein. Der Mensch soll sein Dasein betrachten, als ob er es 
in jedem Augenblick filr ungezahlte Male reproduzierte." 
3KSA 9, no. 11(163], 505. 
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sollte. 4 
This parallel seems to lend credence to the idea that 
Nietzsche intends the eternal recurrence to function in a 
manner similar to the categorical imperative, i.e., as a 
directive principle of action. A parallel reading is also 
suggested by the special emphasis that both philosophers 
place on the will's autonomy. As I indicated in the 
preceding chapter, both Nietzsche and Kant associate genuine 
moral agency with the will's autonomous self-direction. But 
as I also indicated in the preceding chapter, the 
relationship between Nietzsche and Kant is complicated by 
Nietzsche's critique of Kant's antinaturalism. Therefore, 
the relationship between the eternal recurrence and the 
categorical imperative cannot be characterized as an 
unqualified parallel. The questions that this chapter will 
address is the following: In what way does Nietzsche's 
eternal recurrence offer a genuine alternative to Kant's 
conception of autonomy? 
The thesis that I will argue for in this chapter is 
that Nietzsche offers a reconceptualization of autonomy 
within a naturalistic framework. The eternal recurrence 
represents Nietzsche's attempt to use the insights of modern 
science, especially modern physics, to provide a 
naturalistic response to antinaturalism. In this sense, the 
4Kant, Grundlegung zur Metaphysic der Sitten, 
Werkausgabe vol. 7, ed. Wilhelm Weischedel (Frankfurt am 
Main: Suhrkamp Taschenbuch Wissenschaft, 1991), 51. 
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eternal recurrence completes the naturalistic revolution 
started by the hypothesis of the will to power. My 
interpretation focuses on Nietzsche's assertion that the 
eternal recurrence is "the most scientific of all possible 
hypotheses."5 I reject both the conventional theoretical 
and practical interpretations of the eternal recurrence as 
incompatible with Nietzsche's naturalistic framework. I 
interpret Nietzsche's thesis about the scientific character 
of the eternal recurrence in three complementary senses. 
Each sense corresponds to a different aspect of 
antinaturalism. 
First, the eternal recurrence is a thesis about 
knowledge, and the conditions of knowledge, within the 
naturalistic interpretive framework of the will to power. 
In this sense, the eternal recurrence is a response to the 
antinatural epistemological assumption that truth is the 
correspondence of a proposition with being, or a fixed, 
unchanging observational given. 
Second, the eternal recurrence is a response to the 
antinatural metaphysical assumption that the meaning of the 
world and human existence lies somewhere beyond the world in 
a metaphysical "true world" or Kantian "intelligible realm." 
The eternal recurrence represents the affirmation of 
existence, the insight that "(n]othing in existence may be 
5The Will to Power, no. 55, 36. 
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subtracted, nothing is dispensable •... " 6 Nietzsche calls 
this spirit of affirmation "amor fati." 7 
Finally, the eternal recurrence is the idea that makes 
possible a reconceptualization of autonomy in light of the 
experience of modern physics. Nietzsche's 
reconceptualization of autonomy begins with a rejection of 
the "atomistic need" for a neutral, independent moral 
subject in favor of a naturalistic reconceptualization of 
the self as a synthetic social structure of drives and 
affects. The eternal recurrence then draws upon the 
implication of modern physics that we can find no 
independent laws within nature and that, consequently, we 
must give ourselves laws in the face of total, eternally 
recurring meaninglessness if we want to live. In other 
words, the eternal recurrence offers a response to the 
antinatural privileging of moral judgment over moral 
legislation by giving full expression to the legislative 
character of human existence. 
This chapter begins with a discussion of the 
conventional theoretical interpretation of the eternal 
recurrence and a critical discussion of some of its 
problematic features. I then turn to a close reading of 
aphorism number 341 of The Gay Science, "The Greatest 
Weight," as the source of the conventional practical 
6Ecce Homo, "The Birth of Tragedy," no. 2, 728. 
7The Gay Science, no. 276, 223. 
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interpretation of the eternal recurrence. This will allow 
me to criticize some recent attempts to separate the 
theoretical and the practical aspects of the eternal 
recurrence. I then proceed to examine Nietzsche's thesis 
that the eternal recurrence is the most scientific of all 
possible hypotheses along the lines outlined above. 
The Theoretical Interpretation of the Eternal Recurrence 
In Ecce Homo Nietzsche refers to the eternal recurrence 
as "the unconditional and infinitely repeated circular 
course of all things. n8 This statement could be taken 
to indicate that Nietzsche thinks that the eternal 
recurrence is a scientific theory about the universe as a 
whole. In other words, Nietzsche's statement about the 
scientific character of the eternal recurrence could be 
taken to mean that the eternal recurrence is intended as a 
cosmological hypothesis. When construed mechanistically, 
this cosmological hypothesis postulates the circularity of 
time and the infinite, identical repetition of all events 
within time. What immediately stands out in this rendering 
of the eternal recurrence is its deterministic character. 
8Ecce Homo, "The Birth of Tragedy," no. 3, 729-730: 
"The doctrine of the 'eternal recurrence,' that is, of the 
unconditional and infinitely repeated circular course of all 
things ••.. " Cf. Seigfried, "Law, Regularity, and 
Sameness: A Nietzschean Account," 386. Seigfried argues 
that Nietzsche's description of the eternal recurrence in 
terms of the circularity of time represents a mechanistic 
misunderstanding of the idea of the eternal play of creation 
that is the true lesson of the eternal recurrence. 
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The spontaneity of actions and events is dissolved by the 
awareness that they have appeared within the same identical 
configuration of events an infinite number of times in the 
past and will reappear identically an infinite number of 
times in the future. All that remains unique is the 
totality of all events considered as a single, monolithic 
event. 
The premisses of the theoretical interpretation of the 
eternal recurrence can be reconstructed as follows. 9 
1. Time is infinite. 
2. Time is objective. 
3. Space is finite. 
4. The total amount of energy is limited. 
5. Energy is conserved. 
6. Logical principles and deductions are valid when 
applied to reality as a whole. 10 
From these premisses Nietzsche draws three related 
9My discussion of the cosmological interpretation of 
the eternal recurrence follows Jaspers, Nietzsche: 
EinfUhrung in das Verstandnis seines Philosophierens, 351-
354. I also rely upon Rose Pfeffer, "Eternal Recurrence in 
Nietzsche's Philosophy," The Review of Metaphysics 19 
(December 1965): 276-300. 
10Jaspers, Nietzsche, 352. Jaspers points out that 
Nietzsche's first three premisses are a Priori and 
indemonstrable. Jaspers also notes that Nietzsche's last 
premise, which Nietzsche implicitly assumes without 
argument, is at odds with Kant's insight, "dass Uber qas 
Ganze weder mit dem blossen Satz des Wiederspruchs noch auf 
andere Weise gUltige bestimmte Aussagen gemacht werden 
konnen, obgleich er [Nietzsche] deise Einsicht in anderem 
Zusammenhang besitzt." 
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conclusions. From the presupposition of the conservation of 
energy Nietzsche concludes that infinitely new becoming is 
impossible. 11 Infinitely new becoming presupposes a 
constant, infinite increase of power. If the total amount 
of energy is limited, however, only two alternatives remain. 
Either reality is tending towards a final end state of 
permanent equilibrium, or reality recurs in identical 
cycles. Nietzsche excludes the possibility of a final end 
state by appealing to the premise of infinite time. 
Granting the infinity of past time, if a final state of 
equilibrium were possible, it would have already been 
reached. 12 Therefore, if we accept Nietzsche's premisses, 
we appear forced to conclude that everything recurs. 
From the premise that space is finite and energy is 
limited, Nietzsche concludes that although the total number 
of possible energy configurations is enormous, it remains 
finite. Since, ex hypothesi, past time is infinite, every 
possible configuration of energy has already occurred. 
Therefore, every present occurrence of an event is, in fact, 
11The Gay Science, no. 109, 167. KSA 9, no. 11(213], 
525: "Das unendliche neue Werden ist ein Widerspruch, es 
wiirde eine unendlich wachsende Kraft voraussetzen. Aber 
wovon sollte sie wachsen!" See also The Will to Power, no. 
1063, 547: "The law of the conservation of energy demands 
eternal recurrence." 
12KSA 9, no. 11(245], 534: "Ware ein Gleichgewicht 
der Kraft irgendwann einmal erreicht worden, so dauerte es 
noch . • • denn bis jetzt ist schon eine Unendlichkeit 
verflossen. Wenn das Gleichgewicht moglich ware, so milsste 
es eingetreten sein." See also The Will to Power, no. 1062, 
546. 
a recurrence. Pfeffer points out that Nietzsche's claim 
should not be interpreted in the mechanistic terms of 
classical atomism, as the reconfiguration of atoms in an 
infinite void. Nietzsche rejects atomism, she argues, in 
favor of a "dynamic energetic theory of explanation. " 13 
What recurs, according to Pfeffer, is not the same 
configuration of atoms, but identical configurations of 
energy • 14 
Finally, because any state of equilibrium has been 
ruled out by the premise of infinite time, Nietzsche also 
rules out the possibility of being in the superlative, 
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metaphysical sense of enduring, unchanging substance. The 
world, as Nietzsche puts it in The Will to Power, is "'in 
flux,' as something in a state of becoming, as a falsehood 
always changing but never getting near the truth .... 1115 
13Pfeffer, "Eternal Recurrence in Nietzsche's 
Philosophy," 279. 
Mibid. See The Will to Power, no. 1067, 550. 
15The Will to Power, no. 616, 330. See also Ibid., 
no. 1066, 549. Nietzsche's arguments for the cosmological 
version of the idea of eternal recurrence are summed up in 
the following passage: "If the world may be thought of as a 
certain definite quantity of force and as a certain definite 
number of centers of f orce--and every other representation 
remains indefinite and therefore useless--it follows that, 
in the great dice game of existence, it must pass through a 
calculable number of combinations. In infinite time, every 
possible combination would at some time or another be 
realized; more: it would be realized an infinite number of 
times. And since between every combination and its next 
recurrence all other possible combinations would have to 
take place, and each of these combinations conditions·the 
entire sequence of combinations in the same series, a 
circular movement of absolutely identical series is thus 
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Although Nietzsche refers to the eternal recurrence as 
a cosmological hypotheses, it has frequently been remarked 
that this interpretation is open to numerous objections. It 
is inconsistent with many of Nietzsche's other ideas. For 
example, the endless repetition of all events implicit in 
this interpretation of the eternal recurrence is 
inconsistent with Nietzsche's thesis in "Long Live Physics!" 
that "· .. every action that has ever been done was done in 
an altogether unique and irretrievable way, and ... this 
will be equally true of every future action. . . . " 16 
Furthermore, it appears to be inconsistent with Nietzsche's 
frequent calls to humanity to create for itself new 
directives and goals of action. How can we create genuinely 
new goals of action if this life is merely the repetition of 
a previous life? 
The theoretical interpretation of the eternal 
recurrence is also inconsistent with Nietzsche's more 
general views about science and scientific procedure. In 
The Gay Science Nietzsche rejects consideration of any 
hypothesis that does not allow of experimental testing. 17 
demonstrated: the world as a circular movement that has 
already repeated itself infinitely often and plays its game 
in infinitum." 
~The Gay Science, no. 335, 265. 
17Ibid, no. 51, 115: "I favor any skeosis to which I 
may reply: 'Let us try it!' But I no longer wish to hear 
anything of all those things and questions that do not 
permit any experiment." 
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The eternal recurrence, however, does not seem amenable to 
such testing. There is no way to escape from the current 
total energy configuration to compare it with previous or 
future energy configurations to determine if they are, in 
fact, the same. Furthermore, science lacks the conceptual 
means to confirm or reject such a general hypothesis about 
the totality of the world. Therefore, the possibility of an 
empirical validation of eternal recurrence by conventional 
experimental procedures is ruled out. 
The theoretical interpretation of the eternal 
recurrence is also inconsistent with Nietzsche's views about 
logic. Nietzsche rejects the idea that logical principles, 
such as the principle of identity and the law of the 
excluded middle, establish substantive propositions about 
the world. Moreover, he has ruled out equilibrium, i.e., 
any fixed state of being. Therefore, to speak of a "state" 
and its "recurrence" appears to become meaningless if there 
is no way to anchor the idea of two states being the same 
state in a determinate conception of identity. 18 
Finally, Simmel has objected that a counter-example to 
Nietzsche's hypothesis based on his own premisses can be 
constructed. 19 Simmel asks us to imagine three wheels of 
equal size aligned on an axis with a mark on each wheel 
18Pfeffer, "Eternal Recurrence in Nietzsche's 
Philosophy," 281. 
19simmel, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, 172-173. 
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indicating the spot of alignment. If the wheels are set in 
motion at a ratio of n, 2n, and n/rr the initial alignment of 
points will never recur. 2° From this thought experiment 
Simmel concludes that "if there exists anywhere in the world 
three motions that are identical to the motion-relation of 
these three wheels, the relative positions taken by them 
could never return to their original relations."21 
Objections such as these may be taken as an indication 
why in his published works Nietzsche explicitly rejects the 
theoretical interpretation of the eternal recurrence as a 
trivialization of what he calls in Thus Spoke Zarathustra 
"my abysmal thought. 1122 Within the context of Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra, we find perhaps the most literal expression of 
the theoretical interpretation of the eternal recurrence in 
the chapter entitled "The Convalescent." In this text the 
eternal recurrence is parroted by Zarathustra's animals: 
Everything goes, everything comes back; eternally rolls 
the wheel of being. Everything dies, everything 
wibid. The configuration will never recur given the 
nature of rr, which precludes n/rr being a whole number if n 
is a whole number greater than zero. 
21 Ibid., 173. See also Walter Kaufmann, Nietzsche: 
Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist, Fourth Edition 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974), 327. 
Kaufmann accepts Simmel's counter-example as a definitive 
refutation of the truth of eternal recurrence as a 
cosmological hypothesis. Cf. Bernd Magnus, Nietzsche's 
Existential Imperative, 91-93, and Gilnter Abel, Nietzsche: 
Die Oynamik der Willen zur Macht und die ewige Wiederkehr, 
197-199. 
22Thus Spoke Zarathustra, "On the Vision and the 
Riddle," no. 2, 269. 
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blossoms again; eternally runs the year of being. 
Everything breaks, everything is joined anew; eternally 
the same house of being is built. Everything parts, 
everything greets every other thing again; eternally 
the ring of being remains faithful to itself. In every 
Now, being begins; round every Here rolls the sphere 
There. The center is everywhere. Bent is the path of 
eternity.n 
Upon hearing this, Zarathustra calls his animals "buffoons 
and barrel organs!"M I agree with Jaspers' assessment that 
the simplicity of the theoretical interpretation of the 
eternal recurrence, especially as summarized in the above 
quoted passage, destroys its philosophical significance. 25 
The Practical Interpretation of the Eternal Recurrence 
In light of the difficulties associated with the 
theoretical interpretation of the eternal recurrence, an 
attempt has been made in recent years to establish the 
thesis that the primary significance of the eternal 
recurrence lies in the practical, rather than the 
theoretical, sphere. One prominent strategy shifts the 
focus completely away from considerations of the truth or 
falsity of the eternal recurrence. On this view, the 
theoretical aspects of the eternal recurrence are irrelevant 
to the practical and psychological impact that Nietzsche 
nibid., "The Convalescent," no. 2, 329-330. 
Mibid., 330. 
~Jaspers, Nietzsche: Einfilhrunq in Das Verstandnis 
Seines Philosophierens, 350: "Meint man jedoch, in dieser 
einfachen Vorstellung den philosophischen Gehalt der Lehre 
zu haben, so irrt man. Die Glatte der Lehre zerstort ihren 
Sinn." 
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thinks belief in the eternal recurrence would have on human 
life. 
There is some textual evidence that can be cited in 
support of this change in tactics. Nietzsche remarks in his 
notes, for example, that the potentially transformative 
effect on human life of the eternal recurrence does not 
necessarily require that it be true. He holds that the 
probability of its truth, or even the mere possibility of 
its truth, is sufficient to have a dramatic and 
transformative effect on human beings. 26 In support of this 
he cites the effect on people that the possibility of 
eternal damnation has had. 27 
Textual support for the separation of the practical 
from the theoretical interpretation of the eternal 
recurrence is also based on the fact that Nietzsche's 
literary corpus is divided into his published works and a 
large body of unpublished notes referred to collectively as 
the "Nachqelassene Fragmente." As Ivan Soll notes, 
Nietzsche's concern with the theoretical aspects of the 
eternal recurrence as a cosmological hypothesis is 
restricted almost exclusively to the Nachgelassene 
Fragmente. There we find Nietzsche's numerous efforts to 
26KSA 9, no. 11(203), 523-524: "· .. auch der 
Gedanke einer Moglichkeit kann uns erschilttern und 
umgestalten, nicht nur Empf indungen oder bestimmte 
Erwartungen!" 
27Ibid., 524. 
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demonstrate the truth of the eternal recurrence through 
arguments based on empirical generalizations and a priori 
premisses. Conversely, in Nietzsche's published works we 
find virtually no effort to argue for the truth of the 
eternal recurrence. In his published works the eternal 
recurrence is often presented as a hypothetical thought 
experiment or in an oracular fashion. On the basis of 
Nietzsche's apparent reluctance to publish his theoretical 
speculations, Soll concludes that we are justified in the 
belief that Nietzsche is less concerned with the theoretical 
truth of the theory than with "people's attitudes and 
reactions to this theory.nu In other words, Nietzsche's 
publishing history seems to indicate that he gives priority 
to the practical over the theoretical interpretation of the 
eternal recurrence. 
A similar line of argumentation is pursued by 
Maudemarie Clark. She extends Soll's conclusion by arguing 
that the existential affirmation of the eternal recurrence 
does not depend upon the theoretical truth of the doctrine. 
Instead, she holds that affirming the eternal recurrence, 
"requires the willingness to live one's life again, not the 
belief that one will, even as a 'mere possibility.'"~ As 
uivan Soll, "Reflections on Recurrence: A 
Reexamination of Nietzsche's Doctrine, die Ewige Wiederkehr 
des Gleichen," in Nietzsche: A Collection of Critical 
Essays, 323. 
29Maudemarie Clark, Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 252. 
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is the case with Soll, we find in Clark's argument an effort 
to separate the practical or existential relevance of the 
idea of recurrence from its theoretical implications. on 
her view, as on Soll's, the theoretical status of the 
eternal recurrence is practically irrelevant. 
Most practical interpretations of the eternal 
recurrence take as their point of departure a text from The 
Gay Science entitled "The Greatest Weight." This is a 
critical text for understanding the practical interpretation 
of the eternal recurrence. It is one of the first 
appearances of the eternal recurrence in Nietzsche's 
published works, and it contains what I take to be one of 
Nietzsche's clearest statements of the practical force of 
the eternal recurrence as a directive principle. For the 
sake of accuracy and convenience, I will first quote the 
entire text in full, and then undertake an analysis of it. 
What, if some day or night a demon were to steal 
after you into your loneliest loneliness and say to 
you: 'This life as you now live it and have lived it, 
you will have to live once more and innumerable times 
more; and there will be nothing new in it, but every 
pain and every joy and every thought and sigh and 
everything unutterably small or great in your life will 
have to return to you, all in the same succession and 
sequence--even this spider and this moonlight between 
the trees, and even this moment and I myself. The 
eternal hourglass of existence is turned upside down 
again and again, and you with it, speck of dust!' 
Would you not throw yourself down and gnash your teeth 
and curse the demon who spoke thus? Or have you once 
experienced a tremendous moment when you would have 
answered him: 'You are a god and never have I heard 
anything more divine.' If this thought gained 
possession of you, it would change you as you are or 
perhaps crush you. The question in each and every 
thing, 'Do you desire this once more and innumerable 
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times more would lie upon your actions as the greatest 
weight. Or how well disposed would you have to become 
to yourself and to life to crave nothing more fervently 
than this ultimate eternal confirmation and seal?30 
In this passage, Nietzsche poses a thought experiment. 
He asks us to envision our possible reaction to a 
hypothetical situation in which a demon confronts us with 
the fact of the eternal recurrence. Nietzsche himself does 
not present the eternal recurrence as a fact, but as an 
imaginary situation. There is no indication here that 
Nietzsche takes the eternal recurrence to be a cosmological 
hypothesis of any kind. Rather, it is the demon who 
presents the eternal recurrence as a fact, when it states 
"'This life as you now live it and have lived it, you will 
have to live once more and innumerable times more. I II 
Nietzsche's use of a demon to report the fact of the 
eternal recurrence to us is significant for a number of 
reasons. It calls to mind the malicious demon of the second 
of Descartes' Meditations on First Philosophy. Descartes' 
malicious demon was a posit of the methodological doubt that 
Descartes employs as a means of establishing an indubitable 
foundation for the sciences. The malicious demon possesses 
unlimited power to deceive us about the veracity of our 
perceptions. By employing a demon as the messenger of the 
eternal recurrence Nietzsche may be alluding to Descartes' 
3
°The Gay Science, no. 341, 273-274. Unless 
otherwise indicated, all quotations in this section will 
refer to this text. 
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demon, perhaps implicitly warning us not to be taken in by 
what the demon is reporting. This reading finds some 
support in the fact that both demons share the quality of 
being malicious, although Descartes does not animate his 
demon or allow it to speak for itself. Aside from this 
circumstantial evidence, however, there does not appear to 
be any reason to identify Nietzsche's demon with Descartes'. 
The choice of a demon as the messenger of the eternal 
recurrence can perhaps be explained better by reference to 
the inherently antiteleological sentiment contained in the 
demon's message. If all events in the universe are going to 
eternally recur, and have in fact occurred innumerable times 
in the past, then this means that history does not begin 
with any original event nor is it progressing towards a 
goal. such an idea is at odds with a Christian 
understanding of history as beginning with the creation and 
culminating with the final judgment. Therefore, given the 
tacit opposition of the eternal recurrence and the Christian 
conception of history, a demon may in fact be the ideal 
choice as messenger. 
Nietzsche's demon informs us of two things: the fact of 
the eternal recurrence and the implications of this fact. 
The demon tells us that our lives as we have lived them up 
to the present moment will be infinitely repeated. He then 
immediately informs us what this infinite repetition 
involves. On the one hand, it means the elimination of the 
164 
possibility of novel content in our lives. Our lives will 
eternally recur and in them "there will be nothing new ... 
" On the other hand, it means that, not only the content, 
but the succession of the content will be absolutely 
identical: "every joy and every thought and sigh and 
everything unutterably small or great in your life will have 
to return to you, all in the same succession and sequence. . 
" 
The demon does not initially ask us if we could live 
the rest of our lives knowing that the eternal recurrence is 
true. Nor does the demon ask us to deliberate and make 
choices in light of it. Rather, the demon is gauging our 
reaction to the lives we have led up to the present in terms 
of the newly revealed fact of the eternal recurrence. It is 
as if we have been living in ignorance of a crucial piece of 
information that now changes our understanding of the 
meaning of our entire existence. 
The eternal recurrence is announced to us in a state of 
unpreparedness. We have simply been pursuing the course of 
our lives when, suddenly, at a random moment ("some day or 
night") we are confronted with the eternal recurrence as a 
fact. Nietzsche amplifies the severity of the effect of the 
news by having it revealed to us when we are feeling most 
insignificant, in our "loneliest loneliness." The demon 
emphasizes our insignificance by referring to us as a _speck 
of dust. 
165 
Our reaction to the demon's message acts as a test of 
our attitude towards the lives we have led up to this point. 
What would our reaction be to the demon's message? One 
possible reaction is that we would experience the eternal 
recurrence as the greatest weight. Imagine the case of a 
person who had spent an entire life miserably performing 
some duty for the sake of a future reward, a final, eternal 
rest, which, because of the fact of the eternal recurrence, 
is never going to be attained. How would this person react 
to the demon's message? Would this person be filled with 
regret for the things that they have done or left undone? 
Would they now view the life they have pursued as pointless 
and wasted? Would they collapse into a furious heap and 
"curse the demon who spoke thus?" 
To experience the eternal recurrence as the greatest 
weight is symptomatic of a negative attitude towards life. 
Such a reaction would be understandable. But, on 
Nietzsche's view, it is not the only possible reaction. 
Even in the case of the person described above it is 
possible for that person to have experienced a "tremendous 
moment" such that the demon's message would be embraced as 
the greatest blessing rather than the greatest weight. In 
this case, it is possible that this person would say to the 
demon, "'You are a god and never have I heard anything more 
divine.'" 
Up to this point, Nietzsche has characterized the 
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eternal recurrence as a test of our disposition or attitude 
towards our past. The thought experiment of the demon 
forces us to consider the lives we have lived, so to speak, 
under the aspect of the eternal recurrence. This experiment 
prepares us for Nietzsche's real objective, which is to 
determine whether or not we can live the rest of our lives 
as if they are going to eternally recur. In this sense the 
eternal recurrence serves as a life-directing principle. 
Nietzsche writes that if the eternal recurrence "gained 
possession" of us we would be transformed or perhaps even 
destroyed. Concerning every future choice we are faced 
with, the question we are supposed to ask ourselves is this: 
"'Do you desire this once more and innumerable times more .. 
1131 As in the case of our past lives, this question 
might be experienced as the greatest weight, one that is 
paralyzing. If, however, we are able to become well-
disposed to ourselves and our lives, we might view the 
eternal recurrence as the "ultimate eternal confirmation and 
seal" of our life. 
One problem with this test is that it is not clear how 
the question, "Do you desire this once more and innumerable 
times more?" could transform one's way of life or direct 
what one does. One interesting suggestion is that the 
31KSA 9, no. 11(143], 496: "Wenn du dir den Gedanken 
der Gedanken einverleibst, so wird er dich verwandeln~ Die 
Frage bei allem, was du thun willst: 'ist es so, dass ich es 
unz~hlige Male thun will', ist das gr6sste Schwergewicht." 
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eternal recurrence functions as an evaluative criterion or 
test of value analogous to Kant's categorical imperative. 
The similarities between the practical interpretation of the 
eternal recurrence and Kant's categorical imperative have 
not gone unnoticed. 
Simmel argues that the eternal recurrence gives weight 
to seemingly insignificant actions by asking us to consider 
the possibility of their infinite repetition. He argues 
that the eternal recurrence forces us to understand our 
responsibility for our actions in a different way. Simmel 
holds that this different way of understanding our 
responsibility amounts to a transposition of the categorical 
imperative's criterion of universalizability into a temporal 
dimension. 32 On Simmel's view, the Kantian criterion of 
universalizability is simply a means to allow the true 
meaning of individual actions to stand out. Considering an 
action in terms of its suitability as universal law 
multiplies the action and makes its inner value more 
prominent. 33 He argues that the eternal recurrence performs 
essentially the same function. The intrinsic character of 
an action is not changed by considering its possible 
infinite repetition, "but in light of such repetition, as 
32Simmel, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, 171. 
330ne of the shortcomings of Simmel's argument is a 
conflation of actions and the maxims of actions. Only the 
latter can be considered as possible universal laws of 
nature, on Kant's view. 
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under a microscope meanings become visible that are 
overlooked in a fleeting world of the only-once. 1134 The 
main difference between the eternal recurrence and the 
categorical imperative, Simmel holds, lies in the fact that 
repetition, unlike universalizability, does not generate 
universal norms of action. 35 
Simmel's analogy between the eternal recurrence and the 
categorical imperative is not without controversy. In 
contrast to Simmel, Magnus argues that the eternal 
recurrence is an "existential imperative": live in such a 
way that you must wish to live again.~ Magnus sums up his 
existential interpretation of the eternal recurrence in the 
following passage: 
That which possesses value is that which can be willed 
into eternity. With the loss of an absolute instrument 
for judgment of conduct, the 'that' which can be willed 
is no longer a single act, but a mode of being; a life. 
Whether or not life is worthy of infinite repetition 
becomes Nietzsche's principle of redemption and 
selection. 37 
Magnus points out that the eternal recurrence possesses an 
ethical meaning when interpreted in this manner, but he 
sharply distinguishes it from the normative meaning of 
"Ibid.: "Kant places action into the dimension of 
infinite repetition in the one-alongside-the-other of 
society, whereas Nietzsche has action repeat itself in the 
infinite one-after-the-other of the same person." 
36Magnus, Nietzsche's Existential Imperative, 
preface, xiii-ix. 
37 b'd I l. ., 139. 
169 
Kant's categorical imperative. on Magnus' view, an analogy 
between the eternal recurrence and the categorical 
imperative cannot be supported because, unlike the eternal 
recurrence, "the positive value of Kant's deontological 
ethics is to be found in the criterion of universalizability 
when applied to specific acts, without regard to their 
consequences. " 38 
A similar conclusion is reached by Kaufmann. Kaufmann 
argues that any analogy between the eternal recurrence and 
the categorical imperative is misleading because the eternal 
recurrence appeals to one's psychological reaction to the 
consequences of the mere thought of the infinite repetition 
of an action.~ Like Magnus, Kaufmann also stresses that 
Nietzsche's primary concern is not with particular actions 
but with "the state of being of the whole man--and those who 
achieve self-perfection and affirm their own being and all 
eternity, backward and forward, have no thought of the 
morrow. "40 
Leaving aside the issue of how one can have 'no thought 
of the morrow' and be a consequentialist, it is important to 
note that both Magnus and Kaufmann assume that the eternal 
recurrence is intended as a test of the value of one's life 
38Ibid. 
~Kaufmann, Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, 
Antichrist, 322. 
40Ibid. 
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as a whole, or one's mode of being. They maintain that this 
is opposed to the categorical imperative, which tests the 
moral value of specific acts. Magnus' and Kaufmann's 
arguments are inconclusive, however, because they fail to 
take into account ambiguities present in both Nietzsche's 
formulations of the eternal recurrence and Kant's 
formulations of the categorical imperative. In "The 
Greatest Weight" Nietzsche appears to hold that the eternal 
recurrence is, contrary to Magnus' and Kaufmann's 
assertions, a test of actions, rather than one's mode of 
life: "The question in each and every thing, 'Do you desire 
this once more and innumerable times more would lie upon 
your actions as the greatest weight" (my emphasis) . 
Therefore, a dissimilarity between the eternal recurrence 
and the categorical imperative could not be established on 
these grounds, if we take the eternal recurrence as a test 
of the value of actions. 
Of course, there is an ambiguity in Nietzsche's 
practical formulations of the eternal recurrence. At times 
it appears to serve as a test of the value of individual 
actions, while at other times it appears to serve as a test 
of life, or of the value of one's mode of being. This 
latter version is especially apparent in the formulations of 
the eternal recurrence that most closely resemble the 
categorical imperative, e.g.: 
Meine Lehre sagt: so leben, dass du wtinschen musst, 
wieder zu leben ist die Auf gabe--du wirst es 
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jedenfalls ! 41 
Therefore, Magnus' and Kaufmann's cases for a difference 
between the eternal recurrence and the categorical 
imperative might be stronger if they were to argue that the 
eternal recurrence serves as a test of value of one's mode 
of life as a whole, while the categorical imperative serves 
as a test of the moral value of particular actions. 
Unfortunately, this strategy appears to be equally 
unsuccessful, but for different reasons. 
The key issue is the meaning one gives to Kant's 
conception of a maxim. The traditional interpretation of a 
maxim holds that it is a simple descriptive statement of a 
proposed action that is tested for moral worth by being 
raised to the level of universal law. This interpretation 
attempts to convict Kant of the absurd position that 
statements such as, e.g., "Open doors with your left hand 
rather than your right!" become moral obligations. 42 
To the contrary, however, it has been forcefully argued 
that this interpretation confuses what Kant would consider a 
"precept" with genuine maxims. This line of argumentation 
41KSA 9, no. 11(163], 505. 
42See, e.g., William Frankena, Ethics, Second Edition 
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1973), 32: "Is 
every maxim that does pass Kant's test a duty, as he 
sometimes seems to think? 'When alone in the dark whistle'-
-this seems to be a maxim one can will to be a universal 
law. If not, 'Tie your left shoestring first' clearly is. 
Yet, surely, neither of these rules can be regarded as a 
duty." 
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has been explored by Otfried Hoffe and Rildiger Bittner, 
among others. 43 They argue that propositions such as "Open 
doors with your left hand rather than your right!" are not 
to be regarded as maxims, but rather as precepts, i.e, rough 
and ready rules of thumb without any pretence of moral 
obligation. Genuine maxims, in contrast, are limited to 
those principles of action that possess the highest level of 
generality. They are not simple descriptive statements of 
an action but rather self-given principles of life. As 
Hoffe puts it, "Maximen beinhalten die Art und Weise, sein 
Leben als ganzes zu filhren--bezogen auf bestimmte 
Grundaspekte und allgemeine Situationstypen des Leben. 
1144 In Bittner's terms, maxims are "Lebensregeln" that 
express in general terms the kind of human being one wants 
to be: 
Sie enthalten den Sinn meines Lebens; wenn namlich 
'Sinn' nicht als transzendente Erfilllung, sondern 
einfach als die Weise genommen wird, in der ich mir 
dies Leben als ganzes denke, 'Sinn' nicht als Ziel, 
sondern als Richtungssinn verstanden.~ 
csee e.g., Onora O'Niell, Constructions of Reason: 
Explorations of Kant's Practical Philosophy, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989), chapter five, 
"Consistency in Action," 81-104. 
440tfried Hoffe, "Kant's kategorischen Imperativ als 
Kriterium des Sittlichen," in Ethik und Politik: 
Grundmodelle und -probleme der praktischen Philosophie 
(Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Taschenbuch Verlag, 1979), 90-
91. 
45Rildiger Bittner, "Maximen, " in Akten des 4. 
Internationalen Kant Kongresses, ed. Gerhard Funke (Berlin-
New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1974), 489. 
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One effect of this interpretation of Kant's concept of 
a maxim is that it allows the possibility of an 
interpretation of Kantian morality from the perspective of 
virtue theory.~ For my purposes the Roffe-Bittner line of 
argumentation is important because it undermines the other 
support upon which Magnus and Kaufmann could rest their case 
for a difference between the eternal recurrence and the 
categorical imperative. Both argue that the categorical 
imperative is intended as a means of testing individual 
actions while the eternal recurrence is intended as a means 
of giving direction to one's life as a whole. As Hoffe and 
Bittner make clear, however, the object of the test imposed 
by the categorical imperative is not a specific act, but 
rather the self-given life principles that determine the 
character of our lives. Therefore, a difference between the 
categorical imperative and the eternal recurrence cannot be 
established on this basis. 
Of course, Nietzsche's philosophical vocabulary differs 
radically from Kant's. He clearly does not describe the 
function of the eternal recurrence as a means of testing 
maxims or Lebensregeln for their moral value. Nevertheless, 
like the categorical imperative, the eternal recurrence 
appears to be directed at similarly general aspects of human 
life as a means of creating a personal ethos: 
~For a critique of this implication of the Hoffe-
Bittner line see Robert B. Louden, "Kant's Virtue Ethics," 
Philosophy 61 (October, 1986): 473-489. 
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Wem das Streben das hochste Gefilhl giebt, der strebe: 
wem Ruhe das hochste Gefilhl giebt, der ruhe; wem 
Einordnung Folgen Gehorsam das hochste Gefilhl giebt, 
der gehorche. Nur moge er bewusst darilber werden. was 
ihm das hochste Gefilhl giebt, und kein Mittel scheuen! 
Es gilt die Ewigkeit! 47 
In light of the preceding discussion, Simmel's thesis 
also demands modification. As we have seen, the categorical 
imperative tests for moral worth by asking if an agent's 
maxim or life-rule is self-consistent when considered as a 
universal law of nature. If the maxim cannot be a universal 
law without generating a self-contradiction, then, according 
to Kant, it has no moral worth. In a similar fashion, the 
eter~al recurrence provides a way to give direction to an 
entire life by asking us to consider every choice we make as 
if our choice, and the life in which it is integrated, were 
going to recur an infinite number of times. Nietzsche 
maintains that if we can press the form of eternity upon our 
choices, then our lives will possesses the highest value. 
Although this interpretation lends support to Simmel's 
hypothesis, the formulation of the eternal recurrence in 
"The Greatest Weight" still leaves many other crucial issues 
obscure and many questions unanswered. One question relates 
to an idea implicit in this passage, i.e., the idea that the 
value of an action is directly proportional to the degree 
that we can desire the action's hypothetical repetition. 
The highest value is thereby accorded to the action that we 
~KSA 9, no. 11(163), 505. 
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can desire to be infinitely repeated. And the person who is 
most well-disposed toward life is the person who could 
desire the infinite repetition of all of their actions. 
Unfortunately, Nietzsche gives no argument for why he takes 
the value of an action to be proportional to its desired 
repeatability, and when we look closer at this idea it is, 
in fact, far from obvious why he thinks this is the case. 
It seems counter-intuitive to say that value is 
proportional to desired repeatability. Generally speaking, 
the value of an action seems to be relative to its rarity, 
its uniqueness, or its difficulty. It might be possible to 
I 
imagine that numerous repetitions could increase the value 
of an action and that we could desire this. But could we 
desire the infinite repetition of an action? More 
importantly, is it possible to desire the infinite 
repetition of every action, which is precisely what 
Nietzsche is asking us to consider? This is problematic. 
If we could desire the infinite repetition of every action, 
this would in effect eliminate the possibility of 
distinguishing between everyday, mundane acts and truly 
important, once in a lifetime acts. Contrary to what 
Nietzsche seems to think, this levelling of action is at 
odds with his stated intention of providing a way to test 
our disposition toward life. The most well-disposed person 
is one who can desire the infinite repetition of each and 
every action. But if every action has infinite value, 
176 
because we can desire its infinite repetition, then no 
individual action is especially valuable. In other words, 
it becomes difficult to distinguish Nietzsche's conception 
of a person who is well-disposed toward life and a nihilist 
who believes that all actions are equally meaningless. 
Ultimately, this conclusion may be close to, although 
not identical with, Nietzsche's belief that the eternal 
recurrence represents "the most extreme form of nihilism: 
the nothing (the 'meaningless') , eternally! "48 But this 
should not be taken as implying that significant problems do 
not remain with the practical interpretation of the eternal 
recurrence. For although it is undeniable that Nietzsche 
lays a great deal of emphasis on the practical effects of 
the idea of eternal recurrence, I believe that an 
interpretation that is purely practical, as well as one that 
is purely theoretical, is at odds with the naturalistic 
spirit of Nietzsche's philosophy. Both the theoretical 
interpretation and the practical interpretation read into 
Nietzsche's texts a distinction between facts and values, 
theory and practice, that is precisely what Nietzsche 
condemns in his attacks on antinaturalism. It is just this 
separation of theory and practice that Nietzsche identifies 
with Kant's critical philosophy and that he endeavors to 
avoid in his own philosophy: 
Dangerous distinction between 'theoretical' and 
48The Will to Power, no. 55, 36. 
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'practical,' e.g., in the case of Kant, but also in the 
case of the ancients: --they act as if pure 
spirituality presented them with the problems of 
knowledge and metaphysics; they act as if practice must 
be judged by its own measure, whatever the answer of 
theory may be. 49 
On the basis of such remarks, I believe that we must reject 
the practical interpretation of the eternal recurrence 
inspired by "The Greatest Weight" as Nietzsche's definitive 
formulation. 
"The Most Scientific of All Possible Hypotheses" 
I believe that it is possible to avoid the problems 
inherent in the practical interpretation of the eternal 
recurrence by a closer examination of Nietzsche's statements 
that the eternal recurrence is "the most scientific of all 
possible hypotheses," and the Yes-saying spirit of amor fati 
is the idea "most strictly confirmed and born out by truth 
and science.nm Most interpretations of these remarks 
insist on an overly narrow construal. Thus the eternal 
recurrence is taken to be the most scientific hypothesis in 
the sense of being the most general or encompassing 
scientific hypothesis about the universe. In effect, this 
shifts the idea of eternal recurrence into the domain of 
metaphysics. Nietzsche's critique of metaphysics is thus 
rendered self-def eating if the eternal recurrence can only 
Gibid., no. 458, 251. 
50Ibid. , no. 55, 3 6. Ecce Homo, "The Birth of 
Tragedy," no. 2, 728. 
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be understood as a metaphysical principle about reality as a 
whole. 
Beginning from the supposition that Nietzsche's 
naturalism precludes a metaphysical reading of the eternal 
recurrence, I would like to suggest the following 
reconstruction of Nietzsche's assertion that the eternal 
recurrence is the most scientific of all possible 
hypotheses. I argue in this section that Nietzsche's 
remarks on the scientific character of the eternal 
recurrence must be taken in three senses, each of which 
corresponds to a different aspect of antinaturalism. First, 
the eternal recurrence is a theory about knowledge 
(including scientific knowledge), and the conditions of 
knowledge, within the interpretive framework of the will to 
power. Second, the eternal recurrence represents 
affirmative spirit of science and presents a life-affirming 
alternative to antinatural metaphysics. Finally, the 
eternal recurrence is a reconceptualization of autonomy in 
light of the experience of modern physics. In short, the 
eternal recurrence is the culmination of Nietzsche's attempt 
to provide a naturalistic alternative to antinaturalism. 
The Naturalization of Epistemology 
The eternal recurrence is a thesis about knowledge and 
the conditions of knowledge within the interpretive 
framework of the will to power. As a theory about science 
and knowledge, the eternal recurrence addresses the question 
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of how knowledge is possible if we reject the possibility of 
being in the sense of an enduring substrate of appearance. 
It has often been maintained that the degree of knowledge 
corresponds to the degree of being of what is known. 
Knowledge of appearance is of a lower quality. Only 
knowledge of being, i.e., of that which is fixed and 
eternal, is considered genuine knowledge. In the context of 
science, a related idea can be found in the form of the 
belief that a true hypothesis is one that corresponds to a 
fixed, independently existing observational given. 51 The 
validity or truth of a hypothesis corresponds directly to 
its accuracy in accounting for this fixed, observational 
given and in its ability to allow us to make predictions 
about its future behavior. 
In the context of my discussion of Nietzsche's critique 
of antinaturalism in chapter two I indicated why he rejects 
the identification of truth with the correspondence of a 
proposition with conceiver independent being. I also 
indicated why Nietzsche rejects as antinatural the idea that 
truth, in the superlative metaphysical sense, is the supreme 
value. on Nietzsche's view, human life requires the 
creation of simplifying schemas, logical fictions, which are 
necessary to organize experience, but are not literally 
true. Given that untruth is a necessary condition of life, 
in the sense described above, the idea that truth is the 
51Seigfried, "Law, Regularity, and Sameness," 374. 
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supreme value is antilife, and therefore, antinatural. 
Nietzsche maintains that the association of the highest 
values, such as truth, with being results in a corresponding 
condemnation of the realm of becoming. 52 This does not 
imply that Nietzsche thinks that we should shift our 
attention from reality to appearance. Such a move would 
simply be the implicit re-affirmation of a radical 
opposition between a true world and the world of appearance. 
By rejecting the true world of being, Nietzsche makes it 
clear that he is rejecting the opposition of the true world 
and the apparent world as well: 
The true world--we have abolished. What world has 
remained? The apparent one perhaps? But no! With the 
true world we have also abolished the apparent one. 53 
Consequently, we are left with this world as a world without 
being, in a perpetual state of becoming. And if truth 
requires being, then, in a world without being, it follows 
that there can be no truth: 
The world with which we are concerned is false, i.e., 
is not a fact but a fable and approximation on the 
basis of a meager sum of observations; it is 'in flux,' 
as something in a state of becoming, as falsehood 
always changing but never getting near the truth: for 
there is no 'truth.'~ 
52The Will to Power, no. 617, 330: "From the values 
attributed to being proceed the condemnation of and 
discontent with becoming, after such a world of being had 
first been invented." 
53Twilight of the Idols, "How the True World Finally 
Became a Fable: History of an Error," 486. 
54~T~h~e~W~1-·1~1~t~o~P~o~w~e~r, no. 616, 330. 
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Therefore, it seems as though without being there can be no 
truth either in the superlative, metaphysical sense or as 
understood by the realistic conception of science. 
Thus far Nietzsche's point is that without being there 
can be no knowledge either in the metaphysical sense or in 
the realistic sense. Does this imply that the quest for 
knowledge must be abandoned altogether? Some have reached 
this conclusion, Nietzsche maintains, and it is for them a 
source of despair. For some, the collapse of the belief 
that there is one definitive meaning of existence has been 
generalized into the belief that there is no meaning in 
existence at all. At this point, nihilism appears: 
One interpretation has collapsed; but because it was 
considered the interpretation it now seems as if there 
were no meaning at all in existence, as if everything 
were in vain. 55 
But, on Nietzsche's view, this conclusion is premature. 
If there is no truth in the superlative sense, this 
should not unduly disturb us, according to Nietzsche, 
because the value of the world does not lie in truth, but 
"in our interpretation."~ Even the truths that have been 
the most enduring are simply interpretations, i.e., 
simplifying schemas thought to have value for life. And 
every new interpretation and valuation must overcome a 
preceding interpretation. This implies that this new 
"Ibid, no. 55, 35. 
~Ibid., no. 616, 330. 
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interpretation must be, in a sense, 'stronger' than the one 
it replaces, i.e., more comprehensive, more capable of 
opening up new perspectives and new horizons of exploration. 
In other words, it must represent a greater will to power: 
That the value of the world lies in our interpretation 
(--that other interpretations than merely human ones 
are perhaps somewhere possible--); that previous 
interpretations have been perspective valuations by 
virtue of which we can survive in life, i.e., in the 
will to power, for the growth of power; that every 
elevation of man brings with it the overcoming of 
narrower interpretations; that every strengthening and 
increase of power opens up new perspectives and means 
believing in new horizons--this idea permeates my 
writings. 57 
The interpretive paradigm created by the hypothesis of 
the will to power bears directly on the problem of truth. 58 
If truth requires being, then there can be no truth if one 
denies being, as Nietzsche does. But an approximation of 
being can be provided by means of an interpretation that we 
bring to experience. Through our interpretative frameworks 
we can attain "truths" and "knowledge," with the proviso 
that the knowledge gained will never be absolute, but always 
perspectival, i.e., always the product of our valuations. 
Our truths will no longer be Truth, i.e., propositions about 
a fixed, conceiver-independent reality, but truths relative 
to the presuppositions and postulates of our 
57Ibid. 
58The following operational and interpretational 
account of the eternal recurrence is indebted to Hans· 
Seigfried, "Law, Regularity, and Sameness: A Nietzschean 
Account." 
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interpretational schemes. 
Interpreting the character of stability into becoming 
by means of logical fictions is what makes "knowledge" in a 
limited sense possible. 59 such knowledge requires a 
"deception" on the part of the senses and reason "to 
preserve a world of that which abides, which is 
equivalent. 1160 The relative permanence of the phenomenal 
world, the regularity and stability of appearance, need not 
be located in an enduring substrate of being. On 
Nietzsche's view, the stability of the phenomenal world lies 
in the relative stability of the simplifying schemas that we 
use to organize experience. In other words, the reality of 
the phenomenal world, 
••. lies in the continual recurrence of identical, 
familiar, related things in their logicized character, 
in the belief that here we are able to reckon and 
calculate. 61 
From Nietzsche's fragmentary account we now have all of 
the parts necessary to state the first sense of the eternal 
recurrence as the most scientific of all possible 
hypotheses. The eternal recurrence represents the idea that 
by continually bringing simplifying schemas to the 
meaningless flux of becoming, we make it thinkable, and 
hence are able to live. The eternal recurrence must be 
59Human, Al 1 Too Human, no. 1 , 1 . 
~he Will to Power, no. 617, 330. 
~Ibid., no. 569, 307. My emphasis. 
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postulated to account for identity, stability, and 
predictability in a naturalistic conceptual framework that 
has rejected being. In other words, the eternal recurrence 
must be assumed in order to understand Nietzsche's account 
of identity, stability, and predictability in terms of the 
will to power. As Nietzsche puts it in The Will to Power, 
"[to) impose upon becoming the character of being--that is 
the supreme will to power. " 62 Actual being is not created 
by these simplifying schemas, but rather the appearance of 
being, i.e., the stability and permanence of phenomena. 
In this sense, the eternal recurrence, together with the 
idea of the will to power, is the most scientific of all 
possible hypotheses because it is the basis of all 
knowledge. 
The Naturalization of Metaphysics 
The eternal recurrence represents a naturalistic, life-
affirming alternative to antinatural metaphysics. An 
antinatural metaphysics, as I discussed in chapter two, is 
one that devalues life and the world by projecting a 
metaphysical "true world" as the source of the highest and 
most genuine values. In Thus Spoke Zarathustra Nietzsche 
refers to those who talk of the true world and speak of 
otherworldly hopes as "poison-mixers" and "despisers of 
62 b'd I 1 ., no. 617, 330. 
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life."~ Their creation of a metaphysical world is 
attributed to suffering and a weariness "that wants to reach 
the ultimate with one leap, one fatal leap. . " 64 
A naturalistic metaphysics, in contrast, would be life-
affirming. Rather than attempting to locate the meaning of 
the world somewhere beyond nature in a true world, or 
Kantian intelligible realm, or beyond history, as the end or 
telos of history, a naturalistic metaphysics would seek the 
value of the world within the world itself. The eternal 
recurrence demands that the meaning of the world must be 
created by the will to power within the world. It is the 
extreme antidote to the extreme position of antinatural 
metaphysics. 65 
Rejecting the ascetic, life-denying ideals of 
antinatural metaphysics, a naturalistic metaphysics contains 
the opposite ideal: 
the ideal of the most high-spirited, alive, and world 
affirming human being who has not only come to terms 
and learned to get along with whatever was and is, but 
who wants to have what was and is repeated into all 
eternity, shouting insatiably da capo--not only to 
himself but to the whole play and spectacle .•.. M 
In Thus Spoke Zarathustra Nietzsche's ideal of a world 
~Thus Spoke Zarathustra, "Zarathustra's Prologue," 
no. 3, 125. 
64Ibid., "On the Afterworldly," 143. 
MThe Will to Power, no. 55, 35: "Extreme positions 
are not succeeded by moderate ones but by extreme positions 
of the opposite kind." 
MBeyond Good and Evil, no. 56, 258. 
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affirming human being, one who could affirm the eternal 
recurrence, is symbolized by the figure of the "overman." 
In the prologue of Thus Spoke Zarathustra Zarathustra 
proclaims the coming of the overman. "Man" is described as 
merely a transitional stage between beast and overman. The 
overman is symbolic of Nietzsche's attempt to naturalize 
metaphysics and provide humanity with an ideal that does not 
express contempt for the earth: 
'Behold, I teach you the overman. The overman is the 
meaning of the earth. Let your will say: the overman 
shall be the meaning of the earth!~ 
The overman embodies the Dionysian affirmation of existence 
that Nietzsche refers to as "amor fati"--love of fate. 
N~etzsche asserts that his experimental philosophy 
anticipates the possibility of the deepest nihilism. The 
negation of the true world could be seen as the most 
devastating blow to all ideals. But Nietzsche insists as 
well that it is not the intent of his philosophy to halt at 
negation. Rather, his philosophy attempts 
to cross over to the opposite of this--to a Dionysian 
affirmation of the world as it is, without subtraction, 
exception, or selection--it wants the eternal 
circulation. . • .~ 
One aspect of amor fati is the affirmation of the 
necessity of the seemingly chance events of existence. 
Occasionally, Nietzsche expresses this as the somewhat banal 
~Thus Spoke Zarathustra, "Zarathustra's Prologue," 
no. 3, 125. 
68The Will to Power, no. 1041, 536. 
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notion that "everything that happens to us turns out for the 
best."69 Another aspect of amor fati is more demanding. It 
is a desire to affirm not merely existence, but the 
necessity and desirability "of those sides of existence 
hitherto denied. . • • 1170 Denial of the true world, and the 
corresponding faith in opposite values forces us to 
contemplate the possibility that the value of everything 
hitherto revered as good might lie in the fact that the good 
is "insidiously related, tied to, and involved with •.• 
wicked, seemingly opposite things .... " 71 In this sense, 
amor fati forces us to move beyond good and evil. 
Amor fati is also Nietzsche's challenge "to learn more 
and more to see as beautiful what is necessary in things •. 
n This desire to see as beautiful what is necessary 
explains why Nietzsche emphasizes science. According to 
Nietzsche, science, especially physics, can teach us how to 
be "the best learners and discoverers of everything that is 
lawful and necessary in the world. 1173 By recognizing 
necessity, science expresses the Dionysian affirmation of 
existence: 
This ultimate, most joyous, most wantonly extravagant 
69The Gay Science, no. 277, 224. 
7
°The Will to Power, no. 1041, 536. 
71 Beyond Good and Evil, no. 2, 200. 
nThe Gay Science, no. 276, 223. 
nibid., no. 335, 266. 
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Yes to life represents not only the highest insight but 
also the deepest, that which is most strictly confirmed 
and born out by truth and science. Nothing in existence 
may be subtracted, nothing is dispensable. . . .~ 
The Naturalization of Autonomy 
The Dionysian affirmation of existence contained in the 
spirit of science is not sufficient to explain completely 
Nietzsche's thesis that the eternal recurrence is the most 
scientific of all possible hypotheses. To understand this 
remark more fully we must recall Nietzsche's critique of the 
optimism contained in the theoretical attitude of 
positivistically conceived science in The Birth of Tragedy. 
The theoretical attitude holds that being can be corrected 
by knowledge and thus strives relentlessly to increase its 
store of knowledge. Eventually, however, the theoretical 
attitude forces its best representatives to face the insight 
that absolute knowledge will always remain out of their 
reach. In The Will to Power Nietzsche characterizes the "in 
vain" of the theoretical attitude in its most extreme form 
as the eternal recurrence of meaninglessness: 
Let us think this thought in its most terrible form: 
existence as it is, without meaning or aim, yet 
recurring inevitably without any finale of nothingness: 
'the eternal recurrence. ' 75 
On Nietzsche's view, this insight into the meaninglessness, 
the "in vain" of the theoretical attitude is demanded by 
~Ecce Homo, "The Birth of Tragedy," no. 2, 728. 
~The Will to Power, no. 55, 35. 
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"the energy of knowledge and strength. • • • 1176 It 
represents, as Nietzsche puts it, "the most extreme form of 
nihilism: the nothing (the 'meaningless'), eternally!"" 
The insight generated by the theoretical attitude of 
the eternal recurrence of the meaningless has important 
implications for Nietzsche's reconceptualization of 
autonomy. If we are willing to accept Nietzsche's Dionysian 
insight into the meaninglessness of existence, then we 
confront the idea that we can no longer look behind the 
world, to a Kantian intelligible realm. for example, for 
directives of human action. The lesson of the theoretical 
attitude, especially as contained in modern physics, is that 
we alone are responsible for creating the conceptual rules 
and laws that make experience possible and manageable, and 
thus empower us to continue with life. 78 From this it 
follows that, if we are to live authentically, we must 
actively give ourselves laws to live by. Only by learning 
the lesson of modern physics can•we attain the goal of 
becoming those we are, i.e., "human beings who are new, 
76Ib'd 36 l. • , • 
"Ibid. See also Hans Seigfried, "Nietzsche's 
Natural Morality," Journal of Value Inquiry 26: 426: "'What 
is certain,' Nietzsche claimed, is that we have not yet been 
able to find any such inscriptions and ready-made truths, 
and that the force of our past efforts suggests that we 
never will." 
78Hans Seigfried, Autonomy and Quantum Physics: 
Nietzsche. Heidegger, and Heisenberg, Philosophy of Science 
57 (1990): 624. 
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unique, incomparable, who give themselves laws, who create 
themselves. 1179 
Nietzsche's reconceptualization of human autonomy in 
light of the experience of modern physics does not stop with 
this insight into the source of autonomy. Nietzsche extends 
his conclusions to the fundamental basis of moral agency--
the neutral, independent moral subject. 
Within the framework of antinaturalism, moral agency is 
conceived in terms of a neutral, independent moral subject, 
or self, that is subject to universal moral norms. 
Nietzsche's naturalism rejects this conception of the moral 
subject. As a result, Nietzsche is able to reject the 
metaphysical conception of a free will and offer a 
conception of human agency constructed within the limits of 
naturalism. 
On Nietzsche's view, the idea of a neutral, independent 
moral subject is a product of slave morality "prompted by an 
instinct of self-preservation in which every lie is 
79The Gay Science, no. 335, 266. See also, Hans 
Seigfried, Autonomy and Quantum Physics, 624: "For if there 
were any laws in the world of experience which were not the 
product of human organization to which we must submit and 
which limit our self-creation, then they would have to be 
the laws which appear to be inscribed in a fixed nature and 
its solid states of affairs (Sachzwanqe). But, ironically, 
it is in the natural sciences and physics where we finally 
come to realize that the whole world of experience is the 
product of our organization. . . . It is therefore in the 
spirit of physics that we can 'become those we are' at last, 
and say about ourselves what the voice in the burning bush 
said to Moses ('I Am who I Am', Exodus 3:14)." 
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sanctified. 1180 The slave has created the concept of the 
moral subject in order to hold the master morally 
responsible for his expressions of strength. In creating 
the concept of the moral self, the slaves exploit a 
fundamental "seduction of language. 1181 The essence of this 
fundamental linguistic error is to assume that all effects 
are the product of something that can spontaneously chose to 
cause an effect. This cause is referred to as the neutral, 
independent subject. 
The assumption of a neutral, independent moral subject 
can be understood as the product of uncritical thinking, 
which implicitly projects an underlying substratum behind a 
deed. Nietzsche uses the example of a flash of lightning. 
The popular mind, Nietzsche maintains, separates the deed, 
the flash, from an underlying substratum, the lightning--in 
effect doubling the deed. 82 But, on Nietzsche's view, 
there is no such substratum; there is no "being" behind 
doing, effecting, becoming; "the doer'' is merely a 
fiction added to the deed--the deed is everything. 83 
In their ressentiment against the master, the slaves exploit 
this feature of language in order to morally condemn the 
master. The slave maintains that 
80on the Genealogy of Morals, second essay, no. 13, 
482. 
81Ibid., 481. 
83Ibid. 
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the strong man is free to be weak and the bird of prey 
to be a lamb--for thus they gain the right to make the 
bird of prey accountable for being a bird of prey.M 
To overcome slave morality it is necessary to overcome the 
notion of the neutral, independent moral subject that is 
intrinsic to it. Nietzsche finds the clue to overcoming the 
slave's conception of the neutral, independent moral subject 
in an unexpected source--modern physics. 
Nietzsche cites the work of Boscovich as crucial for 
overcoming materialistic atomism in physics. By 
understanding atoms as centers of force, rather than as 
infinitely small particles, Boscovich allows us "to abjure 
the belief in the last part of the earth that 'stood fast'--
the belief in 'substance,' in 'matter,' in the earth-
residuum and particle-atom. " 85 
Nietzsche believes that Boscovich's achievement in 
physics should be extended, and used to root out the last 
vestiges of the metaphysical "atomistic need." Nowhere is 
this need more apparent than in "the soul atomism," i.e., in 
the neutral, independent moral subject. on Nietzsche's 
view, it is not necessary to eliminate "the soul," per se. 
Rather, he suggests refining the soul-hypothesis. This 
would allow the possibility of conceiving of the soul as 
"subjective multiplicity" or "as social structure of drives 
85Beyond Good and Evil, no. 12, 210. 
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and affects."M 
This latter conception of the soul as a social 
structure of drives and affects has dramatic implications 
for the traditional conception of freedom of the will and 
autonomy. This can be seen by comparing Nietzsche's 
conception of the free will with Kant's. 
Recall that for Kant, autonomy requires the rational 
self-legislation of the will. Autonomy requires the will be 
free in the superlative metaphysical sense, i.e., not 
determined by the necessary physical laws that govern the 
world of appearance. This is problematic for Nietzsche for 
two reasons. On the one hand, it forces Kant to emphasize 
the role of universalizability in moral agency. On 
Nietzsche's view, as I discussed in the previous chapter, 
this effectively undermines Kant's attempt to establish a 
morality based on the priority of the will's self-
legislation because universalizability is the primary 
vehicle of moral judgment. 
On the other hand, by identifying an autonomous will 
and a free will, Kant separates morality from the empirical 
world of nature and history. In Daybreak Nietzsche makes 
his point in a polemical manner when he writes: 
In the face of nature and history, in the face of the 
thorough immorality of nature and history, Kant was, 
like every good German of the old stamp, a pessimist; 
he believed in morality, not because it is demonstrated 
in nature and history, but in spite of the fact that 
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nature and history continually contradict it.n 
Thus, according to Nietzsche, by separating the will from 
all empirical determinations, Kant must appeal to a 
metaphysical afterworld and create a conception of the 
autonomous will as a causa sui. It is this picture of the 
will that Nietzsche has in mind in Beyond Good and Evil when 
makes the following remark: 
The desire for 'freedom of the will' in the superlative 
metaphysical sense . . . the desire to bear the entire 
and ultimate responsibility for one's actions oneself, 
and to absolve God, the world, ancestors, chance, and 
society involves nothing less than to be precisely this 
causa sui and, with more than Milnchhausen's audacity, 
to pull oneself up into existence by the hair, out of 
the swamps of nothingness. 88 
This notion of freedom of the will represents to Nietzsche 
"the best self-contradiction that has been conceived so 
far," and demands a reconceptualization within a 
naturalistic framework.~ 
Nietzsche's critique of the metaphysical idea of the 
free will is the result of an analysis of human volitional 
action. The will is spoken of "as if it were the best known 
thing in the world, ... " But Nietzsche counters that 
philosophers have oversimplified the complex structure of 
willing.~ This oversimplification is the result of 
noaybreak, preface no. 3, 3. 
uBeyond Good and Evil, no. 21, 218. 
89Ibid. 
~Ibid., no. 21, 218. Willing is described as a 
complex phenomenon that is "a unit only as a word." 
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interpreting the act of willing in mechanistic terms as the 
relation of a neutral, independent subject (cause) and an 
action (effect). On Nietzsche's analysis, willing is not 
the product of a unified subject acting as a cause, but 
rather a synthesis of sensitive, rational, and emotive 
components of the "social structure" of the self into a 
hierarchy. 
The first component of willing is sensation. The 
sensitive component of willing is active on more than one 
level. At the first level of analysis are the states "away 
from which" and "towards which. 1191 This level of sensation 
appears to refer to what is conventionally called the object 
of intention. At the next level of analysis is "the 
sensation of this 'from' and 'towards' themselves. 1192 The 
sensations of "from" and "towards" appear to refer to the 
intentional act itself, rather than to the object of 
intention. The final sensitive component in willing is 
physiological. It consists in the muscular sensations that 
correspond to the sensations of "from" and "towards" but 
which are prior to any actual motion. 93 
Since this muscular sensation corresponds to the 
sensations of "from" and "towards" and yet precedes physical 
movement, it appears that Nietzsche is implying that the 
~Ib1'd., 19 215 no. , . 
93Ibid. 
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various sensations that comprise the sensitive component of 
willing do not occur simultaneously, but rather 
sequentially. The introduction of a temporal element would 
necessitate the introduction of a causal means to connect 
the various sensitive elements into a unity. It is highly 
unlikely that this is what Nietzsche intends, however, given 
that he is attempting to undermine the causal efficacy of 
willing. Therefore, it seems best to conclude that the 
appearance of a sequential relationship between the various 
sensitive factors in willing is an illusion resulting from 
Nietzsche's analysis, and that the sensitive factors occur 
concurrently in any act of willing. 
The second main component in the synthetic structure of 
willing is a rational component. Unfortunately, Nietzsche 
does not say much about this aspect of willing, except to 
indicate that in every act of the will there is a "ruling 
thought" that is indispensable: "--let us not imagine it 
possible to sever this thought from the 'willing' as if any 
will would then remain over!"94 Although Nietzsche's 
remarks on this rational component are sketchy, they at 
least indicate that he thinks that reason is a necessary 
component of volition. Moreover, by referring to the 
rational component as a "ruling" thought, Nietzsche implies 
that the rational component of willing in some sense governs 
the sensitive component. 
94Ibid. 
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Nietzsche does not discuss the relationship between the 
sensitive and rational components of the will in detail. 
The introduction of a third main component in willing, 
however, gives an indication of how this relationship might 
be understood. 
The third main component of willing is the emotive 
component--the "affect of command." Nietzsche indicates 
that the emotive component of the will is its most 
significant feature. 95 In all willing there is a relation 
of commanding and obeying. It is accompanied by the 
focusing of attention on a single aim and by the "inward 
certainty that obedience will be rendered. . n96 In 
short, 
A man who wills commands something within himself that 
renders obedience, or that he believes renders 
obedience. 97 
The tendency to attribute willing to a unified, 
substantial ego has resulted in a misunderstanding of the 
causality of the will. Philosophers have come the think 
that "willing suffices for action."~ Nietzsche argues that 
since in a great majority of cases there is an exercise of 
will only when the resulting action was to be expected, "the 
appearance [i.e., of a necessary connection of the will as 
95Ibid. 1 215. 
96Ibid., 215-216. 
97Ibid. , 216. 
98Ibid., 216. 
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cause and the action as effect] has translated itself into 
the feeling, as if there were a necessity of effect."~ 
Willing and action have become identified. The successful 
outcome of volition comes to be identified with the will 
itself as a unique form of causality. 
Having interpreted the will as a synthetic social 
structure of drives and affects consisting of sensitive, 
rational, and emotive elements, Nietzsche draws the 
implications of his analysis for the moral-metaphysical 
doctrine of the free will. If willing is not conceived as 
the action of a unified, substantial ego, but rather as a 
synthesis of commanding and obeying elements within the 
synthetic social structure of the self, then one eliminates 
the need to create a unique form of causality {i.e., 
freedom) to account for the will's ability to legislate for 
itself. The conception of free will becomes unnecessary to 
account for autonomy. 
Does Nietzsche's rejection of the free will imply that 
he is embracing determinism? This is not the case. With 
the dissolution of the free will, the opposing idea of an 
unfree will vanishes as well. Nietzsche argues that the 
idea of the unfree will, i.e., the will completely 
determined by causal necessity, is the result of a 
reif ication of the "conventional fictions" of cause and 
~Ibid. 
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effect. 100 This is precisely what Kant does when he employs 
the appearance-thing-in-itself distinction as a means to 
postulate the possibility of transcendent freedom. Kant 
seeks to escape what he interprets as the disastrous 
implications for morality of universal causal necessity. On 
Nietzsche's view, however, Kant's reaction against the 
implications of causality is exaggerated: 
In the 'in-itself' there is nothing of 'causal 
connections,' of 'necessity,' or of 'psychological non-
freedom'; there the effect does not follow the cause, 
there is no rule of 'law. ' 101 
Nietzsche's reference to the "in-itself" should not be 
read in terms of Kant's thing-in-itself. Nietzsche is not 
referring to a transcendent, conceiver independent realm, 
but rather to the empirical world in the absence of an 
interpretation. Nietzsche's point is that our observation 
of causal necessity is the result of an interpretation that 
has been imposed upon the empirical world: 
It is we alone who have devised cause, sequence, for-
each-other, relativity, constraint, number, law, 
freedom, motive, and purpose; and when we project and 
mix this symbol world into things as if it existed 'in-
itself,' we act once more as we have always acted--
m¥00thologically. The 'unfree will' is mythology ... 
This conclusion implies that we should abandon the 
identification of an autonomous will and a will that is free 
IOOibid. , 219. 
101Ibid. 
IOOibid. 
in the superlative, metaphysical sense. On Nietzsche's 
view, the notion that autonomy requires a special form of 
causality, namely freedom, is simply misguided because it 
has uncritically presupposed a unified conception of the 
will. Interpreted in terms of an internal relation of 
commanding and obeying, autonomy can be expressed as "the 
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affect of superiority in relation to him who must obey: 'I 
am free, "he" must obey'--this consciousness is inherent in 
every will. 11100 This affect of superiority produces a 
"complex state of delight" in the person who exercises 
volition and interprets any overcoming of obstacles as the 
direct result of this volition. 1™ As a result, the 
opposition of a free will and an unfree will is eliminated 
and replaced with a distinction between strong and weak 
wills: 
The "unfree will" is mythology; in real life it is only 
a matter of strong and weak wills. 105 
Nietzsche does not conceive of an autonomous will as 
one that is free, but rather as one that is strong. This is 
interesting because, unlike freedom, strength is not a 
metaphysical absolute. Strength is a relative term that 
admits of varying degree. If autonomy is thought of as a 
quality possessed by a strong will, and if there are varying 
103Ibi' d. I 19 216 no. , . 
1™Ibid. 
105Ibi' d., 21 219 no. , . 
degrees of strength, then it seems reasonable to conclude 
that there are varying degrees of autonomy as well. 
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This is exactly the conclusion we should expect as a 
result of my earlier examination of Nietzsche's naturalistic 
opposition to antinatural moralities. As I argued above, 
the essential feature of Nietzsche's naturalism is a shift 
in moral discourse from a framework in which moral judgment 
is given priority over legislative considerations to a 
framework that gives priority to legislation over judgment. 
This shift is consistent with the idea that there can be 
varying degrees of autonomy depending upon the particular 
moral framework under consideration. 
The idea of varying degrees of autonomy harmonizes well 
with Nietzsche's more general project of dissolving value 
oppositions and establishing a new order of rank among 
values. 1~ This project is morally relevant because it 
implies that moral deliberation can no longer be reduced to 
subsuming particular actions or intentions under one of two 
mutually exclusive polarized categories, such as good and 
evil. In other words, the dissolution of opposed moral 
categories forces moral discourse to move beyond moral 
judgment in this sense. 
Conclusion 
The idea that it is possible to reconstruct the eternal 
106ttuman, All Too Human, preface nos. 6-7, 9-10. 
202 
recurrence as a coherent response and alternative to 
traditionally conceived, i.e., antinatural, morality, might 
be anathema to many who read Nietzsche. I think that such a 
reaction is inappropriate and wholly out of keeping with the 
spirit of revaluation that inspires Nietzsche's philosophy. 
Nowhere is this clearer than in Nietzsche's attitude towards 
morality. I take it that Nietzsche is not asking us to 
abandon morality tout court, but rather to understand 
morality in a different way. This is why he can write in 
Daybreak: 
It goes without saying that I do not deny--unless I am 
a fool--that many actions called immoral ought to be 
avoided and resisted, or that many called moral ought 
to be done and encouraged--but I think the one should 
be encouraged and the other avoided for other reasons 
than hitherto. 107 
This dissertation has been an attempt to understand what 
these other reasons might be. In trying to clarify this 
issue I have examined three separate but related aspects of 
Nietzsche's philosophy. The first aspect of Nietzsche's 
philosophy that I examined centered around his conception of 
a naturalistic morality. I argued that Nietzsche's 
naturalism could be understood as an application of the 
principle of the will to power to the domain of human 
conduct. I attempted to show how the most important 
implication of the will to power was that it shifted moral 
discourse from a framework in which moral judgment is given 
107oaybreak, no. 103, 60. 
priority over moral legislation to a framework in which 
moral legislation is given priority over moral judgment. 
203 
Nietzsche's attempt to prioritize moral legislation 
made it crucial to examine his critique of Kantian morality. 
I argued that both Nietzsche and Kant attempt to construct 
moral philosophies in which legislative discourse 
predominates over judgment. In contrast to Kant, however, 
Nietzsche rejects the premise of human moral equality. 
Nietzsche views Kant's conception of universalizability, as 
formulated in the categorical imperative, as having 
implications that undermine Kant's attempt to create a 
morality based on legislative considerations. 
The last aspect of Nietzsche's philosophy that I 
examined was the eternal recurrence. I rejected the 
conventional theoretical and practical interpretations of 
the eternal recurrence as inconsistent with Nietzsche's 
naturalism. I argued that the eternal recurrence can 
plausibly be understood as one of the key principles, along 
with the will to power, of Nietzsche's naturalistic 
reconceptualization of autonomy. 
Each aspect of this study reflects a different facet of 
Nietzsche's hammer metaphor. As I showed in my opening 
chapter, the hammer metaphor represents the diagnostic, 
destructive, and creative aspects of Nietzsche's thought. 
Nietzsche's naturalism allows him to diagnose the problems 
of antinaturalism. Nietzsche's critique of Kantian morality 
illustrates the destructive aspects of his philosophical 
project. Finally, the creative aspect of Nietzsche's 
philosophy was illustrated by the idea of the eternal 
recurrence and the will to power that it requires. 
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I think that when taken together, these three aspects 
of Nietzsche's hammer metaphor reveal the revaluative 
character of his philosophy. It is particularly important 
to emphasize this aspect of Nietzsche's thought in the face 
of reductionistic accounts which attempt to trace each of 
Nietzsche's ideas to a previous philosopher. Clearly, there 
is a strong syncretistic element in Nietzsche's writings, 
but this should not be exaggerated to the point of 
overlooking his original contribution to philosophy. 
Conversely, it is also important to emphasize the 
revaluative and reconstructive character of Nietzsche's 
philosophy against many post-modern readings which tend to 
exaggerate the idiosyncratic aspects of his thought at the 
cost of detaching him completely from his historical 
context. By reading Nietzsche's ideas of the will to power 
and the eternal recurrence against the background of Kantian 
autonomy, I have attempted to do justice to the concerns 
with both the syncretistic and idiosyncratic elements of 
Nietzsche's thought while at the same time remaining 
faithful to his texts. This has not always been easy and 
this study is not the last word on anything--but it may be 
the first word on at least a few things. 
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